

Cook "Theorizing Musical Meaning" Spectrum 2001

① In examples provided (Marriage of Figaro → Citroen commercial; 9th Recap → Torey/Lam/Simpson flaming sky → McElroy violence, frustrated rapist)

Cook shows how visual + verbal "emergent meaning" is both possible and defensible via the ^{described} process ("emergent" via "an act of performance" 179 (on a patient receipt) experienced pre-cognitively (emotionless nuance))

- 1) Contain a piece of music given to us by culture (emotionless nuance)
- 2) Make a selection of its attributes → the "feel" and "texture" and motion of the musical moment or series of moments.
- 3) Consider, via the principle of homologies (e.g. 172), other aspects of our experience that are potentially similar in shape or "feel"

4) Attach the non-referential emotionless nuance (potential meaning) to a specific referent (auto; sky; rapist; etc.) and what will be lit up, at this point, is a "constructed meaning" (181)

or "formal object" (p.180) ← like connecting a circuit (JH)

- 1) Enabling conditions (181) = "enabling similarity"; "the blended space"
- 2) Because of homologies + their limits, the enabling similarities are similarly constrained: → Much of article about these limits (177) from Leo epigraph onward — Thus: attributes are "Indefinite [in number] but not infinite" (178)

They constrain the selection of images to which they might reasonably be attached. (a repeated point in the article)

- 3) ∴ Emergent meaning is "socially negotiated but not arbitrary" (177) Similarly (p.172) it is precisely the aspect of homology (attributes) that keep "emergent meaning" from becoming arbitrary

Q → Cook's 3 examples all provide vividly concrete, almost flamboyantly pictorial referents onto which the "emotionless nuance" is attached. (obv. issues of programmaticism loom large here) —

∴ Is that the intended scope of "meaning" in these pieces? Is "meaning" (or "reading") in these pieces reducible to verbal analogies? (If not -- why are those the only exx. chosen?)

Q → Given a constructed, emergent meaning ("interpretation" or "reading" or "emaciation") of a musical text, what is the epistemological status of that reading? Cloud-picture? "Knowledge"? Metaphor? If it's a merely playful analogy, why bother? Is there a knowledge-claim? I.e., Torey/Lam/Simpson were clearly NOT claiming that Beeth "intended" to depict a flaming sky? On McElroy that B intended to depict a frustrated rapist? Mere similes or metaphors to provide some sense of the momentousness or urgency of that musical moment?

Much discussion of how + on what grounds a meaning may be generated... BUT:
 Q → Not a mention anywhere of comparative evaluation of these emergent meanings! How do they co-exist? Is any of them better or more appropriate than any other? Assuming some grounding in selected attributes, in homologues, in "enabling similarities," is the implication that there is NO WAY that we could ever consider Interp. X "better," more "adequate," more "text-appropriate" than Interp. Y?

cf. Agawu 1998, quoted by Whittell
 Music Analysis, p. 30 top
 - not "knowledge" but a "performance" (?)

better: recap 9th is a moment that in history has elicited significant extreme metaphors of experience.

— If not, why is this not "arbitrary" free play with the text (or with the text's selected attributes)? And why is this NOT the same as cloud-pictures? And why would we even consider this kind of meaning an interesting or valuable thing to pursue? (In effect - "no meaning" is there!)
 - If so, then on what conceivable grounds could we decide which of several competing readings or meanings is actually more "text-adequate"?

Q → Is it possible (reasonable) that a text (and its attributes) might constrain a range of viable interps. than is suggested here (or in Bartles or others)? Are attributes "neutral" - lying there waiting to be neutrally selected - or do they, as active attributes in a context, in effect actively shape the kind of listener (and "meaning") that the text desires?

(One might ignore these larger generic or contextual constraints for a more liberated sense of "free play," but is that fully "text-adequate"?)

ideology which would suggest this emergence of a part with a self-reflective subject.

i.e., we are more manipulated by the text than we manipulate it?

- i.e., ^a chief attribute of recap moment in B's 9th = NOT those selected by Cook, pp. 184-85, but rather its PLACEMENT in the generic context of Recap Moment, in dialogue both with traditions of recaps in minor-mode sonata forms AND in dialogue with all that has happened thus far in the movement?

(Horizontal meaning + generic synchronic meaning, NOT ONLY "vertical meaning")

(NB → Citroen commercial absolutely bypasses initial contextualization)

Q - Gadamer "fusion of horizons" - How is this different? Gadamer → the reader or listener must remain "open" to the utterance of the "other" in order to try to "come to an understanding" of what the other meant? A central condition is openness: one must "want to know." Do the Citroen people want to know what Mozart "meant" (or what the music meant) → or is this an emptying of meaning, a draining, in order to appropriate Figueira-attributes with full awareness, in order to manipulate behavior? Why is this a "meaning"? In what sense? Similarly, does McLary really "want to know" what Berlioz meant? Or is she appropriating the work, à la Citroen, to make a controversial prestige-claim within a circumscribed community? Not "meaning" but a redirection of meaning?

irreducibly cultural *and* intimately related to its structural properties. And I shall suggest that engaging in this way with issues of meaning forms the basis of a theoretical project that does not reject or ignore the "New" musicological challenge to its disciplinary identity, but instead builds upon it.

HANSLICK'S LEGACY

It is convenient to borrow Lydia Goehr's terminology and see the development of nineteenth-century criticism as the conjunction of a "*transcendent* move from the worldly and the particular to the spiritual and the universal" and a "*formalist* move which brought meaning from the music's outside to its inside."³⁰ That way we can understand what happened towards the end of the century as a repudiation of the transcendent move, leaving the formalist one in place as the sole criterion of musical significance and value.

The most visible symbol of this is the way in which Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* came to be read as a denial of music's capacity to support expressive meaning. Looking back on it, it is hard to see how even so richly polysemic a text as *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* might have been thought to say *that*. A more careful reading might have seen it as asserting the continuity of structure and meaning, and arguing that any understanding of music's meaning has to be predicated on an understanding of its structure.³¹ It would also have seen Hanslick's book as an exercise in aesthetic categorization, not denying music's expressive power but drawing a clear line between expression and beauty. What

³⁰Goehr 1992, 153.

³¹Wilson Coker expresses the claim more explicitly: "For musical works to be effective bearers of metaphoric meanings, they are expected to be adequate sign vehicles, coherently organized in themselves so as to sustain pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic dimensions" (Coker 1972, 153). Scott Burnham effectively reiterates this when he says that "precisely because music is musical it can speak to us of things that are not strictly musical" (Burnham 1997, 326; this passage also appears in Burnham 1999, 215).

Omitted here: Cold-war Politics (Robbitt, etc.)
(Martin Brady) and the anti-right/fascist
Darmstadt movement.

matters in this context is not so much what Hanslick meant, however, but what he was generally understood to mean. And by the early twentieth century, the generally accepted reading of Hanslick was that music was to be understood in exclusively structural terms while issues of meaning were ruled out of court. That became the orthodoxy on which, after the second world war, both music theory and (within the British empiricist tradition) the philosophy of music were based. In this way, the concept of structure acquired the narrowness by comparison with early- to mid-nineteenth-century formalism that Joseph Dubiel has complained about—a narrowness that, he says, has caused him to stop using the term altogether.³²

This problematic Hanslickian inheritance is most evident in the work of those philosophers and, more recently, music theorists who have readmitted issues of meaning within academic debate, but on terms which maintain the underlying values of formalism: I shall refer mainly to Peter Kivy, Stephen Davies, and Robert Hatten, but could just as well have referred to Jerrold Levinson, Jennifer Robinson, Edward T. Cone, Leo Treitler, or Eero Tarasti. The basic premise of these writers is that, in Hatten's words, "musical meaning is inherently musical," so that in speaking of the expressive qualities of music, of its qualities of acquiescence, resignation, or abnegation, we are as much talking about the music as when we speak of themes, harmonic progressions, or formal prototypes.³³ It follows that, as Kivy argues, expressive concepts should be integrated within the analytical process. But this turns out to be rather problematic in practice.³⁴ Kivy attempts to demon-

³²Dubiel 1997, 313; for similar comments see Maus 1988, 73.

³³Hatten 1994, 276. The same is claimed by Cone: "formal and expressive concepts are not separable but represent two ways of understanding the same problem" (Cone 1974, 112) and echoed by Newcomb: "Formal and expressive interpretations are in fact two complementary ways of understanding the same phenomena" (Newcomb 1984, 636); Treitler has written an entire article on the topic (Treitler 1997).

³⁴Kivy 1993a, 316–17. For a more extended exposition of the following argument, see Cook & Dibben (forthcoming).

NB → All refs. (except Tarasti) to Engl. - language
analytic philosophy (no significant continental approach)

strate what he means through Haydn's symphonies "La Pass really happens is that he substitutes: he speaks of "the passage where the rest of us might speak minor,³⁵ but otherwise little changes are much more sophisticated, locate structural features within expressive codes, there is a problem being put forward is a structure expressed in emotional vocabulary expressive meaning grafted onto it of the first movement of Beethoven in point).³⁶ It is telling that Hatten informed expressive character structural analysis, but he never the basis of his expressive intention his discussion of the *Cavatina* the expressive analysis genuine one—for example, by demonstrating where the music is structurally to "the interaction of expressive movement,³⁷ he does not really relationship between them on be based, and indeed it is difficult given the premise that musical shall return to this issue at the e

³⁵Kivy 1993a, 322.

³⁶Consider, for instance, his description: "The 'willed' (basically stepwise) emotional as well as registral space, substitution of a stepwise descent in the bass

³⁷Hatten 1994, 320 (n. 8).

³⁸A similar ambivalence may be page they say of the relationship b

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 to Kivy, Davies, or Hatten
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musical meanings see Davies 1994,
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 it serve" (33-4), but Scruton, as
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 cruton 1997, 169).

Again, concepts of limits or restraints on interpretation —
 (cf. Eco, epigraph at top of article)

And what about such "enforced" conventions as TOPICS —
 Are we constrained by those?
 music and meaning (it clearly invokes worldly and not just "inher-
 ently musical" meaning), but at the same time there is an intimate
 binding between the unfolding of the music and the emergence of
 that meaning.

