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INITIAL

REMARKS--DAHLHAUS

COURSE

Ostensibly, this course is about the thought of Carl Dahlhaus, and in many ways this would be a sufficiently adequate description. But in actuality we shall be "using" Dahlhaus not so much as an authority-figure, guru, or delphic oracle, but rather as a model or test-case for our own, larger concerns in 1990. In other words, beyond acquiring the ability to navigate through the specific thought of Dahlhaus, this course is even more fundamentally concerned with the dynamics of methodological crises--our own and the not entirely dissimilar one that faced German musicologists/literary critics in the 1960s and 1970s. For it now seems clear that in American musicology and music theory unexamined praxis--by which I mean research activity that takes its own legitimacy for granted, that is either unconcerned with its philosophical underpinnings or does not make them explicit and open to examination--the continuation of this sort of research is increasingly coming to appear naive. And it is very much on the run, under siege--probably in extremis, in a state of collapse. The most basic assumption of this course is: the present American musicological crisis of methodology was to a considerable extent foreshadowed in the German one of around 1960 to 1975 or 1980. As we begin to understand exactly what that crisis was, who its

principal players were, and just what issues were really at stake, I hope that we may help to clarify some of the issues that American musicology faces in the 1990s.

As students and practitioners of musicology we are living through turbulent times--probably the most turbulent that our discipline has ever seen. We have watched other disciplines--English, American Studies, Comparative Literature, Art History--undergo their own paradigmatic shifts in the 1980s, largely through the resurgence of various new literary-critical methods, competing structural-history theories, and resurgent Marxisms: this has been for those disciplines a real crisis of methodology, and we have watched this overturning of one set of methodological myths by another from the sidelines, knowing, I suspect, that it would happen to us--or should happen to us. And now it is happening to us.

It may not be too early for a prediction. I predict, then, that American musicology, which has for the past forty years and more by and large concentrated on purely musical and music-related questions, one which has actively engaged the textures of real music and real composers (as opposed to philosophical, social or methodological matters). I predict that the period from about 1987 to 2000 will be seen as a time when most of will have paid far more attention to issues of methodology and musical meaning than to issues of how music works as music per se. We have entered--and will enter further--into a crisis of methodology, and it will take some time for us to find our way out of it--if we ever do. What this means is that while in the past musicology students have tended to be musically knowledgeable--"musically literate," as it were--but

notably weak and naive in philosophy and methodology (the "why" of what they were doing), the new crop of musicologists will probably reverse this: they are more likely to be very sophisticated with regard to the problems of methodology and far less so with regard to any sense of music as an aesthetic experience, which includes a broad and deep knowledge of the canon itself (already a challenged concept)--a gap that we can only hope they will fill up by themselves. This is neither good nor bad, in itself, but it does suggest a radical paradigm shift for our discipline, and it does suggest that the proper training for graduate students in musicology is now one that stresses methodological questions: in short, one that thematizes the methodological crisis that is spelling the death of traditional training in musicology.

Our crisis has several complications that Dahlhaus never had to contend with. His issues were primarily those of the 1960s and early 1970s--the ever-stronger critiques of a now-enervated, eclectic positivism, the collapse of Geistesgeschichte, the rise of a new, strong variant of Marxism in the New Left, especially via the Frankfurt School, the impact of student activism, and so on--and he remained, so far as I am aware, essentially unconcerned such Franco-American things of the later 1970s and 1980s as Foucault's concepts of power and the archaeology of scientific reason, mainline structuralism, deconstruction, poststructuralism in general, feminism, and (what I suspect would have been the largest challenge he would have faced) postmodernist theory. Nevertheless, the factions and issues with which he did contend have by no means receded today, and in some instances they serve as the base-models

or at least partial guides by some of today's "isms." The point of this class, then, is to examine a methodological controversy--to understand it as fully as we can--and to determine to what degree the Dahlhausian contribution can remain an active player in our own controversies.

One word of caution: in the fast-breaking 1990s we are being bombarded with radically competing points-of-view, each of which aggressively proselytizes for followers, jockeys for academic power, and claims its own set of values while peremptorily dismissing others before they have been sufficiently investigated. In the fast-breaking 1990s, we have all been conditioned to make instant judgments: none of us wants to be left behind, so we have created an atmosphere that tells us we have to move quickly and decide quickly, embracing the "ism" du jour with full fervor and consigning the others to the outer regions. This is not what I want to happen in this course. In fact, I would be delighted if we could suspend judgment for a while--or at least mute our own beliefs in what we believe to be so certain. In this course I am far less concerned with judgment than with understanding.

And so our first task--and your first reading assignment after this session--will be to begin to understand the context out of which Dahlhaus's thought springs: a look at both the German Positivist Dispute of the 1960s and a cautious laying-out of Dahlhaus's repeated critiques of Marxism: it will take us two or three sessions simply to clarify the issues. The methodological point that I embrace here is simply that we ought not to read Dahlhaus naively, or "in the abstract." He is historically

grounded; something of a "period-piece" already. He is having his conversation not with us, but with a few, specific, highly educated Germans of the 1960s and 1970s--and 1) that conversation was already well underway when he began to write; hence it is the underlying network of assumptions guiding his argumentation; and 2) it is a conversation that is largely unknown to most American musicologists--although other disciplines seem to know it well enough. Thus the principle: To understand Dahlhaus, one must understand to whom he is speaking, with which thinkers he is taking issue, and with which thinkers he stands. We must seek out the opponents and the supporters that he is addressing: All of this is to be discovered behind and between the lines. And our first task, therefore, will be to "historicize" Dahlhaus--to try to get a grasp of the intellectual context in which he operated: Germany, 1960-80.

[TO DAHLHAUS----CAREER.....BOOKS.....

EVENTS IN GERMAN HISTORY

EVENTS IN GERMAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY.]

Merges traditional German Musikwissenschaft (an enclosed discipline with clear boundary-lines, etc.) with philosophy, criticism, and hermeneutics formerly outside the discipline. Goal: a philosophically aware musicology that can still produce results rather than becoming lost in methodological puzzles. (Highly impressed by Adorno → at <sup>in Musica</sup> death → "before, musicians were not philosophers, philosophers were not musicians -- Adorno set a new level at which one [and ought] to write about music." Adorno also → discovered... ∴ Main contribution: within the discipline (TWA an outsider) he combined its traditions with the problems of philosophy and methodology -- and he did this at a time of near-collapse for traditional musicology in Germany in the 60s and 70s → methodological crisis. Thus: CD raised the level of the conversation in musicology, far beyond the technical, into the philosophical... and also provided a strikingly new set of paradigms, or ways of seeing, music of the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, and 20<sup>th</sup> c.

