

Dahlhaus — Aesthetic presence + persistence of the "work" through time

① Combination of:

- Ingarden (intentional act) (a "binding together" of "profiles" by score)
- Wellek variant (W-W — "a structure of norms" (150) "a stratified system of norms" 152)
- Gadamer → distance, alienness (see DIAGRAM)

→ Vergegenständlichungs concretization, not false-consciousness reification (Verdinglichung) or intentionality

cf. also p. 35 "aesth. presence which can be recaptured in later performances"

cf. 155 → "The Iliad still exists" → "it can become again & again effective" p. 156 = "norms and values" [assessments of its workiness]

Q → Is this the concept of work that you accept in your own work? When you to accept it, would anything change in your approach?

Q → what about CD's dissolution of WORK on p. 35, pp. 3-15 down??

Dahlhaus, Wellek, Ingarden presuppose a "high-art" world within a closed canon of masterpieces → Question + problems within that tradition only, which is left unquestioned in terms of value.

Does "The Star-Spangled Banner" have the similar aesthetic presence in this sense?

"Amazing Grace" "We Shall Overcome?"
"I Got Rhythm" Beanie Smith's "St. Louis Blues"

Q within a closed art system

Or do only HIGH-ART WORKS HAVE AN AESTH. PRESENCE?

cf. Dahlhaus p. 8, 7 up — trivial music is NOT a "WORK" but a fragment of social reality.

Problem of ontology of the work in popular music?

Do those works belong to MUSIC HISTORY? (Hist. of music that is a hist. of values)
Marseillaise — Onward Christian Soldiers — We Shall Overcome —
Maine Corps Hymn — This Land is Your Land — Rule Britannia

Other Conceptions of the work — apart from Aesthetic Presence?

(Next Page →)

4/1

Recall the larger picture of what we are trying to do... and how each session fits into the larger plan —

In this seminar

We begin with defenses of dealing with the work as a relatively stable entity, of mind and of consistent expression ^{as} Something centered.

- ① "Work" as a more or less consistent self-presence (coherent, relatively stable meaning) through time. The product, usually, of a single composer — an "AESTHETIC PRESENCE"
 - "liberal arts" / humanistic view → where a "work" is taken for granted.
 - phenomenological variants (Ingarden — Wellek — Warren)
 - autonomy (auto-nomos → judged by its own laws)

But it is precisely this view that has been arraigned as obsolete, naive, indefensible in the past 30-40 years. (It is our "default" position if we do not consider the matter carefully.) ("HONORIFIC" ^{But intellectually bankrupt} close-reading + PERFORMANCE)

I.e. → CAN IT BE SUSTAINED IN THE 21st CENTURY? Do we want to sustain it? ("Collapse" in the belief of high art? or only in the academy?)

Some ^{"New Musicology"} Alternatives (nearly all cast suspicion on an aesthetic approach)
 Call: contra autonomy

- ② Anthropological approaches (esp. via Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, etc.)
 - "thick reading" of contexts and symbol functions of the work for a community (What did this community think it was doing?)
 - "Ritual Studies" (Margot — Craig — Martha Feldman —)
 - Work as socially communicative via symbols of sound — behavior — body placement, etc.
 - Aesth. substance + close reading dissolves away (or leech) into thick context of usage + local symbolism... to "dissolve" music (work) into our historical conditions. → Social function.

- ③ Music and work as marketed commodities within differing systems of circulation, exchange, and prestige (REIFIED COUNTERS of PRESTIGE)
 - Not "Beethoven's 9th" but the "selling of Beethoven's 9th (to which community? what what used as currency or indicators of value? How were costs + benefits reckoned?)
 - Who gained in this transaction? Who lost?
 - ("Monument" studies — S Aspin, Alex Lehitz —
 or cultural construction of "ideological" sites of memory" (lieux de mémoire)
 (opera houses, canons, statues, disciplines)
 Pierre de Nora