That we might often wish to see musical meaning in such a
 way is plain enough. Edward T. Cone asserts that "a piece of
 music allows a wide but not unrestricted range of possible expres-
 sion";⁵⁰ more concretely (and again with reference to Haydn's
 "La Poule"), James Johnson argues that you might hear the oboe's
 dotted-note patterns as a hen, or equally as an expression of merrim-
 ent, or even as "an essential thread in a web of indescribable
 content"—but what you cannot credibly do, he says, is argue "that
 it is a funeral dirge, or paints the storming of the Bastille, or pro-
 motes slavery."⁵¹ Such formulations reflect a view of music and
 meaning as interacting with one another: as different, but linked.
 Again, Shepherd and Wicke speak of "the construction of mean-
 ings through music's sounds [that] can be understood as being
 socially negotiated but not arbitrary."⁵² And, of course, there is in
 principle no reason why musical meaning cannot be at the same
 time both culturally constructed and conditioned by formal struc-
 ture (as Martin says, social constructionism need not imply that
 "musical meanings . . . must be random, or that any pattern of
 sound is likely to represent any object or idea").⁵³ Indeed, critical
 commentaries on music frequently make this an implicit, common-
 sense assumption. But common-sense assumptions are insufficient
to regulate critical discourse, and the ideologically inspired veer-
 ing away from issues of the material grounding of meaning to

⁵⁰Cone 1974, 166.

⁵¹Johnson 1995, 2.

⁵²Shepherd & Wicke 1997, 116.

⁵³Martin 1995, 72 (see also 144-5). For Martin, this is entirely compatible
 with meanings being "arbitrary", in the technical sense, so it is necessary to
 view this particular word with caution; cf. Davies's comment that "there is an
 unfortunate tendency to treat 'conventional' as equivalent to 'arbitrary' and to
 regard all conventions as structuring symbol systems dedicated to generating
 semantic content" (Davies 1994, 39).

which I referred has militated against the development of more
 principled approaches. For this reason the most telling formula-
 tion is Richard Middleton's: "it seems likely," he says, "that in
 practice there are . . . limits to the transmutation of meaning."⁵⁴
 The phrase "it seems likely" simultaneously conveys the urge to
 believe this and the absence of any principled basis for doing so.
 The challenge for the theorist, then, is to find a third way, and so
 pass between the Scylla of inherent and the Charybdis of social
 constructed meaning.

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

There is a general tendency for critical discussions of musical
 meaning to assimilate it to verbal signification. Miles argues that
 McClary "treats music as if it were almost linguistic in nature:
 witness the liberal use of verbs such as 'articulates' . . . McClary's
 metaphors effectively convey her insights into the social meanings
 of music but at times they obscure the distinction between music
 and language."⁵⁵ Particularly revealing in this context is a prevail-
 ing suspicion, particularly evident in Kramer's writings, of the
 associated ideas of immediacy and ineffability. The grounds for
 suspicion are plain enough: meaning that lies beyond the range of
 critical discourse will by definition present itself as immanent and
 indeed natural, thereby contravening the social-constructionist
 principles to which I have referred. And since Kramer's back-
 ground is in literary studies, it is hardly surprising if he identifies
 meaning with language and thinks in terms of the mutual perme-
 ability of text and commentary.⁵⁶ But music is not language, at

⁵⁴Middleton 1990, 154.

⁵⁵Miles 1995, 26.

⁵⁶Kramer asserts that the work "resists fully disclosing itself, that in certain
 important respects it is mute, and that we ourselves understand it at first in
 terms we must work to articulate" (Kramer 1990, 5). This looks at first sight
 like a defence of ineffability but in reality is not, for the premise of Kramer's
 criticism is that music "must be made to yield to understanding" (6, my italics),
 in other words that it can be made to talk.

least in more than a partial and analogical sense, and if we are to draw on other cultural practices for models of musical meaning, then it would make equally good sense to turn to the study of material culture, where issues of ineffability cannot be airily waved away.⁵⁷

In his book *Material Culture and Mass Consumption*, Daniel Miller writes of

the inadequacies and crudity of language when faced with objects in everyday interaction . . . Imagine for a moment attempting to describe in detail the difference in shape between a milk bottle and a sherry bottle, or the taste of cod as against haddock, or the design of some wallpaper. Clearly, compared with our ability to make fine discriminations of perceptual qualities and immediately to recognize and discriminate amidst a profusion of ordinary objects, linguistic description may appear slow and clumsy.⁵⁸

And in a similar vein, in his essay on some Eisenstein stills, Barthes spoke of the "obtuse" meaning of visual images, a meaning that is "evident, erratic, obstinate," and that defies explicit formulation or representation: as he says, it is "theoretically locatable but not describable."⁵⁹ Such views run parallel with the widespread intuition that music, too, resists comprehensive verbal formulation—views hard to shrug off as just lingering Romantic ideology (in the case of Scott Burnham, for instance, for whom "we hear music speak . . . not by reducing it to some other set of

⁵⁷It is a curious fact that so many musicologists and theorists have embraced Goehr's image of the "imaginary museum of musical works" without really considering the implied parallel between musical works and what real museums contain, that is to say material artefacts. To pursue this observation would take me beyond the bounds of this article, but I have in mind the possibility that the most appropriate models of narrativity in music might be drawn not from literature but from the manner in which turn-of-the-century museology conveyed social-evolutionary and diffusionist paradigms through the collocation of material artefacts (Miller 1987, 110–11).

⁵⁸Miller 1987, 98.

⁵⁹Barthes 1977, 53, 65.

!!
Central + pivotal
assertion

pivot (?)

circumstances but by allowing it the opacity of its own voice"⁶⁰. It follows that the interpretation of material culture might provide a useful model for musical meaning to complement the widespread, though often tacit, appropriation of models derived from language or from literary texts.

How, then, do objects signify? Through the social construction of meaning, to be sure. Like a literary or musical text, a pot or a picture does not simply have meaning built into it, just waiting to be discovered. Accordingly, Miller rejects "the idea of physicality as some 'ultimate constraint' or final determining factor," instead emphasizing that

even a cursory examination of artefacts as actually employed within different societies reveals the extreme diversity of uses and connotations among physically similar forms . . . Societies have an extraordinary capacity either to consider objects as having attributes which may not appear as evident to outsiders, or else to ignore attributes which would have appeared to those same outsiders as being inextricably part of that object.⁶¹

Again: limits!

But in saying that the meaning of the object is socially constructed, he is not saying that it is simply or exclusively arbitrary. And it is the idea of the attribute that enables him to find a way between these two positions. The argument is in essence a simple one: any pot or picture has an indefinite, though not infinite, number of physical attributes, and each society makes its own selection from and interpretation of those attributes. (It is perhaps easiest to see what this might mean in terms of the different ways certain paintings have been seen at different times: Hans van Meegeren's Vermeer forgeries, for example, originally fooled the experts but look quite different from the originals now. The shift in the way they are seen reflects a different selection of attributes, and their price has changed accordingly.) The meaning that the object acquires within a particular culture is thus supported by—

⁶⁰Burnham 1997, 326.

⁶¹Miller 1987, 105, 109.

and at the same time helps to attributes which that culture has what it is for that culture. In the constructed, it is both enabled and tributes of the object.

Before we can confidently address a culture to the analysis of musical practice. Material objects autographic; they may be replicated independently. Musical instances equally by scores, per this way the notational trace frequently, by a number of more commented or substituted by the rances and recordings, each of empirical resistance in both the what we think of as "a piece" of as an indefinitely extended series).⁶² But this is only part of: one can usefully draw analogies performing arts. And for this re the material culture analogy I have drawn from theatre studies.

In her book *A Semiotics of the* concerned with the way in which between theatrical performers, and being reproduced in performance tant to musical performance, but occasion.) Where a modernist culture and unity, Melrose invokes the role of . . . semiotic potential, he

⁶²Goodman 1969.

⁶³For further discussion, see Cook 1

But are
objects for
practical
use?
Music
different?

Postulate [from material culture]

and at the same time helps to stabilize—the specific selection of attributes which that culture has made; it helps to make the object what it is for that culture. In this way, while meaning is socially constructed, it is both enabled and constrained by the available attributes of the object.

Before we can confidently apply a model drawn from material culture to the analysis of musical meaning, however, we need to address a very obvious distinction between the two forms of cultural practice. Material objects are, in Goodman's terminology,⁶² autographic, they may be replicated, but each object has its own independent existence. Musical objects, by contrast, are allographic, instanced equally by scores, performances, or sound recordings. In this way the notational trace represented by the score—or, frequently, by a number of more or less diverging scores—is supplemented or substituted by the multiple acoustic traces of performances and recordings, each of which manifests its own forms of empirical resistance in both the semiotic process and its analysis; what we think of as "a piece" of music should really be conceived as an indefinitely extended series of traces (and when I speak of the musical trace in this article, it is a shorthand for the entire series).⁶³ But this is only part of a larger issue: the extent to which one can usefully draw analogies between the autographic and the performing arts. And for this reason it is helpful to complement the material culture analogy I have put forward with a further one drawn from theatre studies.

In her book *A Semiotics of the Dramatic Text*, Susan Melrose is concerned with the way in which dramatic meaning is negotiated between theatrical performers, rather than inhering in the text and being reproduced in performance. (This approach is equally relevant to musical performance, but I shall explore that on another occasion.) Where a modernist critic might have looked for coherence and unity, Melrose invokes the decentered concept of a "bundle of . . . semiotic potential, held together by the differing ener

getic input of group members faced with the demands for immediate concrete work" and "ceaselessly negotiated" between them, resulting in "a cluster of different contributions which produce, even 'in the moment' of what looks like 'a single action,' a tension and a certain semiotic heterogeneity."⁶⁴ As constructed in performance, then, meaning is emergent; it is not reproduced in but created through the act of performance. And it is this emergent quality, together with the idea of a bundle or cluster of semiotic potential, that I want to invoke in the analysis of musical meaning. For, like physical objects, the material traces of music support a range of possible meanings, and like Melrose's image of performance interaction, they can be thought of as bundles comprised of an indefinite number of attributes from which different selections will be made within different cultural traditions, or on different occasions of interpretation. We might speak of differential semantic parsing, and this is one source for the cultural variability of musical meaning, one way in which there is an articulation—a degree of play—in the relationship between music and its meanings.