Specialties: for all these things he gave us new ways of thinking.

larger concerns

- ① Music aesthetics, esp. 1750-1900 ["Autonomy"; "Originality"; "Music as Thought"; etc.]
- ② Philosophy of Theory [Esp → concepts of Arnold Schoenberg: "musical prose" "developing variation" "thinking in music," etc.]
- ③ Theories of Knowledge and Historical Methodology [as it intersected with the ongoing dialogue of 1950-75] -- Genre Theory

More specialized

- ④ Liszt and program-music
- ⑤ Richard Wagner: music and theoretical/philosophical writings
- ⑥ The problem of "Absolute Music" and Musical Autonomy from Beethoven to Schoenberg.

Problems ④ ⑤ ⑥ seem to motivate and guide his explorations into ① ② ③

CD: A Tale of 3 possible "conversations" to have ca. 1960-1980 in Germany.

① Hegelian-Marxist  
-- Critical Theory --  
(Dialectic)  
Adorno/Horkheimer/  
Habermas

② "Hermeneutics"  
and Phenomenology

③ Empirical Science.  
(tradition of Germany  
+ USA)

empirical  
via

CD: builds bridges here

CD: appears to conclude that this  
bridge is virtually unbuildable  
(regrettable conclusion ... still, it is  
a dialogue to be followed +  
attended to)

Cf. Habermas: Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968)

3 types of knowledge

② PRACTICAL

historical/hermeneutic  
(Verstehen) conversation  
with the past

①


TECHNICAL

(empiric/analytic sciences)

③ EMANCIPATORY  
(self-reflection  
critically-oriented  
sciences)

CD doubts the attainability  
of this.

# CD's Constellation of Main Theoretical Resources outside of music



as in P. Bürger's essay in Habermas, Observations

(to the left all of these are voices from the right, or voices of conservatism... This seems far fetched... E.D. Hirsch, more on the right, sees in Gadamer a dangerous radical relativist, etc. -- Basically non-political group (exc. for Heidegger?)  
 If not right, at least = non-left.



Americans began to intersect w/ Dahlhaus only in the very late 70s, and esp. in 1980s - 1980s = the decade that Dahlhaus hit Am. musicology + turned 19th-c studies upside down, challenging our narrow empiricism.

Picture of his thought emerged unclearly. out of context (hence: puzzling!) Translation.

(Kerman or agent)

German dates (original)

- 1979 Richard Wagner's Music Dramas (1971)
- 1980 Between Romanticism + Modernism (1974) Revolutionary ideas... but unclear where they were coming from.
- 1982 Esthetics of Music (1967) (no impact? (a puzzle...))
- 1982 Analysis and Value Judgment (1970) (unread...)
- 1983 Foundations of Music History (1977) { Nobody seems to have confronted this in earnest!! Seemed imp., but not widely understood... thought of as "difficult," etc... Hence w/o much influence -- yet.
- 1985 Realism in Nineteenth-Century Music (1982) More practical... more read.
- 1987 Schoenberg and the New Music <sup>1960s - 1980s</sup> (imp. coll. of essays -- most imp -- coll. 1988 from various dates!)
- 1989 Nineteenth-Century Music (1980) (magnum opus)
- 1989 The Idea of Absolute Music (1978)

hence = to us, it has been hard to order these ideas into developing thought

1946 - Darmstadt Summer Courses

1948 - Leibowitz at Darmstadt (Schubert discovered)  
1949 Adorno: Philosophie der neuen Musik  
49 - Messiah at Darmstadt  
Schoenberg - Berg - Webern Cult.  
1951 Cologne Studio (Eimert - Stockhausen)

1966 ed. Friedrich Schlegel project... alphabetical...  
1949 vol. 1 - 1918 (supplements in 1970s)

1956 Stockholm: Zeitmasse  
1959-60 Casse, Momente (Moment-form)

New Editions - to experimental music  
Mozart - Beethoven - 1960 Adorno: Mahler  
Wagner - 1961 Knepler - 1941 - History  
Adorno dominant aspects of music, philosophical

1967 Georgiade: Epiphany Musik und Spiel - pivotal year

Stage One aesthetic, theory of analysis of genres and Wagner

Stage Two strong anti-Marxist stand now formulated (only after New Left collapse?)

But bio. atm. inefficient Context German history

anti-Marxist stand consolidated

Stage Three Herodotus: problem of history itself.

also - mo. in study of opera + Ethel. opera

Born 1928

47-52 Studied Musicology Göttingen (w/ Rudolf Gerber) + Freiburg (Wilihald Gurlitt, Hermann Zenck) (also visited Brecht in Switzerland (Zürich) during this period) Gurlitt ->

1953 grad. (D.M.A.?) thesis on masses of Gorkin + publ.

1953 "Kants Musikästhetik" AEMW / lecture on Christoph Benda's Figurenschre.  
1950-58 - Dramatic producer - German Theatre Göttingen directed by Heinz Hilpert (Read much dramatic literature! - all pit, say, rhythm)

M66 "Konservanz-Dissolvanz" article (1958) 1958-60 studies source of Wagner's Enttöbung

60-62 - music critic of Stuttgarter Zeiten - much travelling  
1961 "Melodie" (M66)

62-66 called on collaborator to Walter Ullrich, Kiel Sachbearbeiter (official expert) for musical research at University of Kiel local matters

1966 Habilitation Grundr. u. of Kiel - Untersuchungen über die Entstehung der harmonischen Tonalität

1967 Joins Technical University of Berlin - successor to H. H. Stuckenschmidt

1967 Musikästhetik

1969 "Die neue Musik und das Problem der musikalischen Gattungen" (essay)

1970 Analyse und Werturteil

1970 "Fortschritt und Avantgarde" (anti-Marxist, Art unclear, quotes Benjamin)  
1971 Richard Wagners Musikdramen

1973 "Zur Problematik der musikalischen Gattungen im 19. Jahrhundert"