- ③ Work (or text) as ideological statement on behalf of one or more constructions of power (meaning can still be "centered")
- Unmarked via hermeneutic of suspicion
 - E.g., to give voice to a minoritarian worldview or ^{hegemonically} to suppress that voice.
- ④ Work (or text) as an ARENA OF DISCOURSE, a SITE OF STRUGGLE within the text itself — Multiple meanings set into tension with one another, some of these clearly escaping the control of the author or composer (or his/her conscious "intention")
- "decenters" the text away from stable + "resolved" content (goal of analyst → to show the interplay of tensions, the multiple voices in the text)
 - I.e., ... power struggles recoverable within the text — discourses of power [Foucault] staged for specific reasons within a contested social arena.
 - Bakhtin: heteroglossia → Multiple voices in the text, some personal, some extra-personal, some embedded in the language-system itself. — Some work to center meaning, others to decenter meaning. — Does language itself (= musical genres + convention) speak more loudly than the composer?
- ⑤ Work as "text" in poststructuralist sense (last week's handout)
- No authorized center of meaning — no "signified" in this free play of the signifier.
 - Author or Composer — Function a mere myth (+ with it, the whole concept of intention)
 - No closure, no resolution — only free play of rich but empty signifiers, etc.
 - pleasure of the body over the centeredness of mind?

Dahlhaus Foundations — 1st 3 Chs.

4/2

Foreword — list of names
Choosing a topic (p. 1)

① Endorsement
persistence of "works" into the present (not doc. evidence)
as in New Hist. ↑

"aesthetic presence" ↑ (not a mere event of the past)

But not externally present (aesth. immediacy) → distanced by our awareness of its
alienness for us. (If they were externally present, they

Both p. 5 → ~~main challenge~~ → could properly be viewed ahistorically)

This is also
CD's justification
of Verstehen, p. 2 top

work
whatever it is

"dispersal" [JH] →
into time + place ... into the present

254 bottom
Wellek-Warren = changes in the minds of readers, critics,
fellow artists

257 = period changes → changes from one
system of norms to another

W-W 43 = "possessive" in a process of traceable development"

Cf. Gadamer = Wirkungsgeschichte.

present time

work
persists

could view
via immediate
experience
(aesthetics of
immediacy —
we historians, as marketed
in open house,
analysts, event
performers (performance
studios)

(music theory)
Cf. W-W; 254 = W.P. Rev.
T.S. Eliot

NB — CRUCIAL → but CD [with Gadamer] insists on
thematising our distance from the original
moments of the work's appearance — MAKING DISTANCE A PROBLEM. (Thus — in part an
∴ a paradoxical/dialectical tension set up) alien object displaced
& put before our eyes)

will be more sophisticated


than Wellek's + Warren's "perspectivism" (NW 43) → somewhat more
(which is basically Gadamer-free) naïvely (?) suggests merely that we
take a middle road in all this, merely
keeping it all in mind ... (p. 43, 18 lines up)

∴ Dahlhaus will want to embrace persistent aesthetic presence
NB but will consistently temper this [problematic it] with the idea
of alien temporal distance [Gadamer] [+ tradition leading up
to him]

Bottom of p. 5 → Main challenge → Political interep. of 19th-c music.

p. 6
"Objectification" (fixing a work) \neq alienation (false consciousness)
as Marxist claim. ^{Entfremdung}

There is a "good"/benign kind of objectification.



② Contra the Transf. Hypothesis \rightarrow which, argues Dahlhaus uses hist. to deny history — historicism \rightarrow a mere awareness of culturally conditioned change + mutability.
all is prelude to a future that's in our hand to mold.
Read p. 7 \rightarrow 12 up — and bottom two lines —

③ Defense of concept (historical) of "greatness" — Disavowal of leveling process of equating all works of music. (Philistines!)
Greatness in music is not oppressive. Not insidious... Quote p. 9, top — bottom

④ ^{p. 10} Hist. as Continuity. Fiction
Foreshadow Ch. 4. Dahlhaus — Protr Joyce — (side by side) ^{hist. as constellation.}
"Does Music History have a subject"? ^{Kracauer} ^{p. 12 bottom 10 up one level system of systems}

OMIT 13 - 17

④ p. 17 bottom \rightarrow Ends with the problem — (we know his solution in Chs 8 + 9)

Chapter 2 - Weltek-Warren Chapter (Similar to Weltek - Warren last chapter)

(19) Alternative Reality - (historical, more intense reality -> more intimate than life) "virtual reality" -> earlier technology

(XX)

(20) 5 approaches to ~~art~~ music in history (20-23) Cf. 74-75

+ Coexistence of multiple paradigms (23, bottom)
Die funktionale Kunsttheorie (Germans) up to ca. 1650 - Affektenlehre - Ausdrucksästhetik
Formalismus - Dokumente
Weltek-Warren recycled, pp. 24-25

24) middle of page Eclecticism (meth. pl.) defended. - Also - advantage of modular assemblies - rather than monoliths - Jan error in one part does not extend to all parts - (cf. social construction)