But there is also another source, which will take longer to explain. As I have suggested, one of the problems with the "contour" theory of musical expression is that it binds meaning so closely to music as to become, to all intents and purposes, immanent; it doesn't, in other words, recognize the articulation to which I have just referred. And because of this, and in order to accommodate empirical evidence that listeners do not exactly agree on what emotions a given piece of music expresses, neo-Hanslickian philosophers like Kivy and Davies have argued that music can express only gross emotional qualities, such as happiness or sadness, but not more nuanced emotions such as joy, elation, delight, and high spirits on the one hand, or grief, despondency, dejection, depression, gloom, moping, and broken-heartedness on the other (regrettably, there are more words for "sad" than "happy").⁶⁵ This argument is based on the premise that these more nuanced or

opacity of its own voice"⁶⁰). Material culture might provide a way to complement the widening of models derived from

rough the social construction of musical text, a pot or a jug built into it, just waiting to be subjected "the idea of physicality as a determining factor," instead

s actually employed within diversity of uses and connotations. Objects have an extraordinary capacity for attributes which may not appear to be attributes which would have been an inextricable part of that ob-

the object is socially constructed or exclusively arbitrary. It enables him to find a way in which meaning is in essence a simple matter, though not infinite, number. Society makes its own selection of attributes. (It is perhaps easier to see the different ways in which objects are used at different times: Hans van den Hoonaard, originally fooled by the originals now. The shift in the selection of attributes, etc.) The meaning that the object has is thus supported by—

"work"



* How diff. from Gadamer + Wirkungs-geschichte? (more "material" + "sound-based" less on reading?)

steering clear of a "conceptual" understanding of the work

⁶²Goodman 1969.

⁶³For further discussion, see Cook 1999.

⁶⁴Melrose 1994, 221-2.

⁶⁵See Davies 1994, 226, where this argument is set out in detail.

Again: "attributes" + "potential"

CRUX

∴

Better than

"contour" theory



NB: THE BERGER/HEIDEGGER PAGE

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cf. Berger's invocation of Heideggerian *Stimmung* w/o an object → viewed as more basic ← elemental.
"higher" emotions require a formal (intentional) object, in the sense that one cannot just be proud or envious, one has to be proud or envious of someone or something; music cannot supply formal objects, or so the argument goes, and hence it is restricted to simple, objectless emotions or moods, like happiness and sadness.⁶⁶ In short, music can only express unnuanced emotion.

I have observed in another context that this conclusion is hardly calculated to satisfy musicologists (hence the prolonged but inconclusive exchange of essays between Kivy and Anthony Newcomb) and that, perhaps unexpectedly, it is Hanslick who suggests the way forward.⁶⁷ In an early formulation of what has since become known as the cognitive theory of the emotions,⁶⁸ Hanslick argued that emotions like longing, hope, or love depend on a formal object in the absence of which, as he puts it, "all that remains is an unspecific stirring, perhaps the awareness of a general state of well-being or distress."⁶⁹ (This is not so different from what Kivy and Davies claim that music is capable of expressing.) But Hanslick pursues his thought in a different direction:

Love cannot be thought without the representation of a beloved person, without desire and striving after felicity, glorification and possession of a particular object. Not some kind of mere mental agitation, but its conceptual core, its real, historical content, specifies this feeling of love. Accordingly, its dynamic can appear as readily gentle as stormy, as readily joyful as sorrowful, and yet still be love. . . . Music can only express the various accompanying adjectives and never the substantive, e.g., love itself.

In short, then, Hanslick is arguing that music is highly ineffective as a means of conveying emotion, but what it does convey is

⁶⁶This argument is widely but not universally accepted: for exceptions see the contrasting accounts of the complex emotion of hope offered by Levinson 1990 and Karl & Robinson 1997.

⁶⁷See Cook 1998, 86-97.

⁶⁸Kivy 1993b, 284.

⁶⁹Hanslick 1986, 9.

TERM
Stimmung?
i.e. Citroën engine
Figaro's attributes
an object.
nuance.⁷⁰ Or even more succinctly: music conveys not unnuanced emotion but emotionless nuance.
And that, I suggest, provides the key to a model of musical meaning that understands it as neither immanent nor arbitrary, but rather negotiated and emergent just as Melrose sees dramatic meaning. I can make the point very simply by referring to a television commercial, about which I have written elsewhere, in which shots of a Citroën ZX 16v powering its way up twisting country lanes are aligned with extracts from Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro* overture.⁷¹ Heard in this context, the energetic and expressive attributes of Mozart's music—in other words, its nuances—cluster themselves around the car, transferring to it the qualities of power and verve and grace associated with them, and at the same time endowing it with connotations of prestige and high culture. (I shall go into this process in a bit more detail below.) The music, so to speak, seeks out the qualities of the car, and conversely the image of the speeding Citroën might be said to interpret the music. And so a composite meaning emerges, one which was immanent in neither the overture nor the car. That, of course, is an example of multimedia, not of "music alone," to borrow Kivy's phrase (which he in turn seems to have borrowed from Hanslick).⁷² But it is central to my argument that music never is "alone," that it is always received in a discursive context, and that it is through the interaction of music and interpreter, text and context, that meaning is constructed, as a result of which the meaning attributed to any given material trace will vary according to the circumstances of its reception. In this way it is wrong to speak of music having particular meanings; rather it has the potential for specific meanings to emerge under specific circumstances. Or to borrow a

⁷⁰In Cook 1998, 94, I suggested that precisely this is implied by Hanslick's admittedly undeveloped analogy with silhouettes (see Hanslick 1986, 18). I have previously advanced the same general argument in Cook 1996, 121-2.

⁷¹Cook 1998, 4-8.

⁷²Kivy 1990; Hanslick 1986, 2 (but Kivy would probably have referred to Gustav Cohen's translation, where the phrase appears more prominently: Hanslick 1974, 17).

term from J. J. Gibson,⁷³ music but it affords sentiments of love. And that is a second way in which relationship between music and source of the cultural variability

CONSTRUCTING MEANING: A CA

In speaking of the "material" from Jean-Jacques Nattiez, who substitutes this term for what (formerly called the "neutral level."⁷⁴ Although like the score in drag, the later patent difficulties of the earlier paradoxical about the idea of it see how it can be conceived in poetic or the esthetic, if not famous Oxford limerick about B level is the opposite of the tree you are not thinking about it.

But that there is a need for is illustrated through the comparison do not present themselves as support. Instead, they appear through, as if meaning was in the same way, the double articulation which I have referred to is imperfectly describes the point of recapitulation Ninth Symphony as an expressive kind of pleasure in its fulfillment

⁷³Moore has also applied Gibson's concept in the context of visual perception see also Cook 1998, 96).

⁷⁴Nattiez 1990, 15.

⁷⁵McClary 1991, 128.

* DISCUSS

NB central!

term from J. J. Gibson,⁷³ music does not have specific meanings, but it *affords* sentiments of love, grace, prestige, desire, whatever. And that is a second way in which there is an articulation in the relationship between music and meaning, and hence another source of the cultural variability of musical meaning.

CONSTRUCTING MEANING: A CASE STUDY

In speaking of the "material trace" of music I am borrowing from Jean-Jacques Nattiez, who in his *Music and Discourse* substitutes this term for what (following Molino) he had previously called the "neutral level."⁷⁴ Although it still looks uncomfortably like the score in drag, the later term at least avoids some of the patent difficulties of the earlier one; there is after all something paradoxical about the idea of the neutral level, in that it is hard to see how it can be conceived in terms that do not invoke either the poetic or the esthetic, if not both. In other words (those of a famous Oxford limerick about Berkeley's philosophy), the neutral level is the opposite of the tree in the quad: it is only there when you are not thinking about it.

But that there is a need for some such conception can again be illustrated through the comparison with material culture. Objects do not present themselves as separable from the meanings they support. Instead, they appear to us as meaningful through and through, as if meaning was immanent within them. In just the same way, the double articulation between music and meaning to which I have referred is imperceptible. And so, when McClary describes the point of recapitulation in the first movement of the Ninth Symphony as an expression of "murderous rage and yet a kind of pleasure in its fulfillment of formal demands,"⁷⁵ it may

⁷³Moore has also applied Gibson's concept of affordance, originally developed in the context of visual perception, to musical meaning (Moore 1993, 6; see also Cook 1998, 96).

⁷⁴Nattiez 1990, 15.

⁷⁵McClary 1991, 128.

come to be heard that way by her readers in just the same, self-evident manner that a generation of British critics and listeners heard it as a representation of cosmic catastrophe. Where Tovey, writing in the 1930s, said that "we see the heavens on fire," Robert Simpson, writing after the war, spoke of "the sky . . . blazing from horizon to horizon," and Basil Lam of a "flame of incandescent terror." Each writer gives the impression of not being engaged in a hermeneutic exercise but simply saying how the music is.⁷⁶ In this way, the plurality of music's meanings is not a phenomenological given but has to be deduced from the study of its reception.

At this point, it is helpful to develop in greater detail the parallel I have already invoked between the experiencing of music and that of such mixed genres as the television commercial, film, or music video, where words, pictures, and music are typically experienced not as separate or even separable components, but as combined with one another and replete with meaning. (In my book on

analyzing musical multimedia, I developed a model for the analysis of such combinations based on George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's concept of metaphor, more recently developed by Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier under the title "conceptual blending."⁷⁷ The model has two basic elements. First, there is what I call an "enabling similarity":⁷⁸ there must be common attributes presented by the various media in question (music and moving image, say), in the absence of which there would be no perceptual interaction between them. Second, there is what Turner and Fauconnier term (the "blended space," in which the attributes unique to each medium are combined, resulting in the emergence of new meaning. The Citroën commercial to which I have referred

⁷⁶Tovey 1935-9, vol 2, 100; Simpson 1970, 60; Lam 1966, 161. See Cook 1993, 66-7.