1974 Zwischen Romantik und Moderne  
1974 "Das Musikalische Kunstwerk als Gegenstand der Soziologie"

1975 "Avantgarde und Popularität"

1977 Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte

1978 Die Idee der absoluten Musik  
1978 Schönberg und andere

1980 Die Musik des 19. Jahrhunderts

1982 Musikalisches Realismus  
1983 Vom Musikdrama zur Literaturoper

1984 "Abkehr vom Materialdenken" + Die Musiktheorie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert

1988 Klassische und Romantische Musikästhetik

1945 - massive destruction of Germany, end of war

1949 Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed -- occupying powers (Fr., USA, England) give power to W. German Gov't. [but state of war with East still till 1955] -- DDR created <sup>one</sup> month later 1949. De facto Division of E + W. Germany -- "cold-war" mentality -- standoff... Ulbricht till 1969

1949 Adenauer (Chr. Dem.) 1949-69 ( rivals = Social Democrats ) (Adenauer/Ulbricht)

Reconstruction of Germany ("miracle") DDR languishes...

1955 joins NATO, sets up armed forces.

Rise of E-W tensions.

1958 EEC begun

Berlin wall

1961

1964 - Tarkin Gulf incident - US commits more to Vietnam Rise of left, after 1965. --

Rise of student movements, middle 60s... more open discussion of leftist politics. Old consensus of social opinion begins to break down.

1967 Student unrest begins in earnest (student shot + killed during Shush of Iron visit... students now active leftist movements. (Adorno - Habermas do not commit) students occupy classrooms, etc (USA deeply in Vietnam...))

1968 Climax of student unrest! In Paris Sorbonne students (aided by W. Germans) virtually bring De Gaulle gov't down. But for communist party makes pact w/ De Gaulle to save regime... Council... Also - Russian crush (Prague Spring... Soviet models less available)

1969 Willy Brandt, Social Democrat... 1969-74 - Ostpolitik. (hopeful for left)

Program of cultural reform → Friendship treaties w/ Russia, Poland (1970), later Czechoslovakia Terrorist groups thrive (Baader-Meinhof -- captured 72, on trial in late 70s)

74 Brandt resigns under scandal (negligence; E. German spy became a member of his staff) -- Helmut Schmidt, more activist -- SHIFT TO PRAGMATISM... public mood begins to turn against the left. Terrorism continues. Eurocommunism a real possibility in Italy, France... <sup>but to Belgium</sup> before it was clear that the New Left had failed. Rise of neoconservatives... (Schmidt still in power) 1975 US evacuates Vietnam.

1977 Terrorist activity at its highest... German public even more anti-left "German Autumn" = 1977 crackdown on terrorists... Strong shifts against the left.. German parliament begins to enact laws against disturbances, etc... law-and-order - called by left Tendenzenwende

1978 Fr. left defeated in elections... Fr. left alliance broken -- Eurocommunism as an ideal seem now dead (Bohmer: "but, at this point did the decade of the 60s come to an end")

Left → Now perceives itself as in a severe crisis... Much written about it, etc.

RISE OF LEFT (Threat to Stability)

Rise of pragmatists + neoconservatives (old order)

Bundesrepublik  
Ascendancies

②

Left

Right


1965

1970

1978

1977

1980



Brandt

Brandt -> Schmidt

Tendenzwende

# Bundesrepublik: Intellectual Events

exile of Institut  
1933-50  
Clerical/philosophical  
(Horkheimer)

1949 Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik  
(outside of musicological loop)

1958 Adorno/Horkheimer return to Germany  
(Frankfurt: Institute for Social Research)  
non-academic -- journals, books, radio...  
Minusc mortaria

1951

1956 Habermas becomes Adorno's assistant  
(Frankfurt school = only type of Marxist theory that flourished in Adorno's Germany -- "important")

1958 Habermas One Dimensional Man

1961 "traditional" history upset by (Fritz) Fischer controversy: attack on post-German history (WW2 and III)

1961 Positivismusstreit begins (1961-70)  
subsequent rise in mass interest in socio-economic history.  
Rise in stature of Habermas

1962 Habermas: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (institution theory)  
(Structural change in the public sphere)

1963 Kuhn: Strukturen / So. Revolution

1963 formation of Konstanz School (reception theory)  
Continued infl. of Gadamer + phenomenologists....

1965 (French) Althusser: For Marx (Interp. early Marx -- had been suppressed -- marks a moment of rediscovery of Marx for many in German Left)

1966 Leftist thought now begins to make its way into milieu  
(beginning of leftist student movement) "relevance"

Benjamin Lukács

1967 Rise of Critical Theory in Univ., + other Marxism (Marxist, Leninist)

1967 clash of students to police -> Adorno lectures on "Reception"

Radicals disavow Adorno's nicht mitmachen

Habermas disavows radicals:

1967-71 Habermas - Luhmann dispute

1968-74 Habermas - Gadamer dispute

1968 Habermas: Erkenntnis und Interesse (theory of knowledge: empirical/hermeneutical/emancipatory)

(Popper) Gadamer critical theory

TECHNICAL PRACTICAL PARTICIPATORY

1969 Death of Adorno

1970 Adorno: Aesthetic Theory

1973 death of Horkheimer

1973 Habermas: Legitimation Crisis (diagnosis of society)

1974 Peter Bürger: Theorie der Avant-garde (institution theory)

1977 Habermas Theory of Crisis

1981 Habermas: Theorie der kommunikativen Handlung

Habermas -> opponent of post-structuralism (postm. debride)

"Normal" paradigms of research unchanged since c. 1910

Geistesgeschichte (Dittley)

Empirical Research

Histories -> Hist. of politics, not economics, Lit Crit - Ernst Robert Curtius

N. Frye 1958 Anatomy of Criticism

1960 Gadamer: Truth & Method, 1st ed.

1961-71 Defense of Popper, positivism by Hans Albert, et al. (Frankfurt dispute)

beginning of reception aesthetics (as response to Marxism) and Wolfgang Iser -- genre theory... 1967

Left in ascendancy

non-Marxist now ascending

Peter Uwe Hohendahl writes of 1974 (p. 91): "By 1974 it was clear that the cultural revolution of the New Left had failed"

In its place: "the restoration of the classical tradition.... literature had returned to its normal function, implying that criticism would also resume its role"

Subsequent picture: "more diffuse" -- ideologies are less split... tensions to some extent patched over... (Dahlgren -> part of the restoration of classical tradition -- but now on a new footing?)