25-26 = Dahlhaus's version of Weltek pp. 257-64

Problems of historical writing

- 1) pure aesthetic immediacy; function (24 = no hist)
2) influence (25) - cf. Weltek 257-58 + parallels
3) biography
4) ~~parallels~~ (2)

27-29 = Mini-Ch. 8 (Foreshadowing)

make it easier for society to penetrate the autonomy of procedure. Specific social needs can be transformed into ways to pose a purely musical problem. Let us go back once again to the mid-eighteenth century:

I may point out a connection which to my knowledge has so far escaped both the historians and the sociologists of music. As frequently stressed, the turn to the genteel style was linked with the demands of a bourgeois stratum of the audience that was forming then and wanted to be entertained at the opera and at concerts. For the first time composers were confronted with the anonymous marketplace. Without the protection of a guild or of a prince's favor they had to sense a demand instead of following transparent orders. They had to turn themselves, their very core, into organs of the market; this was what placed the desiderata of the market at the heart of their production. The leveling that resulted—in comparison with Bach, for instance—is unmistakable. Not unmistakable, although just as true: that by virtue of such internalization the need for entertainment turned into one for diversity in the compositions, as distinct from the relatively unbroken unity of what is falsely called the musical Baroque. This very variety among the several movements, with the aim of *divertissement*, became the premise of that dynamic relation of unity and diversity which constitutes the law of Viennese classicism. It marks an immanent advance in composing, one which compensated, after two generations, for the losses caused by the initial turn in style. It was the source of a way to pose musical problems that has survived to this day. The customary invectives against commercial mischief in music are superficial. They delude regarding the extent to which phenomena that presuppose commerce, the appeal to an audience already viewed as customers, can turn into compositorial qualities unleashing and enhancing a composer's productive force. We may phrase this in the form of a more comprehensive legality: social compulsions under which music seems to be placed from without are absorbed by its autonomous logic and the need for compositorial expression, and are transformed into an artistic necessity: into steps of the right consciousness.¹

The history of ideas, and thus the history of music, is an autarchic motivational context insofar as the social law, on the one hand, produces the formation of spheres screened off against each other, and on the other hand, as the law of totality, still comes to light in each sphere as the same law. Its concrete deciphering in music is an essential task of musical sociology. Due to such hypostasis of the musical sphere, the problems of its objective content cannot be transformed directly into problems of its social genesis, but society as a problem—as the entirety of its antagonisms—immigrates into the problems, into the logic of the mind.

Let us reflect further on Beethoven. If he is the musical prototype of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, he is at the same time the prototype of a music that has escaped from its social tutelage and is esthetically fully autonomous, a servant no longer. His work explodes the schema of a complaisant adequacy of music and society. In it, for all its idealism in tone and posture, the essence of society, for which he speaks as the vicar of the total subject, becomes the essence of music itself. Both are comprehensible in the interior of the works only, not in mere imagery. The central categories of artistic construction can be translated into social ones. The kinship with that bourgeois libertarianism which rings all through Beethoven's music is a kinship of the dynamically unfolding totality. It is in fitting together under their own law, as becoming, negating, confirming themselves and the whole without looking outward, that his movements come to resemble the world whose forces move them; they do not do it by imitating that world.

In this respect Beethoven's attitude on social objectivity is more that of philosophy—the Kantian, in some points, and the Hegelian in the decisive ones—than it is the ominous mirroring posture: in Beethoven's music society is conceptlessly known, not photographed. What he calls thematic work is the mutual abrasion of the antitheses, the individual interests. The totality that governs the chemism of his work is not a cover concept schematically subsuming the various moments; it is the epitome of both that thematic work and its result, the finished composition. The tendency there is, as far as possible, to dequalify the natural material on which the work is confirmed. The motive kernels, the particulars to which each movement is tied, are themselves identical with the universal; they are formulas of tonality, reduced

to nothingness as things of their own and preshaped by the totality as much as the individual is in individualistic society. The developing variation, an image of social labor, is definite negation: from what has once been posited it ceaselessly brings forth the new and enhanced by destroying it in its immediacy, its quasi-natural form.