⁷⁷Cook 1998, Chapters 2-3; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Turner 1996; Turner & Fauconnier 1995. A major element of the original theory, not incorporated within my adaptation of it, is the hypothesis that all metaphors are ultimately grounded in body schemata, creating a potential link with "contour" theory (see n. 42 above).

⁷⁸Cook 1998, 70.

provides a convenient illustration. The alignment of music and moving image works, obviously, around the representation of the car that is being promoted (see the top square of Example 1).⁷⁹ In the left- and right-hand squares (film and music spaces), we have some of the corresponding attributes of the two media (no doubt there are others, but it is the framework rather than the detail of the analysis that I want to convey). And at the bottom, we have the blended space in which the meaning of the commercial emerges: the qualities of agility, precision, style, and prestige associated with Mozart's music are drawn from it, so to speak, and transferred to or predicated of the ZX 16v. In that predication lies the advertiser's message.

My point is that we can model an interpretation of the recapitulation in the first movement of the Ninth Symphony in just the same way. Example 2 is a representation of the Tovey/Simpson/Lam interpretation, which is based mainly on the quality of sustained, glaring brilliance shared by Beethoven's music and the image of the sky on fire. The result is to transfer to the music the qualities encoded within the image: on the one hand a sense of the remote and the inhuman, and on the other connotations of catastrophe and terror. (Though the Tovey passage predates the Second World War, I cannot imagine Simpson writing of the sky "blazing from horizon to horizon" or Lam of a "flame of incandescent terror" without evoking the memory of the devastating bombing raids on British cities from 1940 on—and so we have come back to a war-like interpretation of the Ninth after all). We might even think of this as a discovery within the music of these qualities, in the sense that the interpretation builds upon the music's semantic potential. And it does so by virtue of a number of specific attributes of the musical trace, as shown by the "music space" box in Example 2. There is the sheer, sustained stasis of the D-major chord; the fortissimo brass tones heighten its perceptual brightness, and the effect is underlined by the emphatic first-

inversion voicing. There is also the very fact of the major mode, wholly unanticipated in the preceding measures, of which Tovey remarks that "there is something very terrible about this triumphant major tonic, and it is almost a relief when it turns into the minor as the orchestra crashes into the main theme."⁸⁰ These particular attributes, then, are foregrounded by the image of the sky on fire, so illustrating what I mean by the selection of attributes from the musical trace.

By contrast, McClary's interpretation involves a quite different selection of attributes. At this point it is worth recalling what McClary actually says.⁸¹ It all turns on a kind of sustained *double entendre* around the word "subject," which she uses simultaneously in a traditional analytical sense (interchangeable with "theme") and in the sense of the putative subject whose experiences the music expresses. The first part of the movement, she says, has seen the arduous individuation of the subject from the "womblike void" of the opening, the construction of an identity maintained "only by virtue of the subject's constant violent self-assertion"—a self-assertion that takes the form of resisting the desire for cadential closure built into the generic narrative of the symphony. This means that the point of recapitulation carries with it a double threat: loss of identity through regression to the undifferentiated state of the opening, and the irresistible demand for cadence into the tonic towards which, as she puts it, "the whole background structure of the movement has inexorably driven." The image of the sexual killer emerges quite logically from these premises: in McClary's words, "the desire for cadential arrival that has built up over the course of the development finally erupts, as the subject necessarily (because of the narrative tradition) finds itself in the throes of the initial void while refusing to relent: the entire first key area in the recapitulation is pockmarked with explosions. It is the consequent juxtaposition of desire and unspeakable violence in this moment that creates its unparalleled

Example 1. Conceptual integrati

fusion of murderous rage and yement of formal demands" (and previously quoted).

Here, then, the blending of m different set of semantic properti interpretation; instead of a remot too-human menace, a mixture o imminent invasion of personal shows, this interpretation is artic glare of the music, but rather its ties. And that in turn is based on different selection of attributes fr ation of thematic identity (inste:

⁷⁹The graphic representation is adapted from Zbikowski 1999; in Turner & Fauconnier's (1995) terminology it is a conceptual integration network (CIN).


⁸⁰Tovey 1935-9, vol. 2, 100.

⁸¹McClary 1991, 128, where the following quotations will all be found.

Are assigned to a visual commercial object

i.e., by homologies (attributes)

Example 1. Conceptual integration network for a car commercial



fusion of murderous rage and yet a kind of pleasure in its fulfillment of formal demands" (and there, of course, are the words I previously quoted).

Here, then, the blending of music and image results in a quite different set of semantic properties from the Tovey/Lam/Simpson interpretation; instead of a remote, inhuman terror, we have an all-too-human menace, a mixture of repression and oppression, the imminent invasion of personal space or worse. As Example 3 shows, this interpretation is articulated around not the sustained glare of the music, but rather its inner tension, its eruptive qualities. And that in turn is based on, and hence foregrounds, a quite different selection of attributes from the musical trace: the obliteration of thematic identity (instead of stasis); the effectively ar-

rhythmic, eruptive sixteenth-note upbeats; and the transgressive, almost twisted progression through which the music lurches from the first-inversion D-major triad to a root-position B \flat -major one (particularly striking is the incoherence, in terms of contemporary norms, of the F \sharp -F \flat -B \flat bass line in m. 312). In this way, and despite its historical implausibility, McClary's sexual interpretation does the same as Tovey's war-like one: it builds on the objective properties of the musical trace in such a way as to construct and communicate a quite distinctive way of experiencing the passage. (This means that, *pace* Treitler, it can justifiably be seen as driven by the music and not just the need to interpret it.) And again as in Taylor's interpretation, the blend of music and image results in a new, which is to say emergent, meaning; there could hardly be a

NB


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Following quotations will all be found.

→ Main point

Example 2. Conceptual integration network for Tovey's interpretation of Beethoven, op. 125, I, mm. 301 ff.



Does this diagram deal only with the vertical dimension? Surely, the horizontal placement also matters (along with ml's awareness of typical recapitulatory strategies "blown up" at this point)

clearer illustration of the way in which the critical and analytical discourse that surrounds music is engaged in the very act of creating meaning.⁸² We shall never be able to shake our experience free from this powerful interpretation—that is, until the next one comes along.

⁸²This is discussed at length in Rabinowitz 1992; see also, for instance, Kingsbury 1988, 201 ("musicological discourse is not simply talking and writing 'about music,' but is also constitutive of music") and Bohlman 1993. In a sense this entire section has been an illustration of Burnham's (1995, 31) succinct claim that Beethoven's music "is not so much about anything in a directly

Discuss → How is this like (or unlike) conceptual concretizations of the text? (or "readings")

REHABILITATING THE INEFFABLE

I have outlined a way in which we can understand musical meanings as afforded (and hence constrained) by the properties of the musical trace while at the same time recognizing their cultural constructedness, and suggested that this provides a way of passing between Scylla and Charybdis. As I shall now argue, it also gives

referential sense but acts as a disembodied yet compelling force that attracts whatever is at hand as long as it is remotely commensurable."

Also → We see the two readings, Tovey + McClay — But is there any way to assess their relative merits? Or are we free, totally, to read cloud-pictures, so long as the clouds in question have some constraining "attributes"?

in "point of meaning pre-actualization" → Q.E.D. / limits!
 sometimes named "(Stimmung)"


Example 3. Conceptual integration

- text s_j
- viole
- minc
- main
- desir

rise to a distinction between what tualized" meaning, and the fact t meaning—to two quite distinct th deal of the confusion that surround

⁸³The distinction I am drawing is rela between "pre-linguistic" and "linguistic" that Coker's "instinctual, affective respon: as the experience of meaningfulness. Cor between "acquaintance" and "discursive" Lucy Green (1998) makes between "inhe: echoing Meyer's (1956) "embodied" and ' tinction is sometimes drawn between "me with the aim of setting limits on the latter

Example 3. Conceptual integration network for McClary's interpretation of Beethoven, op. 125, I, mm. 301 ff.



rise to a distinction between what I shall call "potential" and "actualized" meaning and the fact that we apply the same word—meaning—to two quite distinct things is responsible for a good deal of the confusion that surrounds issues of musical meaning.⁸³

⁸³The distinction I am drawing is related to Coker's (1972, 151–2) contrast between "pre-linguistic" and "linguistic" meaning, though it is not clear to me that Coker's "instinctual, affective response" (152) is the same as what I refer to as the experience of meaningfulness. Compare also Coker's further distinction between "acquaintance" and "discursive" meaning (171–81), and that which Lucy Green (1998) makes between "inherent" and "delineated" meaning, itself echoing Meyer's (1956) "embodied" and "designative" meaning. A parallel distinction is sometimes drawn between "meaning" and "interpretation," generally with the aim of setting limits on the latter (see below, n. 93).

When I spoke earlier of "semantic potential," I was referring to something more than a merely theoretical potential for meaning. The tensional or energetic qualities on which the "contour" theory is based are given in perception, and I would maintain that they are *experienced* as a potential for meaning as yet undefined;⁸⁴ it was just this experience I had in mind (when I spoke of music conveying emotionless nuance. (Perhaps the best analogy is hearing conversation in a language you do not know: you do not grasp the meaning, but you do sense its meaningfulness.) But there is a

⁸⁴For Green, by contrast, "we can only ever experience music when its inherent materials temporally reach consciousness as meanings in terms of their status as a historically defined, delineated musical unity" (Green 1998, 33).

Again, the stimming argument? (Beyer)

p. 180

we can understand musical (strained) by the properties of (me recognizing their cultural his provides a way of passing shall now argue, it also gives

yet compelling force that attracts commensurable."

Does this argument re-inscribe, in modestly
Engl.-language phil. terms, the
concepts of the phenomenologists?