CD apparently did not intersect with

CD did intersect with

(9)

1918 Frye: Anatomy of Criticism

1958 Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie structurale

Roman Ingarden: The Literary Work of Art [1937]

1962 Lévi-Strauss: La pensée sauvage  
2nd ed 1960, 3rd 1965

1963 Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

1964 Lévi-Strauss: Mythologiques I: Le ciel et le cult

1965 Arthur Danto: Analytic Philosophy of History [?]

1966 Foucault: Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things)

1967 Derrida: De la grammatologie



1969 Foucault: L'archéologie du savoir

1970 Barthes: S/Z

1973 Le Plaisir du texte - Barthes (one non-signif. reference in the "new" in Avant-garde & Popularity 1975)

1976 Foucault: Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 1

1979 Lyotard: La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir



[RESUME]

It may prove more advantageous for us in these first sessions, however, to sketch out the two of the three theories of knowledge that Dahlhaus had to address (and these are the two that seem most at odds in American musicology. These are: 1) the traditional constellation of "scientific inquiry"/empirical methods (this is the constellation now under heavy attack in the USA); and 2) what I shall call a constellation of socio-economic/ideological approaches, nearly all of which owe some allegiance--however orthodox or however elliptical--to either the writings of Karl Marx and subsequent Marxist thinkers or to various French forms of structural history--and sometimes to both (this is the constellation which in various competing forms seems clearly to be ascendant). Dahlhaus's middle ground, the bridge to hermeneutics--Gadamer, Jaus--has not really made an appearance yet). And to complicate matters, there is also a differing, emergent additional force for us that Dahlhaus never seems to have faced--namely that of postmodernism, with its characteristic post-deconstructionist claims to undermine all prior metanarratives, but we'll get to that in due course.

But for now let's look at the two main factions and reduce or simplify the issues at stake to their most basic structures, for this is the easiest point of entry to the Dahlhaus's thought--and to our own methodological crises, and it is this set of structures that will be with us for a long time. Many of you--all of you, I hope--will in one way or another "know" all of this already, but at times it's a good thing to reorganize the obvious, because when we trip



up, it's usually at basic levels. In this case I have tried to set up the "obvious" in a way that will lead into and help to clarify the main issues in Dahlhaus. We'll have plenty of time during the quarter to provide nuance and complexity. Once this is done, to transpose it back into Dahlhaus's Germany should not be so difficult to do.

"Traditional" Empirical Methods

What should we call this constellation of practices? Joseph Kerman tends to lump them all together under the label of "positivism," but this is a "loaded" label--filled with connotations--as unfortunate as it is inadequate. We might borrow the term of Karl Popper and call them the families of "Critical Rationalism." Or, more provocatively, we might have recourse to the Marxist literary critic Frederic Jameson, an opponent of this constellation, or at least of its equivalent in literary studies--when he describes this diverse family of scientific humanists as "that mixture of political liberalism, empiricism, and logical positivism which we know as Anglo-American philosophy and which is hostile at all points to [dialectical thinking]" and writes of its "anti-speculative bias . . . its emphasis on the individual fact or item at the expense of the network of relationships in which that item may be embedded. . . ." [Marxism and Form, p. x].

Let's try to discern some of its principal characteristics--and these are the things all of you would be imbibing, normally without question, were you studying musicology in a major center in, say, 1980--or even in some places today. (They are certainly the things that I imbibed at Harvard from 1972 to 1978; the things that I once supposed it would be my primary duty to pass on to you.)

The reigning methodological metaphors of the empiricists have been those of scholars as detectives, as scientists, as statisticians, or as mathematicians. Inquiry here may often be described as problem-solving--the tackling of individual problems

within individual pieces or within carefully blocked-off repertory-groups. At the heart of the musicological variants lies some sort of adherence to what is perceived as the "scientific method"--the striving for an objective, disinterested examination of data, the formulation of cautious hypotheses that do not stray too far from the facts immediately at hand, the testing of the hypotheses--and the willingness to have one's own cautious conclusions corrected or disproven through the adducing of new data. This is the pursuit of explanations by means of what Thomas Kuhn called "normal science"-- busy activity designed to "explain" things, data-oriented research-work carried out under the sway of an assumed paradigm, one that remains unquestioned until the data start beginning to cast doubt on it. It is resolutely non-dialectical, and it has an aversion both to ambiguity and to aggressively complex prose.

Generally the practicing researchers in the method have not demanded a rigorously laid-out philosophy to guide them, but for those who have been concerned about it, the appeal has been to what is usually called the Philosophy of Science, which was developed largely in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By mid-century the philosophy had received both a substantial critique and its most eloquent reinforcement in the work of Karl Popper, whose magnum opus along these lines is Logik <sup>der</sup> ~~der~~ Forschung (1938, trans. as The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959), followed up by Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach in 1972. Popper's basic line of argument, it may be argued, underpins what musicologists have been doing for the past several decades.

Although the whole enterprise in musicology has been bathed in the glow of a diffuse, general, liberal humanism (largely undefined, but always devoted to an unquestioned sense of music as an aesthetic experience--in Germany the variant was Geistesgeschichte), the general inclination has been to approach history as a set of individual, potentially solvable problems, and these are problems that to a large extent are to be solved by the further uncovering or production of verifiable data. Thus the goal of research has been to gather ever more-precise data about individual works or small repertoires--how they were written, how their inner logic works, and so on. We search for new information, particularly that which renders past information incomplete or short-sighted. One of our main activities has been to correct the empirical errors of the past, and thereby to render obsolete or inadequate the past's tentative conclusions: we are behaving normatively when we disprove the findings of someone else or spot the flaws in his or her argument. And because all of us have assumed that our own conclusions could be overridden by even more precise data-collection in the future, the moral lesson has been to keep our speculations modest: don't overreach, or else our hands will get slapped, just as we are slapping the hands of our predecessors. Everything is assumed to be subject to the empirical check, the "reality-principle," what Arthur Mendel called the pattern of "evidence and explanation." In other words, the pattern of argumentation--the "shape" of scholarly articles and books--has been essentially the result of the arrangement of the verifiable data, an arrangement

that ultimately leads to a modest conclusion that appears, virtually of its own accord, at the end of the discussion.

It is centrally important to stress that the method traditionally assumed to be valid--before Popper's critique, which we'll get to in a moment--was essentially the inductive method -- from the isolated problem and the facts that surround it to the conclusions they suggest--and it is likely that most musicologists would embrace some sort of principle of induction. In solving a problem, we are to begin, that is, with data (described as precisely as the tools permit) and cautiously to draw tentative conclusions. There is a profound suspicion here about speculating too far beyond the evidence--as if beyond the evidence all is "free ground," non-scientific or non-professional ground where we all become amateurish. And certainly there is a general suspicion of broad, interdisciplinary claims, emotional arguments of any sort, and sweeping conclusions, all similarly viewed as non-professional, naive. What is important, however, is a constant sharpening of the tools: the tools used become all important.

Because the battle-ground for the viability or lack of it in this method depends entirely on the validity of its philosophical assumptions, this is where the current war in scholarship is being waged. Let's look a little more closely at the method, first in its more inductive mode, favored historically for example, by nineteenth-century scientists and historians (but now philosophically suspect).

[TO DIAGRAM]

Karl Popper disputes the inductivism of this model and claims that even the mere gathering of facts presupposes an end towards which they are gathered. Popper focusses instead on the problem ("above the facts") which we wish to solve and argues that it is the sense of the problem that guides our research. The method is fourfold: 1) isolate the general problem above what seem to be "the facts"; 2) inquire into other relevant factors surrounding the problem (poke or root around what seems to be promising); 3) and most important, formulate a theory or solution to the problem, a kind of covering hypothesis (this is the leap into the void--but it is the crucial scientific act); 4) test the hypothesis by rigorous criticism, testing, and the process of deduction; if it doesn't pass the test, try another theory. Thus the core of Popper's system is theory-construction (something from which the "facts" may be explained deductively) and rigorous theory-testing, usually by a community of self-critical researchers. (The community of critical researchers keeping each other honest is centrally important to Popper: here unavoidable individual subjectivity is generally corrected in the direction of objectivity, or so he claims.) All knowledge is provisional--our theories hold until someone finds the problems that they do not explain, and we shall be forced to devise a richer hypothesis. Knowledge is not a body of facts, but a set of provisional explanations. And so on. Popper thus claims to have overturned induction from facts and replaced it with deduction from posited hypotheses that are kept close to the facts at hand: a

"theory of the deductive method of testing." Thus the Philosophy of Science--or at least one form of it.

Much is implied here--particularly with regard to that "non-knowable" zone beyond empirical data--a deep problem ever since Kant, who essentially discredited speculative metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason. The argument is that speculations into this realm go beyond possible experience--and this reduction of the knowable has been a specter haunting us for the past two centuries, leading both to various strands of philosophical and scientific positivism and to such things as Husserlian phenomenology bracketing out everything beyond immediate experience in order to plunge more deeply into the concreteness of what we actually do experience (the "eidectic abstraction"). Note also, within the diagram, the distinction that can be made between two key concepts for Dahlhaus, the distinction between Verstehen and Erklären. Verstehen works from a position of limited knowledge to get a sympathetic understanding of the problem or situation by moving from facts to covering hypotheses--from right to left on the diagram. Erklären, claims knowledge of a concept and seeks to "explain" the covered facts by moving from left to right. The traditions of positivism have generally embraced both Verstehen and a very limited, very cautious use (à la Popper) of Erklären, subject always to the test of verifiability.

As many of you know, the Popper-model of knowledge has been under heavy attack from within the Philosophy of Science itself (assisted by the Philosophy of Language and Phenomenology) in the last three decades or so. The model is crumbling from within, as it

were. The main onslaughts have been those stressing the role of intuition and subjectivity, questioning the possibility of objective knowledge. Some of this is grounded further back into the twentieth century, in such important figures as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles Sanders Peirce. But in the second half of the century some of the main figures include:

1. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958), arguing against objectivity in favor of a more humanized personal participation" and, in later works, for the value of "tacit knowledge," knowledge which we "know" but cannot express.
2. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958)--science as, in part, Wittgensteinian language-game.
3. Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (1960, with several subsequent revised versions). A critically important book. Without question the most powerful critique produced in Germany--and one that left a deep imprint on Dahlhaus. Gadamer was a student of Heidegger deeply interested in language and in hermeneutics--the issue of explaining texts or uncovering their meaning. He, too, opposed the idea of objective knowledge as naive--we can never understand the original meaning of works because we are too implicated in our own present--and suggested that at best we could strive for a fusion of our own personal and subjective "horizons" with that of the work we want to understand. The method: question-and-



answer, derived from, among others, Collingwood--also an influence on Dahlhaus. We'll have to return to this.

4. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), maintaining that "normal science" proceeds under a tacit paradigm of reality--when that paradigm shifts the notion of science shifts with it. The whole effect was to undermine the notion of objective truth, since truth is conceived only within paradigm systems. The book was extremely influential in Germany in a translation in the 1960s, and Dahlhaus and others make considerable use of it.
5. <sup>Paul</sup>~~Wolfgang~~ Feyerabend, Against Method (1975), an anti-rationalist delighting in undermining virtually all aspects of positivistic inquiry and supposed disinterestedness. Feyerabend is an intellectual anarchist or Dadaist, as Richard Bernstein has argued, who claims that there are no "free-floating standards of rationality detached from actual historical practices." (Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 67).

Thus: standard empirical research has encountered a crisis from within the Philosophy of Science itself, which is one reason that it is collapsing and that the naive forms of it are no longer tenable. In the German 1960s Dahlhaus was confronting a situation "objectivity" could no longer be upheld. This is the same situation that we face today. The point is that even within the sciences there is a crisis of faith in rationality and objective research: it's not only a matter of opponents from outside launching the attack.


But precious little of this intersected with current American musicology until recently (Treitler's circle is a prominent exception.) So--back to the Popper-model, or even to the models that he claimed to be refuting. For traditional American musicology conceiving itself as a science, the five chief crimes are: 1) naiveté; 2) special pleading and self-interest (Popper's subjectivism and relativism); 3) rashness to judgment; 4) insufficiency of talent; 5) lack of clarity. The punishments meted out for these offenses are essentially two: 1) a contemptuous neglect (refusal to allow one to enter the existing scientific conversation); or 2) ridicule (or exposure). One invalidates the argument of another chiefly by exposing one of the crimes.