Holsinger: aesthetic of empathy,
transhistorical

of concretization —
a "reading" [Ingarden; Iser]

further component of this experience, and that is an urge to create the kind of explicit meaning that depends on words for its formulation and communication; I have elsewhere likened this interpretive desire to the compulsion to tell a secret.⁸⁵ And interpretation means transforming potential meaning into actualized meaning in the manner I described in the previous section. (This is what happens every time a writer in the neo-Hanslickian tradition identifies an expressive characteristic in the music. (In fact, it would be possible to reformulate the "contour" theory in terms of a conceptual integration network defined by tensional or energetic attributes.) It is for this reason that there is a kind of sleight of hand in the impression these writers give of simply describing how the music is, when in reality they are in the business of proposing interpretations and so constructing actualized meaning.

And that brings me back to some of the issues I raised at the beginning of this article. We can see that the disturbing impression McClary gives of discovering meanings just "waiting to be read," as DeNora put it, derives not from the interpretations themselves but rather from the way that McClary appears to draw them directly from the music: the double articulation between musical trace and actualized meaning (in the selection of attributes, and in their incorporation within a critical interpretation) is disguised behind an account that gives every indication of simply telling it how it is. But there is a more general issue here. The social constructionism which underwrote the culturally oriented musicology of the 1990s entailed a denial that there could be such a thing as unmediated access to musical meaning (along with a thoroughgoing suspicion of theory as a discipline allegedly dedicated to in-

⁸⁵Cook 1998, 267. It might be objected that the desire to interpret music is not restricted to verbal expression but also encompasses, for instance, dance, film, and even musical performance. While this is true, none of these involve the kind of complementation, based on the opposed values of connotation and denotation, that is created by the alignment of music with words; one might speak in such cases of a process of triangulation, a progressive refinement of connotation resulting from the blend, but that is not the same thing.

interpreting music directly, in and for itself, without reference to the mediating role of social and cultural knowledge). But not all the writers associated with the "New" musicology would have signed on to this creed—not Philip Brett, for example, who has called music "an enclave in our society—a sisterhood or brotherhood of lovers, music lovers, united by an unmediated form of communication that is only by imperfect analogy called a language, 'the' language of feeling."⁸⁶ What is at issue here is not just Brett's explicit description of music as "unmediated" communication: it is his optimistic invocation of music as a means of bridging cultural difference and creating a sense of shared identity. This position contrasts starkly with Gary Tomlinson's strictures concerning the colonizing qualities of aesthetic appreciation and the necessity of maintaining cultural distance, strictures that themselves developed out of a protracted controversy between Tomlinson and Kramer, during the course of which Kramer accused Tomlinson of wanting a "musicology without music."⁸⁷

This tangled pattern of dissent even between those more or less within the "New" musicological orbit reflects, I think, not so much a healthy variety of opinion as a confusion between the different senses in which music may be described as meaningful. As I have suggested, musical meanings are actualized through processes of critical interpretation that are culturally and historically contingent; in this sense meaning is indeed a cultural construction, and it is this that justifies Tomlinson's warnings against the danger of too easy an understanding of the music of other times and places, along with the illusory sense of communality which it creates. But the same does not apply to the more pre-reflective level at which music is experienced as potential meaning, as "pure" nuance, so to speak. Of course, "pre-reflective" is not the same as "pre-cultural," and even the musical attributes on which

⁸⁶Brett 1994, 18. Treitler similarly speaks of the "unmediated" experience of foreboding in music (Treitler 1997, 44).

⁸⁷See Tomlinson 1993a, Kramer 1993 (the reference to "musicology without music" is on p. 27), and Tomlinson 1993b.

the "contour" theory is based on terms of implication and realization for which this may not be the consistent cross-cultural associations of brightness, for instance,⁸⁹ and associations of dynamics, tempo, think of music as a succession of time, then there is at least a the musical experiences across cultures such an experience might be associated or informed listeners, and justify calling music "the' language sufficient basis for the communal course that in itself constitutes structured performatively through tending together. In this way, it tion in agreeing with both Tom realize that they are talking about

A rather similar argument issue of music's ineffability. I tion of claims that musical meaning sees as masking a belief in its un at pains to emphasize the role of ing musical meaning. But the comes to the experience of music

⁸⁸For a discussion of the relationship see Davies 1994, 241–3; more generally of the concept of iconicity (Eco 1979, Marks 1978, 89–91).

⁹⁰I mention from the relative sense of cross-cultural "core" might be located in the experience which Levinson (1997) refers to as lying the level at which culture-specific practices are individuated. To be sure, Levinson's approach towards Western "art" music, would not be used this way.

the "contour" theory is based may involve culture-specific patterns of implication and realization.⁸⁸ But there are also attributes for which this may not be the case; there is empirical evidence of consistent cross-cultural associations between sonic and visual brightness, for instance,⁸⁹ and the same might be predicated of associations of dynamics, tempo, and perceived energy. And if we think of music as a succession of such attributes presented through time, then there is at least a theoretical possibility of the sharing of musical experiences across cultural boundaries.⁹⁰ However limited such an experience might be as compared to that of fully enculturated or informed listeners, and whether or not it could possibly justify calling music "the language of feeling," it would provide sufficient basis for the communality that Brett is invoking—and of course that in itself constitutes a form of musical meaning, constructed performatively through the very acts of playing and listening together. In this way, it turns out that there is no contradiction in agreeing with both Tomlinson and Brett, just so long as we realize that they are talking about different things.

A rather similar argument might be pursued concerning the issue of music's ineffability. I have already cited Kramer's suspicion of claims that musical meaning lies beyond words, which he sees as masking a belief in its unmediated nature. And I have been at pains to emphasize the role of verbal interpretation in actualizing musical meaning. But the situation is quite different when it comes to the experience of music as potential meaning, as in the

⁸⁸For a discussion of the relationship between "contour" theory and convention see Davies 1994, 241–3; more generally compare Umberto Eco's critique of the concept of iconicity (Eco 1979, 191).

⁸⁹Marks 1978, 89–91.

⁹⁰I mention in the relative sanctuary of a footnote the idea that such a cross-cultural "core" might be located at the concatenationist level of experience which Levinson (1997) refers to as "basic musical understanding," underlying the level at which culture-specific (non-concatenationist) listening strategies are individuated. To be sure, Levinson's model, which is frankly oriented towards Western "art" music, would need considerable refinement if it were to be used this way.

case of emotionless nuance.⁹¹ In *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, Hanslick makes the famous observation that Gluck's music in the aria "Che farò senza Euridice" from *Orfeo ed Euridice*, long admired for "the feeling of intense grief which it expresses in conjunction with those words," would be at least equally effective if the aria instead expressed Orfeo's joy at recovering Euridice.⁹² Hanslick's immediate purpose is to argue that music is emotionally unspecific, but, as in the case of his discussion of love, the implication is that the music's specificity lies in its nuancing of expression. However, one cannot even begin to describe these nuances by means of a vocabulary of the emotions until one has decided whether the music expresses sadness or happiness. It follows that the experience of music as emotionless nuance is one that cannot be translated, even approximately, into words, because the necessary interpretive decisions are not contained within it. One can use words to exemplify possible actualized meanings emerging out of such an experience, but then one is no longer describing the original experience.⁹³ And so we are driven to what looks like a paradoxical conclusion: music depends for its meaning on critical interpretation but is at the same time ineffable. But again there is in reality no contradiction between these claims, because they refer to different kinds of musical meaning.

What I have been referring to as the experience of music as potential meaning corresponds to what Melrose calls "an energetic

⁹¹Raffmann 1993 outlines a partially similar concept of "nuance ineffability" (focussed around issues of pitch).

⁹²Hanslick 1986, 17–18, citing a certain "Boyé, a contemporary of Rousseau"; for further discussion see Kivy 1980, 73–7 and 1993c, Davies 1994, 208–9, and Hatten 1994, 216.

⁹³Cf. Green's (1988, 33) observation that "no inherent meanings are understandable without delineations." In the same way, the distinction between "meaning" and "interpretation" to which I have already referred (see n. 83 above) makes "meaning" incorrigibly mysterious (as soon as you articulate it, it is no longer "meaning"), which is why this is an effective rhetorical device for constraining interpretive debate. It is for this reason that, in Cook 1998, 96 (n. 125), I argued that the term "meaning" is better reserved for what I am here calling actualized meaning.

→ gently chiding Tomlinson's limits?

principle of charity + good will?

cf. Stravinsky

NB!

because experience as Stravinsky pre-concatenation

Kant: the manifold presented
to us?

potential not already semanticized... but made available for different semiotising," and she emphasizes the extent to which this energetic potential is viscerally engaged, somatic, grounded in what she terms "the feel of the words in the mouth."⁹⁴ This locates a source of ineffability in the theatrical experience (words surely cannot articulate the feel of themselves in the mouth), and Melrose develops this into a critique of theoretical marginalization of the somatic at the expense of the categorical, the written, the seen. As she puts it, "through acquiescence to *literature's* dictates... we have learnt to neglect habitually the bite and taste of the words in the mouth in theatre... We have learnt compulsorily to see what we in fact experience elsewhere."⁹⁵ This argument transfers readily to music (we might speak of the feel of the sounds in the fingers or the gut), and once again it contains a hint of what it might mean to theorize music as performance.

What I want to emphasize here, however, is the disjunction between the somatically engaged experience of music's meaningfulness on the one hand, and the terms in which as musicologists—that is to say, as musical word-smiths—we engage with it on the other. I have suggested that, in terms of the semiotic process, musical works are to be understood as bundles or collocations of attributes that may be variously selected, combined, and incorporated within any given actualization of the music's meaning. In other words, regarded as agents of meaning, musical works are unstable aggregates of potential signification. But this is an understanding of "musical works" very different from that constructed through musicology and represented in scores, recordings, stemmata, and middleground sketches: in those interpretive contexts,

⁹⁴Melrose 1994, 207, 202 (emphases Melrose's). A comparison might be made with the "tears, shivers down the spine and gooseflesh" which Sloboda has shown to be significantly correlated with structural features of Western music from classical to jazz and pop, and of which he writes that "these sensations or feelings are not specific emotions, although they may easily give rise to specific emotions if appropriate contexts or associations are to hand" (Sloboda 1998, 27).