What is the point to which all this strives? Why is any of it done? These questions are normally either not addressed at all or they are answered with platitudes (to increase knowledge; to demonstrate the mastery of Mozart; to arrive at better texts; to help us understand and appreciate the music). Some have argued that the point is to "validate the canon," or personally to genuflect before it, for reasons that are either individualized or presumed unnecessary to explain. For most scholars, then, in practice the philosophical bases of the obviously eclectic method have gone largely unexamined. This is an important point--many of its practitioners have proceeded with no articulated method at all. In practice, musicological researchers have been philosophically timid. For musicology, real models of empirical, sober research have been more important: Gustave Reese of NYU (and his student, John Ward of Harvard), Oliver Strunk and Arthur Mendel of Princeton, plus various

German luminaries. Their influence upon the discipline has been incalculable via their students.

Thus "the establishment," as it were. Now let's turn to the main family of challengers--certainly for Dahlhaus and probably for us as well.

X = individual (technical) problems to solve  
 O = solutions = covering hypotheses



Ignorance  
 (do not speculate)  
 (cf. Kant...  
 "Cartesian Anxiety")

Knowledge  
 (verifiable) ("objective")  
 openness to criticism, etc.  
 leads to "Open Society"  
 (Hence promise of freedom  
 within this system)

once this was the area filled by  
 myth, religion, metaphysics --

Habermas: in lieu of a guiding principle  
 (esp. of Enlightenment) this whole realm  
 of experience -- part of the most important  
 realm -- is given over, or abandoned,  
 to arbitrary decisions

(Decisionism) -- and these  
 decisions, as in Germany 1933-45, can be  
 highly repressive + unjust.  
 Hence this whole area is abandoned by  
 the "amoral" scientist and can be  
re-mythologized by anyone with sufficient  
 power to do so.

Marxist-ideological solution: fill this  
 in with social analysis, dialectics

To Max Weber: Zweckrationalität (instrumental  
 rationality, leading only to specific ends --  
 does not lead to freedom of the spirit, but only  
 to "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality and  
 the disenchantment of the world. No ultimate  
 vision → morally disinterested.

(Critique would be adopted by Adorno, Horkheimer, and  
 Habermas) = opposite of open society -- a  
 society of domination by technocrats.

Problem? Locating base  
outside of system --

Shouldn't base be inside, in  
 fact, in X's or right?

Maybe a new diagram is  
needed for the Marxist model

Socio-Economic/Ideological	Approaches
("Contextual"	Approaches)

(These are far more difficult to generalize about--but I'll try: some of this may be revised by the quarter's end.). Here the watchwords (code-words) are "social contexts" and "interdisciplinary approaches," the breaking-down of the compartmentalized barriers of the traditional methods, the search for the "social meaning" or the "political meaning" of music itself. In practice in the late 1980s and early these approaches usually display demonstrable links (either tacitly or openly) with the call for present-day social action and with current oppositional politics. And in practice nearly all of them, however variable their surfaces or whatever else has been added to them, owe a considerable debt--usually acknowledged--to the language and texture of certain key passages in Marx's writings subsequent variants of Marxism or post-Marxism, especially to the Germanic Benjamin--Adorno--Horkheimer--Marcuse--Habermas--Bürger constellation. Although researchers in this area by no means all accept Marxist ideology en masse (most are especially critical of Soviet and other "official" versions, for example) they tend to be engaged with issues forged by German post-Kantian philosophy (Kantian concepts of categories and the dialectical method of Hegel and Marx) and with French Marxist philosophy from the 1930s to the present (Sartre; Althusser). But above all, these groups are philosophically aware and highly sophisticated about their axioms in a way that traditional humanists

have not been. As such they are posing many of the central questions about music and ideology, and they are obliging the traditional scholarly community to respond: in short, they are forcing the issues--and traditional musicology is responding nervously.

The reigning metaphors for this group are that of the scholar as philosopher, as critic or cold-eyed destroyer of comfortable illusions, the scholar as moralist and seeker-of-justice in a corrupt age. The chief method of inquiry is that of decoding, of reading "latent messages" in works, of unmasking, of the "laying bare" of essential social meanings that others have chosen not to see.

At the core of the enterprise--or better, this widespread family of highly varying enterprises--is the notion of art as a reflection of social power interests. The roots of this are easy enough to find in Marx: see for example, the passage from The German Ideology [written 1845-46, not publ., until 1932] on the photocopies [Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 136-39: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas. . . . The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. . . ." Etc.)

And in practice, all such socio-economic theories have relied to some extent on the fundamental concepts of Base and Superstructure [Basis und Überbau] developed by Marx in several famous passages, most notably from The German Ideology, The

Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon [1852], and in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [1859] and developed later by Engels. <sup>Go to Marxist packet, (In brief)</sup>  
① We'll deal with some of the specifics later, because Dahlhaus engages them. (A word of caution: Base-superstructure theory is extraordinarily complex in 20th-century Marxist theory, and it is not easily simplified or summarized--I'll just touch on it here and we'll return to it as seems necessary to do it more justice.) In short, the Base is the fundamental generator of power, the real driver of society. Traditionally, for Marxists this has been the material forces of production--the material base or economic base to which all else relates. The superstructure thrown up above the material base (ideas, laws, customs, religion, art, and so on) are to be related back to the base to be understood: they may either reflect the base, for example, or, in more recent variants, they may have the base in some way inscribed into their superstructural essence. Superstructural phenomena must be decoded, brought back to the base, because in orthodox theory they are determined by the base: in the most classic positions, to assume their independent existence or full autonomy is to fall prey to "false consciousness" or willful self-deception. (Note: because a key feature of Dahlhaus's system is the concept of the Autonomy Principle in 19th-century "absolute" music--something that he upholds, thus disagreeing with Marxist theory--this issue looms very large in Foundations.)

In orthodox Marxist theory, of course, there is only one base, to which all else is related, and by which all is determined. (Of late there have been a number of attempts to suggest and work with

multiple bases, at least for heuristic purposes--this complicates things, and we'll get back to this in due course.). Again, the task of normal Marxist or Marxist-oriented criticism is to see the base-- or a relevant base-- through or within a superstructural product or set of products.

Such approaches, of course, particularly when joined with a program of oppositional politics, are eager to stress the "political" nature of artworks, by which is meant, as Linda Hutcheon puts it, "the interests in which they operate and the power they wield" [The Politics of Postmodernism, p. 44]. In its more orthodox manifestations--the ones with which Dahlhaus intersected (and everything is more complicated today)--the political or social aspect of this family of approaches is nearly always motivated by what we may call a myth of teleology, a myth, historical "story", or master-narrative [metanarrative], essentially arguing that human beings have been slowly progressing through stages and struggles from a low, unjust state--the unjust exercise of abusive power and illusion--towards a world that, at least potentially, can be more just, more rational, and less illusion-ridden. The argument is thus a moral one, and works of art are characteristically assessed from moral points of view. The tone involved in the assessment--since it so often involves the unmasking of unjust power-relations--is not infrequently skeptical, critical, suspicious, the cold facing of historical facts, the attitude of one "unduped" by or personally uncomfortable with the narcotic or "sheer beauty" of the artwork. (I stress this here because Dahlhaus stresses what he sees as the fundamental skepticism of the Marxists--in fact, he often uses the



word "skepticism" as a kind of synonym for Marxism and related approaches.)

In its classical forms the utopian vision or goal at the end of the metanarrative is egalitarian in nature (i.e., one in which the power of one group over another has been exorcised), and the goal is usually perceived as being blocked by current Western social structures, especially those of technocratic rationality or "instrumental rationality" (Weber's Zweckrationalität) and advanced capitalism, in which the standard enemies are the capitalistic reduction of all things to the principle of exchange (already articulated by the early Marx in The German Ideology), the resultant alienation from this devaluing exchangeability of all things, and the presumed commodification of all that is valuable in human experience. (The analysis of commodification, a central tenet of twentieth-century Marxism, <sup>and Marxist-oriented argumentation</sup> goes back to Marx's notion of the fetishism of commodities in Part I, Section 4 of Das Kapital; this is the source of what Georg Lukacs would in the 1920s term Verdinglichung, reification, one of the standard concepts in the thought of the influential Frankfurt School).

An influential, individualistic variant of the metanarrative-- and the chief challenge to Dahlhaus, as it turns out--is the one pursued in the Critical Theory of Horkheimer and Adorno, and continued with considerable variation in the 70s and 80s by Habermas and others, in which the goal is progressive "Enlightenment." In the "dialectic of enlightenment," as it was classically framed by Horkheimer and Adorno, the goal is "liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty . . . the disenchantment of the

world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy" [Dialectic, p. 3], the program of what Adorno called "individuation," "the emancipation of the subject from myth" [Aesthetic Theory, 301]. Moreover, Adorno developed a theory of autonomous art that is situated in history but not completely determined by it: Art as individual resistance (an individual artist or artwork could be a "precipher" of a longed-for but probably unattainable "redemption" through its uncompromising resistance to society). All of this was non-orthodox within Marxist schools, and it would appear to be closely related to the German Romantic myth (rooted in Rousseau, perhaps) of individual self-realization apart from the corroding influence of a conformist, classical society--or a manipulated mass society of trivial consumption--viewed as false, superficial, and all-ensnaring for the unaware. In Adorno's highly pessimistic variant, however, the individual loses, martyred to the cold forces of technical/instrumental reason [Zweckrationalität] and increased domination and repression. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s Habermas would subsequently attempt to find ways to reconstitute the positive form of the teleological myth.

Regardless of one's preferred metanarrative within the Marxist- or Marxist-oriented families, analyses of works of art are often inseparable from calls to action, protest, or resistance in the present. Analyses, that is, can either expose the still-surviving errors and contradictions of the past or, in another variant, can point the way to a redemptive future beyond power-struggles. Works of the past are thus analyzed, at least in part, to ascertain their "progressive" or "reactionary" tendencies in

conforming with the teleological metanarrative. On which side of the line does any individual work fall? (This is what Adorno would call seeking for a work's "truth-content"--this is often to be the new basis for, if not "aesthetic judgment," then for critical understanding.)

The explanatory power of many of these models is indeed impressive. The insights can be extraordinarily impressive, and one would be ill-advised to bracket them out of one's thinking. It is worth noting, though--and Dahlhaus would note this--that before one can decode works, one must posit, axiomatically, a knowledge of what the base is. Hence the model has very few, if any, inductive components; rather, it is emphatically deductive (deductive, but through the process of dialectics). One begins by positing the "conclusion" (the base and the metanarrative: commodification, alienation, the principle of exchangeability, etc.) and then proceeds by explaining superstructural events deductively from the axiomatic base. This is the decoding-aspect of socio-economic or ideologically committed criticism. A typical goal of analysis, then, would be to read the art-work (or the musical work) allegorically, as an expression of how to place that art-work within the metanarrative that one is espousing. Thus art is essentially an allegory to be read, and it is not until that allegory is produced out of the work that any analysis is properly finished. All prior analyses (such as those by traditional music theory or empirical musicology--or traditional scientific enterprises), that is, those that do not make the final steps into the proper metanarrative, are viewed as timid, futile, pointless, only half-finished, or, worst of

all, morally uncommitted and hence "irrelevant" to real life, snares trying to dupe us into thinking that art is autonomous, existing for its own sake and not ultimately for social ends (hence the characteristic Marxist attacks on formalism). Normal science is charged with a confinement to merely "technical problems"; traditional researchers become mere "technicians"--and entire bodies of thought and research devoted to those technical problems are merely, in Habermas's words (originally directed at the systems-theory of Niklas Luhmann), "form[s] of technocratic consciousness, which today [permit] practical questions to be defined from the outset as technical ones, and thereby [withhold] them from the public and unconstrained discussion" [in Frisby, Intro. to The Positivist Dispute, p. xxxii].