⁹⁵Melrose 1994, 218 (emphases Melrose's).

works emerge as relatively stable, hierarchically structured, culturally privileged—in a word, *authorized* wholes. And I suggest that this disjunction between the instability of music as an agent of meaning and the fixed manner of its cultural representation lies behind the strangely garrulous inarticulacy that so easily seizes us when we talk about music.

I can clarify this issue through a final reference to material culture. Miller speaks of the "extreme visibility" of the material object, and also of its "extreme invisibility."⁹⁶ By this he means the divergence to which I previously referred between the physical presence of the object on the one hand—its immediate disclosure of itself as a totality—and on the other, the hidden and fragmented manner of its signification. One sees the object, but one does not see its operation as an agent of meaning, resulting in, as Miller says, its quality of ineffability, its resistance to verbal articulation—a resistance so strong that he is driven to conclude that objects speak directly to the unconscious mind. As he puts it, "the massive gulf between perceptual ability and linguistic competence of conscious articulation... provides evidence in day to day experience of the power of an unconscious oriented towards objects rather than language."⁹⁷ Translate this to music and we might speak of the inaudibility of its operation as an agent of meaning, and the resonance between this and the title of Claudia Gorbman's well-known book on film music, *Unheard Melodies*, is entirely apposite.⁹⁸ The basic message of Gorbman's book is that, by "masking its own insistence and sawing away in the background of consciousness,"⁹⁹ music disguises its participation in the diegetic

⁹⁶Miller 1987, 108. Shepherd & Wicke make a similar point: "The sound-image experienced as a musical sound cannot easily be distinguished from the affective experience that *has* to occur if the sound-image is, indeed, recognized as musical" (Shepherd & Wicke 1997, 139).

⁹⁷Miller 1987, 100.

⁹⁸Gorbman 1987; her psychoanalytically influenced theory of the unconscious working of film music is highly consistent with Miller's interpretation of material culture.

⁹⁹Gorbman 1987, 1.

illusion of the cinema; the aim of therefore to uncover its disguise, to der the music, in a word, *audible*. ory of musical meaning would ent music not (or not only) as authori nant interpretations such as Tovey fugitive amalgams of the potential derlie such interpretations. Or to p recognizing the music's otherness of its own voice, as Burnham pu "engaging that voice in ways that own, much as we allow others a them."¹⁰⁰ And that gives me the c promise and sketch a possible ro builds upon the "New" musicologi

CONCLUSION: THEORY, ANALYSIS, /

As far as fully actualized mean interpretation are concerned, I have about how theory might be invest my comparative analysis of Tovey lytical tools might contribute to an ular interpretation not only emer; musical trace, but also moulds the rience. In this way, theory mig something of the regulative functi ence to nineteenth-century herme opening up questions such as, Just

¹⁰⁰Burnham 1997, 326–7; Miles (1995) concerning music's ability to resist interpret alectical engagement with it. Stephen Bl can gain from acts of close reading and c bility of rereading and rehearing, increas of paradigms, 'ideal types,' and other cons

*
pre-
concretization
Cusick?
Bartnes?

NB
SUMMARY

= Reception History? Wirkungsgeschichte?
open, e.g., to a more historical than theoretical inquiry?
Theorizing Musical Meaning 189

hierarchically structured, cul-
thorized wholes. And I suggest
instability of music as an agent
of its cultural representation lies
articulacy that so easily seizes us
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39).

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illusion of the cinema; the aim of a critical theory of film music is
therefore to uncover its disguise, to reveal its participation, to ren-
der the music, in a word, *audible*. In the same way, a critical theo-
ry of musical meaning would entail the attempt to hear works of
music not (or not only) as authorized wholes stabilized by domi-
nant interpretations such as Tovey's or McClary's, but also as
fugitive amalgams of the potentially meaningful attributes that un-
derlie such interpretations. Or to put it another way, it would mean
recognizing the music's otherness and so allowing it the opacity
of its own voice, as Burnham put it, and then (as he continues)
"engaging that voice in ways that reflect both its presence and our
own, much as we allow others a voice when we converse with
them."¹⁰⁰ And that gives me the cue to make good on my earlier
promise and sketch a possible role for a theoretical project that
builds upon the "New" musicological challenge.

CONCLUSION: THEORY, ANALYSIS, AND MEANING

As far as fully actualized meanings articulated through critical
interpretation are concerned, I have at least provided some clues
about how theory might be invested in such approaches through
my comparative analysis of Tovey and McClary: a variety of ana-
lytical tools might contribute to an understanding of how a partic-
ular interpretation not only emerges from the properties of the
musical trace, but also moulds the manner in which they are expe-
rienced. In this way, theory might be understood as taking on
something of the regulative function that I suggested with refer-
ence to nineteenth-century hermeneutics and formalism, thereby
opening up questions such as, Just how tight is the fit between mu-

¹⁰⁰Burnham 1997, 326-7; Miles (1995, 28-9) offers a similar argument con-
cerning music's ability to resist interpretation and the consequent need for di-
alectical engagement with it. Stephen Blum makes a related claim: "What we
can gain from acts of close reading and close listening is, above all, the possi-
bility of rereading and rehearing, increasing our recognition of the limitations
of paradigms, 'ideal types,' and other constructs" (Blum 1993, 50).

sical trace and meaning, and how variable is it as between compo-
sitions, repertoires, or cultures? At what level of detail does it
make sense to interpret music in terms of fully actualized mean-
ing?¹⁰¹ How far do the attributes that support meaning coincide
with existing analytical categories, or might the interrogation of
music as meaning lead to new ones? (Implicit in these questions
are the beginnings of what might be called a "meaning-to-music"
approach to analysis.)

more like
a
psych.
of
cognition

Given what I have said about ineffability, however, it is hardly
surprising that some authors have proclaimed the entire domain of
a somatically engaged experience of music as potential meaning
to lie beyond the grasp of theory and analysis as conventionally
conceived. For Shepherd and Wicke,

the problem, ultimately, is that music theory and music analysis are based
on the description of sounds as physical events occurring in time and
space and are constructed as linguistic discourses. As linguistic dis-
courses, music theory and music analysis are quite different and distinct
in the character of their thinking from the character of musical experience.
They cannot "reach out" to musical experience in any convincing or use-
ful manner.¹⁰²

One problem with this formulation is the overgeneralized or
simply uninformed claim (which the authors repeat more explic-
itly elsewhere¹⁰³) that theorists and analysts do not care how music
is experienced. Behind it, however, there seems to be a more basic

¹⁰¹For instance, it seems to me that, in ascribing actualized meanings to the
details of moment-to-moment unfolding, Hatten is describing an analytically
constructed mode of listening rather than the everyday experience of music as
meaningful (i.e., describing a form of "musicological" rather than "musical"
listening, as I put it in Cook 1990).

¹⁰²Shepherd & Wicke 1997, 143. They also offer a further argument against
analysis: musical meaning is to be understood in terms of traditions of signifi-
fying practice, not individual instances or artefacts of music (4).

¹⁰³"Music theory and music analysis have taken as their starting point not
musical experience, but the production of music. They have in other words been
more concerned with how the notes are 'placed' than with their effect once
placed" (Shepherd & Wicke 1997, 139).

i.e., we are now to use theory to understand
how "readings" can be actualized?
On the one hand → self-evident? On the other → practically, what do we do??

failure to understand what Charles Seeger called the musicological juncture the manner in which as musicologists or theorists we use words to grasp and worry at what lies beyond words, rather than restricting our disciplinary purview to what can be translated into words without leaving any residue. And what this implies for the analysis of musical meaning is that the aim should not be to translate meaning into words, but rather to attend to the conditions of its emergence.¹⁰⁴ As a form of interpretive criticism, then, discussing as Levinson does whether or not Mendelssohn's *Hebrides* Overture expresses hope might be thought a distinctly thin exercise,¹⁰⁵ and even Hatten's readings of Beethoven could be criticized along similar lines (if only because the emotion expressed so frequently turns out to be abnegation or some other variant of Romain Rolland's slogan "Joy through suffering"). But of course this would be a bit like complaining that Schenker reduced everything to "Three Blind Mice": the focus of Hatten's analyses is not on the emotional identification as such,¹⁰⁶ but on the manner in which expressive qualities are constructed, supported, undercut, or negated by the music. In other words, what matters is not so much the expressive vocabulary as the structural analysis that regulates its application—analysis, that is, of the material trace and of the expressive codes that inform it. It is in this sense that Hatten might claim that, if meaning is inherently musical, then in analyzing music one is always already engaged in analyzing meaning.

¹⁰⁴Martin offers a similar rationale for what he sees as a more genuinely sociological and ethnographic account of musical meaning than homology-based approaches: "attention shifts from a concern with the production of an authoritative reading of a text to the process by which readings are produced and sustained—and to the grounds on which 'authority' is claimed" (Martin 1995, 157).

¹⁰⁵Levinson 1990; it is only fair to note that this is not so much a free-standing exercise in criticism as an approach to the issue of whether music can express complex emotions (see n. 66 above).

¹⁰⁶At one point Hatten refers to his preference for labelling musical meanings "more naturally in terms of correlations with cultural units" rather than in terms of specific emotions (Hatten 1994, 242), but in practice, emotional identifications play a major role in his vocabulary.

But at this point I come back to my earlier complaint that Hatten's interpretations look too much like structural analyses onto which a semantic dimension has been grafted, in effect absorbing meaning back into structure and so reinscribing traditional theoretical assumptions regarding the autonomy of music. If, as I have been suggesting in this article, analysis of musical meaning might be profitably modeled after that of musical multimedia, then there is a particular approach to meaning—or more accurately, perhaps, an approach to a particular kind of meaning—that I would like to mention in closing. Classical film theory insists that the various contributing elements of the moving image (such as diegetic action, camera motion, or editing rhythm) should cohere within a single hierarchy, with none of the components obtruding in its own right, and with relationships between media—moving images, music, and the rest—being restricted to the global level. But in reality, it is common to find subordinate elements within each hierarchy interacting with elements of other hierarchies (for instance, coincidences of cutting rhythms and musical rhythms, which are taboo according to traditional film theory but commonplace in music videos). And the effect of this interaction is to subvert, disrupt, or shatter the hierarchy of the individual media¹⁰⁷—an effect that may be purely perceptual (as when existing concert music is used for a film soundtrack) or composed into the medium in question, as in, for example, the case of traditional Hollywood underscore music.