[TO DIAGRAM--Consider Verstehen and Erklären;  
the problem of decisionism]

The claim made, then, is that art can be more or less fully decoded. "We can decode art--we can tell you what art really means, so long as you accept our metanarrative, our teleological narrative of history." Herein lies the great appeal: that of a final explanation--the ability to stand outside of history and art and comprehend what the very players involved did not. As Frederic Jameson puts it, referring to Marxism vis-à-vis all other methods: "Nor do we need to suggest that Marxism is an alternative to those methods; rather, it is to be seen as their completion, and as the only method that can really finish what it is they all in their

various ways set out to do." ["Criticism in History," 1976, in The Ideologies of Theory, vol. 2, p. 120] This is a seductive claim, indeed, one that is difficult to resist. The promise is nothing less than total knowledge or knowledge of the "societal totality." And, moreover, one enters into a dialogue forged by clearly brilliant, morally concerned thinkers, ~~profane~~ <sup>certainly scolding</sup> intellectuals asking entire groups of the "right questions," <sup>the "important questions,"</sup> those questions often ignored by the other side.

For partisans of ideological criticism, the chief crimes to be avoided within the ranks are two: 1) heresy and deviation from the reigning versions of the metanarrative; 2) flirtations with or sympathetic responses to arguments from or methodologies of one's opponents--that is, minor or major concessions to the other side. Hence ideological purity becomes a key issue, sometimes the overriding issue, and internecine wars and jihads are common. The punishments for the crimes, as with any religious system, are also two: 1) moral denunciation (usually through the application of a tag epithet, ending in "-ist"); and 2) excommunication. (And of course, there is simply no denying history, no matter how much one sees in it a perversion of purer forms of accepted doctrines: In "official," bureaucratized Marxist societies, that is, this process of labelling and excommunication has often had ominous consequences--Gulags, mental hospitals, show trials, "re-education" campaigns and Cultural Revolutions, torture and execution.)

Clearly these methods rise or fall on the acceptability of the base and the allied metanarrative--tinkerings with the system are hard to make because the method is deductive (this is one reason

that Habermas is so controversial): normally, though, once the base and metanarrative go the entire system tends to be discredited along with it, as we have been seeing politically in Eastern Europe and with Gorbachev's perestroika. Protection of the base and metanarrative thus are usually elevated into crucial survival

strategies. *Those who do not accept the totalizing power of the base and metanarrative (half-acceptance or compromise will not do) are accused of being duped + deceived, in the grasp of commodity/power forces -- "bad faith" "false consciousness" - Source -> Marx's ideology critique, central passage 1843, Introduction to Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*

Consequently, the primary danger of the socio-economic method (and remember, the primary dangers of the critical rationalists was short-sightedness, lack of talent, moral unconcernedness, or timidity), the primary danger of the family of ideological/socio-economic methods, at least as historically practiced, has been its too-eager willingness to consider or valorize only those facts that are congruent with the base and metanarrative --to "make facts fit," as it were, or to ignore or downplay those facts that call the base into question.

*critique of religion -- opinion of the masses, false, but reveals the necessary escape from society that opposes but... utopian quality, or not... - same as Habermas's philosophy of autonomous art or bourgeois escape*

When it comes to the history of art, music, or literature, the secondary danger --if danger it is--is to be overly willing in virtually all cases to read "through" a work of art into its main point--the social allegory. This considers the work of art to be primarily an object of social documentation. Its primary value for us, therefore, is to be used as a springboard for our own criticism and calls to social action in the present. According to its adversaries, using art in this way ignores its essence, its aesthetic quality, and skeptically passes over the central distinctions between artistic mastery and commonplace, para-aesthetic artworks. The charges often thrown up by its opponents, therefore, have been charges of insufficient development of the

artistic sense and of philistinism. (In the skeptical, relativistic climate of the 1970s and 1980s, the response has been to challenge the notion of "ART" itself--capital "A"--as a reified power-category serving special interests.) Thus leftist-oriented studies are sometimes attracted (or at least not repelled) by studies of Trivialmusik and popular music and popular culture for two reasons: 1) those metagenres often seem to provide an even clearer, more explicit reflection of the desired base than do more complex art forms; and 2) those metagenres engage larger social groups and are thus seen as more insidious or more promising, depending on your point of view.

Between the two approaches there is a huge gulf--a virtually unbridgeable gulf: both sides generally refuse to acknowledge anything but deception on the other side, and creative discussions between them are almost impossible. This is what Feyerabend called the incommensurability of theories--they are grounded in such radically different conceptions of the world that they cannot even be measured against one another. And this is why, I suspect, Dahlhaus concludes that no bridges may be built in the direction of the Marxists, although one should continue to listen and learn what one can. Still, the empiricists see in the socio-economic group all the marks of their chief crimes--rash speculations and assumptions; insufficient concern with evidence and the complexity of individual facts; unwillingness to be disproven, etc., and they normally delight in pointing out factual discrepancies and errors made by the socio-economic group (a group accused of having insufficient talent

to talk about the subjects they claim to decode). On the other hand, the socio-economic group see in the traditionalists the naiveté of those who have generally left their own axioms unexamined--mere babes when it comes to larger questions of purpose and meaning. Worse, they see the traditionalists as "selling out" to power structures that are essentially unjust, as creatures that are themselves duped by the system in their obsession with tiny, unimportant details--mere technicians in a corrupt system.

Please notice also that the new literary-critical models (and the models of post-Foucault thought and postmodernism) are often merely tools-----tools that either side can use to its own ends. Structuralism, narratology, genre theory, deconstruction, and so on, could be used to support or undermine either side. Orthodox Marxists see these developments as "ambivalent" because of the possibility of being co-opted by the other side or the possible use of the tools themselves to undermine or deconstruct their own metanarratives..

This is exactly the context within which we can begin to understand what Dahlhaus is trying to do. His essential task was to try to steer a middle path--a very narrow middle path--between these two sides--and remember that for Dahlhaus there is also that middle path--that of hermeneutics (Gadamer, Jauss, the Russian Formalists, etc.), which we shall have to pursue. His strategy is initially to reject both extremes (raw, unguided empiricism and orthodox Marxism)--to shatter the pretensions of both....and then to return to pick up the pieces to see what is salvageable and useful.



[PHOTOCOPY FROM REALISM, p. 16

The core of the Dahlhaus project in nuce]

Having rejected both sides, his task will then be to build a viable system out of the old and the new, brick by brick, that he hopes will avoid the errors of each side: on the one hand, a philosophically aware, non-naive, historically grounded empiricism; on the other, an empirically sensitive metanarrative, one capable of revision and questioning without total collapse. The task of this course is to see how Dahlhaus actually tries to accomplish this.