In his discussion of the musicological juncture, Seeger suggested that "gaps found in our speech thinking about music may be suspected of being areas of music thinking."¹⁰⁸ The same principle can also be applied the other way around: in *Analysing Musical Multimedia*, I put forward a number of analyses, some of them using Schenkerian graphing, the aim of which was to locate points of musical incoherence, breakdowns of hierarchical organization, which I saw as reflecting or performing the intrusion upon

¹⁰⁷For a fuller account, see Cook 1998, 144–5.

¹⁰⁸Seeger 1997, 49.

Beethoven — incision?
rupture?

music of words, images, or of here is that; in the absence of v discontinuities might be seen a sion of meaning, now seen as ; might call this a "music-to-me is not unlike the one I have els the reception of the Ninth Sym incoherence": apparent contra generic heterogeneity, its disj cencies in text setting—were mentators as interpretive oppo were, squeezed into the gaps the application of established becomes possible to extend tl music's unfolding through time into the interstices of the music on its directed motion to cre: causality that the messages wo

¹⁰⁹See the analyses of extracts of Godard's contribution to the collabora These analyses might be compared v modified Schenkerian graph which Ha tion of expressive and structural featu ments from different voice-leading le sentially an orthodox expression of lin of expressive characterization (and w to fit the latter), and in this way migh rather than an interaction between—st

¹¹⁰As explained in Cook & Dibbe gestions of a similar conception in t Robinson, Maus, and Guck; my aim in the kind of theoretical framework that might entail. There is also a link with (mainly) nineteenth-century music as "purely musical" impulses; for a recen

¹¹¹Cook 1993, 67–71.

¹¹²Cook 1998, 16.

!!
no
Solitary
Virtu
meaning

NB

Good.

i.e., that which is not readily assimilable
to generic or orthodox modes of "continuous"
perception? Meaning ONLY IN DISCONTINUITY
AND DEVIATION?

music of words, images, or other media.¹⁰⁹ What I am suggesting here is that, in the absence of words, images, or other media, such discontinuities might be seen as reflecting or performing the intrusion of meaning, now seen as a kind of ghost in the machine (one might call this a "music-to-meaning" approach).¹¹⁰ The principle is not unlike the one I have elsewhere described, with reference to the reception of the Ninth Symphony, as "creating meaning out of incoherence": apparent contradictions in Beethoven's music—its generic heterogeneity, its disjointed orchestration, even its deficiencies in text setting—were seized upon by sympathetic commentators as interpretive opportunities, with meaning being, as it were, squeezed into the gaps left by the composer.¹¹¹ Through the application of established (and other) analytical methods, it becomes possible to extend this principle to the details of the music's unfolding through time. Advertisers insert their messages into the interstices of the music in television commercials, relying on its directed motion to create the logic, consequentiality, or causality that the messages would otherwise lack.¹¹² If this is true

¹⁰⁹See the analyses of extracts from Lully's opera "Armide," as used in Godard's contribution to the collaborative film "Aria," in Cook 1998, Chapter 6. These analyses might be compared with Example 8.3 in Hatten 1994, 213, a modified Schenkerian graph which Hatten describes as representing the interaction of expressive and structural features through its unorthodox mixing of elements from different voice-leading levels (319–20 [n. 8]). But the result is essentially an orthodox expression of linear-harmonic coherence with an overlay of expressive characterization (and with the voice-leading level being adjusted to fit the latter), and in this way might be seen as representing the fusion of—rather than an interaction between—structure and expression.

¹¹⁰As explained in Cook & Dibben (forthcoming), there are sporadic suggestions of a similar conception in the work of, for instance, Hatten, Karl & Robinson, Maus, and Guck; my aim in the remainder of this article is to suggest the kind of theoretical framework that more sustained development of this idea might entail. There is also a link with the tradition of criticism that understands (mainly) nineteenth-century music as an interaction of opposed narrative and "purely musical" impulses; for a recent overview, see Micznik, forthcoming.

¹¹¹Cook 1993, 67–71.

¹¹²Cook 1998, 16.

of the miniaturized art of the commercial, then the far more complexly articulated unfoldings of extended compositions carry correspondingly enlarged possibilities for the shaping and transformation of meaning, and it is precisely this kind of complex articulation that analytical tools are designed to locate and explicate.

In this way, tools conceived under the formalist regime as means of demonstrating music's unity and autonomy (may just as well be pressed into service as means of measuring degrees of unity, charting the limits of music's autonomy, and locating aporias and points of slippage: they then become the instruments of what I referred to as a critical theory of musical meaning. And the autonomy of music becomes not the presupposition or dogma as the "New" musicologists saw it, underwriting the disciplinary identity of music theory and so consigning it to cultural irrelevance, but instead a hypothesis, a fragile and provisional construction negotiated within specific contexts of musical production and reception. No longer seen as just a dimension of autonomously musical structure (as "inherently musical," to borrow Hatten's words once again), meaning emerges as an autonomous agent, an independent principle in the construction and interpretation of music. I take this to be consistent with the kind of dialogical relationship which Burnham enjoined when he wrote, in the passage which I quoted earlier,¹¹³ of engaging the voice of music "in ways that reflect both its presence and our own, much as we allow others a voice when we converse with them."

But I also take it to be consistent with something else, and here I am initiating some unfinished business of my own. Wrapped up with music theory's traditional identification with issues of unity is the search for fundamental structures. By this I do not mean the Schenkerian *Ursatz* as such, though it is certainly a prime example; I mean the idea that unity subsists in uniquely privileged structural elements, from which all other aspects of musical organization are to be derived (and there we have the traditional work

Discontinuity
can be located
via standard
analytical
tools

¹¹³See n. 100 above.

of analysis). It is these other aspects of organization that are embraced within the Schenkerian concept of "design," a catch-all term defined as that which expresses or projects the fundamental structure (in other words, given the predicate of unity, as everything except the fundamental structure itself). This is the background against which Agawu remarks, in *Playing with Signs*, that themes, topics, and other phenomena of the musical surface should not be relegated to the function of design.¹¹⁴ But if we are not to think of them that way, what is the alternative? The answer, clearly, is to think of them as autonomous structural agents, interacting with the fundamental structure through some kind of dialogical relationship. In other words, we would seek to make sense of such phenomena not simply to the extent that they conform to or concretize an underlying, abstract structure, but equally in terms of how they oppose, contradict, or otherwise interact with that structure (and with one another). Follow this through and we end up with an image of music that looks "less like a closed entity," in Kevin Korsyn's words—and, in particular, less like the hierarchies that result from the fundamental structure/projection model—than like "networks or relational events"¹¹⁵ (and it is no coincidence that Korsyn directly links this idea to Bakhtin's concept of dialogic). In other words, one ends up seeing even Kivy's "music alone" as an interaction of autonomous agents, as emergent—in short, as structured in much the same way as multimedia.

And at this point a perhaps unexpected reversal takes place. For if we look upon musical structure this way, meaning becomes just another autonomous agent. It becomes, in other words, an integral element of the music after all—but only because we have started thinking about music differently. Perhaps, then, we should

¹¹⁴Agawu 1991, 113. His call for attention to be given to surface detail in its own right is of course reflected by writers such as Subotnik and in particular Fink, whose argument tends in the same direction as mine (Subotnik 1981, 84–5; Fink 1999).

¹¹⁵Korsyn 1999, 56.

not be theorizing musical meaning after all, but rather looking for ways of understanding music that are fully attuned to its emergent properties, of which meaning is just one.

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Re: Cook → Addresses a classic issue in music aesthetics — The apparent nonreferentiality of nontexted instrumental music... and the associated problem of ascribing "meaning" in any normative sense to music (which is still, albeit, powerfully affecting)

"ROMANTIC" BUT ALSO POSTSTRUCTURALIST, FEMINIST, BARTHESIAN

Pre-cognitive

Immediate

Physical

("object-less")

(cannot be dealt with in linear, logical language)

HIGH MODERNISM

Cognitive "Reading"

(concretized into a "meaning" — attached to concept, idea, or object)

Heidegger: Stimmung (mood): colors Dasein

(as explicated by Karol Berger)

(also → "Being" [non-logical] is wh. fact

Kristeva's "semiotic" mode of discourse

(pre-linguistic)

Lacan: "real" + "imaginary"

Barthes: "grain" + "physicality"
"Geno-song"

→ Kristeva's "symbolic" mode (language grounded)

→ Lacan "symbolic"

→ rejects "meaning" (adjectival) as normally construed

Cook: "emotionless urance" 187

"potential meaning" 180, 185, 1

"bundles of attributes" 180 188

185 "semantic potential" (meaning as yet undefined)

[pre-linguistic]: "cannot be translated,

even approximately, into words" 187, 188, right

∴ reserves the "ineffable" [184, 187

"feel of the sounds in fingers or gut" (188)

"theorize music as performance" (188)

INB: Unlike Barthes, the specific attributes (bundles) LIMIT the actualization of meaning

but does NOT want to disallow?

"actualized meaning"

meaning as "emergent" 179 through an

act of interpretation → attach

selected attributes to a metaphorical referent

"constructing meaning" via

"an enabling similarity" (181) and

"blended spaces" (181)

Is music "ineffable" in this sense to Ingarden?

cf. Ingarden: "concretization" (??)

cf. Gadamer: "fusion of horizons" —

responsibility to "want to know" what the other is saying

Cusick → non-rational, non-analytical

embrace of perf. as a feminist side of things?

Ramsey — "ineffable" in cultural/racial terms?

Holsinger — "body" — music?

Street — elusive meanings + "slippages" /

Jira (Yate talk 21 Feb 05) = "blank" "unstable text"

"enigmatic signifier"

of multiply interconnectable shapes + contexts.

Cook, et.

"ineffable" (184, 187)

Might be a problem in preserving (or lionizing) this category too quickly or too-triumphantly (a pre-cognitive, etc.)

(JH →) Danger → "beyond" or "prior" to words + thus non-capturable, etc etc Can lead to

- 1) an encouragement of non-inquiry (since inquiry is laid out in words + systems)
- 2) a self-blinded emotional free play with music
- 3) uninterrogated self-deception (or indulgence)
- 4) a facile doctrine of musical metaphysics.

Alan Street (orig. Music Analysis, 1989)

Reaction to hammer-lock hegemony of Schenker / Set theory, esp. 1970-90
(Yale, origin of "Music Theory," origin of SMT, req. courses at Yale)

- language of science + mathematics [Babbitt, Forte, Lewin]
- w/ sense that no other methods are tenable AND that these methods are alone adequate to ferreting out "truth" (as Baker, pp. 84-86) and a piece's "unity" (p. 61) [Also true of "method + evidence" modes, p. 91!!]

GOAL → In order to arrive at a "claim to emancipated knowledge" (!! 71, 11 down) !!

Old Order → Must be challenged, undermined, subverted, exploded with the strongest weapons (an attack on rationality + self-preservation) — the verbal weapons:

- "demystification" (71) (esp. of claims to reification, completeness) READ
- "resistance" (107) ^{wherein the power of allegory} + "undermining" (107) all easy solutions (107)
- "complicate" easier, traditional solutions (88) ^{make} "a decisive break" (89) _{revisiting rhetoric}
- avoid all claims of unity and "premature closure" ⁹³ of any analysis (88, 12 up — 93) →
- "disturbing high-romantic dreams of origin, truth, presence" (87) → pure deconstruction - language

"Allegory" [Pivot → Section VIII, p. 87] + "allegorical interpretation" (= deconstruction à la Paul De Man) [post mod.] (1989 - De Man + politics)

(traditional modes denounced as "Symbolist")
3 up 105 "interpretation" can never "contain" ... "structural undecidability" → cf. 89, top line

TRIBUNAL METAPHOR and LANGUAGE (see p. 70) — the language of political interrogation by unforgiving revolutionaries + zealots — totalitarian — no "justice" for the overthrown order. — language of uncompromising assessment (cf. marxist-language "interrogation fantasy") (Orwellian?)
+ VERDICTS (Whitall 82 ⁺¹⁰⁵ — Baker 86 — Kernan 86) (pp. 61, 91) (cf. Klumpenhouwer) — "bad faith" (p. 91) "ideological false ⁽⁹¹⁾ consciousness" (92)

Solution

Never regard any analysis as adequate, massailable, or complete, especially if it makes claims to finding "unity", a single "meaning", or a blind appeal to traditional, quasi-scientific methods. P. 94 offers the Rx \Rightarrow "allegorical interpretation"

- This is because "meaning" [if it exists at all... which it may not, apart from bourgeois self-interest] is elusive and cannot ever be fully captured ["slippage", p. 95 of communication + meaning - standard deconstruction]

- Again p. 105, 1' up \rightarrow "structural undecidability"

- (No exits from slippage, undecidability)

- \therefore Dunsby + "multi-piece" (Brakins op. 116) \rightarrow each piece may be "disruptive" or lack closure ... but at level of multi-piece the unity and closure is attained (76-78 - - or clearer 99, 8 down)

"disruptive"
"synthesis"
and closure

"disruptive implications"

But cf. "Gestalt" ?

Street (2)

Closes all exits, all hope of presence, coherence, meaning —
 Very deconstructionist — bleak — "all knowledge a fictional projection" 107!
 (Punk+!)

Then p. 107! ^{middle} Advantage? emancipation from error (cf. Bourdieu)
 (the usual claim) → also stated, p. 109 middle

Then! bottom of 107, ^{8 up!} — knees buckle ... and a tiny shaft of light enters
 via Davidson — Rorty (pragmatist!)
 Read 107, 7 up to 108, 14 down or so.

Conclusion → 108 margin

109 → keep utopia/ideology critique "double-truth" dialectic alive

110 ^{5 down} ∴ some "constructive insight" is still available!
 but avoid all institutionalization

2005

Street — more general observations

Most of the complaints and jeremiads against orthodox high-modern music theory are virulent reactions against its scientific claims (mixed with the typical "high-reverence" for canonic works + composers)

Esp

- Assumption of "unity" "coherence" "organic structure"
- "perfect continuity + wholeness of thought" — UNITARY MEANINGS that are to be demonstrated by "analysis."
- Demonstrations of wholeness + perfection, the ultimate goal of which is either personally to demonstrate or to reinscribe the reverence or high veneration that we have for the masters, (an unquestioned assumption of the aesthetic — Street, 87 = "the high romantic dream [read: capitalist/bourgeois dream] of origins, truth, and presence") 87
- "goal of formal integration" (72) "unshifting holism" (72)

∴ 75-79 Jonathan Dunsby on "multi-piece" (Brahms op. 116-7 Fantasias) Intermezzo
 (in Chopin Preludes, e.g.) → while each constituent part is consciously not unified ^{disruptive, lack of unity}, collection as a whole is —

79-82 Whittall on Webern op. 7 no. 3 — more unity + coherence in search of "new kinds of coherence" (etc.)

84-85 James M. Baker Webern Six Pieces for Orch, op. 6, as a "highly unified cycle"

Main Q → Is "coherence" IN THE PIECE, as something to be found + then shown as something that objectively exists?

"Coherence" "Continuities of thought/intention" "Unity"

↑ → →

Or are these qualities functions of the analyst (listener) projecting them onto (or into) the text as imaginary fictions — and, moreover, fictions (or self-deceptions) that have more of an ideological grounding and purpose than a musical one (even in the Gadamerian sense of one who "wants to know") —

These are fictions that we also want to project (enforce) onto our disciplinary community for reasons of disciplinary and self-promotion.

(over) →

BUT! The question remains!

If organic continuity, wholeness, coherence, etc., are mostly functions of the analyst and not the text itself...

then why could we not value equally a style of analysis that highlights disjunctions, discontinuities, disruptions, contradictions, ambiguities, self-underminings and the like?

- to refuse to suppress a work's discontinuities in favor of "an illusory coherence" *
Wouldn't it simply be a matter of finding (or inventing) what we're looking for? I.e., tautological?

And in what sense is that "analysis"??

NB - Neither Street nor Klumpenhouwer (nor Casick, nor ...) provide clear examples of how to proceed effectively and interestingly with such an analysis.

* paraphrased from Makaryk entry in De Man, p. 295

Klumpenhouwer "Commentary: Poststructuralism + Issues in Music Theory"
Resisting the Aesthetic

289 ① Basic struggle — Enlightenment norms vs "everything else" that seeks to counter or resist them (anti-humanism, etc) (goes by name: "poststructuralism")
290 — welcomes postmodern critiques, but is also critical of them
— avowed of his Marxist credentials (card-flashing) 290, bottom ONE BEST WAY

286 — both analysts + posties are "running dogs of capitalism"

291 ② "Old" + "new" musicology's objections to music theory —> the shift from the one to the other —> result of new, fragmented conception of self (294)
* 293 —> New musicology —> anti-analysis because of: assumption of a unitary essence + meaning; reification of "work"; + resulting "mystification" (293)

296-97 ③ "Pleasure" - talk - Barthes - liberation of body, etc.
— rejection of "Right puritanism" (Hanslick) 299 and "left puritanism" 309 Tomlinson

300 ④ Poststructuralist music analysis — esp. libidinal / feminist —> mildly approved

303 ⑤ * Schenker analyzed as "feudal socialism" — attack on capitalism + the machine from a reactionary or old-world position — aristocratic critique
— "methodological conservatism" + non-material, non-historical ^{READ}

+ futility of abstract set-theory arguments (306) —> same focus on pure machine + methodology, directing attention from historicity of work in material capitalist culture.

306 ⑥ MARXIST POETICS OF MUSIC — READ + ASSESS

* But what does this have to do w/ music "theory"?

- Jamison
- ① necessity of history, historicization
 - ② implication within socialist societies
 - ③ must address non-political, non-socialist art
 - ④ reception theory in our own culture

pp 306-07

307 Marxist "poetics" — BUT NOT Music analysis in any normative sense?

308 Conclusion: Recommended:

* But —> Does he want to restrict the study of music to only one "superior" category of questions? Why?

- ① Music as Ideology / Ideology Critique
— "yet another locus where classes square off against each other"
- ② Music as fulfilling (some) basic need of societies
— "functioning of music as a libidinal object"
- ③ Analysis of other (entrenched) modes of music-theory/analysis
— as ideology critique
— as "knowledge production"

FINALLY, at VERY END?

Can we use current systems? —> Yes but dialectically (tensely, critically)
"as its most engaged participants" and "its fiercest critic" (309)

Klumpenhouwer Music Analysis essay

Like Street, language of the tribunal + "interrogation fantasy"

All measured by orthodox (more or less) Marxism (Marx, Trotsky ... Lenin + Mao
[Cited as authorities]
looking in! the blood?)

language of 1960s Cuban ideologue or "official" Soviet historians
(North Korea)

- but some Fredric Jameson (esp. early etc.)
Suspicious of Western Marxists (Adorno, Lukacs, etc.) or not loyal enough
(hence express "errors" + "deviations" of thought)

Only Marxism can explain this! (368! Decisionism? a big leap here)

Adorno -

X Culture Industry (373)

X How diff. from Bourdieu (non-empirical) -375 - emph. in structural features³⁷⁵
(but HK rejects - top of 376 + esp. bottom 376)

X Autonomous + valid art (388) "resists containment" - resistance -
hibernation in bad times - seen in structure!!
(HK criticizes ... p. 398 is a summary!) windmills in a moor

Bollen "normotic illness" 385-86 !!

Conclusion → all-embracing ideology critique?

(But see the shorter article in Resisting the Aesthetic)