On the whole, however, these negations are supposed—as in liberalist theory, to which, of course, social practice never corresponded—to have affirmative effects. The cutting short and mutual wearing down of individual moments, of suffering and perdition, is equated with an integration said to make each individual meaningful through its voidance. This is why the *prima vista* most striking formalistic residue in Beethoven—the reprise, the recurrence, unshaken despite all structural dynamics, of what has been voided—is not just external and conventional. Its purpose is to confirm the process as its own result, as occurs unconsciously in social practice. Not by chance are some of Beethoven's most pregnant conceptions designed for the instant of the reprise as the recurrence of the same. They justify, as the result of a process, what has been once before. It is exceedingly illuminating that Hegelian philosophy—whose categories can be applied without violence to every detail of a music that cannot possibly have been exposed to any Hegelian “influence” in terms of the history of ideas—that this philosophy knows the reprise as does Beethoven's music: the last chapter of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the absolute knowledge, has no other content than to summarize the total work which claims to have already gained the identity of subject and object, in religion.

But that the affirmative gestures of the reprise in some of Beethoven's greatest symphonic movements assume the force of crushing repression, of an authoritarian “That's how it is,” that the decorative gestures overshoot the musical events—this is the tribute Beethoven was forced to pay to the ideological character whose spell extends even to the most sublime music ever to mean freedom by continued unfreedom. The self-exaggerating assurance that the return of the first is the meaning, the self-revelation of immanence as transcendence—this is the cryptogram for the senselessness of a merely self-reproducing reality that has been welded together into a system. Its substitute for meaning is continuous functioning.

All these implications of Beethoven result from musical analysis

without any daring analogies, but to social knowledge they prove as true as the inferences about society itself. Society recurs in great music: transfigured, criticized, and reconciled, although these aspects cannot be surgically sundered; it looms as much above the activities of self-preserving rationality as it is suitable for befogging those activities. It is as a dynamic totality, not as a series of pictures, that great music comes to be an internal world theater. This indicates the direction in which we would have to look for a total theory of the relation of society and music.

The spirit of a time is social in nature, a mode of human conduct which for social reasons has parted with the social immediacy and become independent. It is by way of that spirit that the social essence prevails in esthetic production, the essence of the individuals who are producing at the time as well as that of the materials and forms which face the subject, on which it exerts itself, which it determines, and which in turn determine it. NB
p. 153 The relation of works of art to society is comparable to Leibniz's monad. Windowless—that is to say, without being conscious of society, and in any event without being constantly and necessarily accompanied by this consciousness—the works of art, and notably of music which is far removed from concepts, represent society. Music, one might think, does this the more deeply the less it blinks in the direction of society.

Subjectivity cannot be absolutized esthetically, either. A composer is always a *zoon politikon* as well, the more so the more emphatic his purely musical claim. None is *tabula rasa*. In early childhood they adjusted to the goings-on around them; later they are moved by ideas expressing their own, already socialized form of reaction. Even individualistic composers from the flowering of the private sphere, men like Schumann and Chopin, are no exceptions; the din of the bourgeois revolution rumbles in Beethoven, and in Schumann's *Marseillaise* quotations it echoes, weakened, as in dreams. The subjective mediation, the social element of the composing individuals and the behavior patterns that make them work so and not otherwise, consists in the fact that the compositorial subject, however necessarily it may mistake itself for a mere being-for-itself, constitutes a moment of the social productive forces.

A sublimated art like music that has passed through the interior

Ch. 3 Was ist eine musikalische Tatsache?

5 or 6 main points

33 Tingardov

— contra Marx (phantoms — German Ideology)

The "problem" bottom → ontology of musical fact (base structure of history) (cf. Tingarden, ontology of "work")

34

Distinguish datum (documents, data) from "facts" LYRONG BEHIND THIS — Collingwood Q + A. (more explicit on Dahlhaus, p. 153)

(X) 35, 3-5 down! dissolution of "work" (Tingarden) + facts as conceptualizations (bottom) [cf. concretization] (diagram) [see next page →]

(X) 36 MAIN PROBLEM → HIERARCHICAL GRADATIONS — (cf. Tingarden strata) → Goal → Uncover motivations (categories) [Begriffe] (those features that drive concretizations) (To be reaffirmed in Chs. 6+9)

bottom of 37 → motivations must be historically grounded ...

38 ^{top} and motivations change from period to period Credo → mid-page

39 → Prob. in re social processes CONTINUITY in history (Main topics of Hayden White + Keith Jenkins) Are these mental constructs arbitrary? ends in time + it is a will confound this h, the robustness of results


40 res gestalt / P. 40 4-11 up!!

mental const Still → not total fiction (as in White, Jenkins) —

(X) 41 Criticisms of no P. 41, 6 up!

42 CD's riposte P. 42, 8 down → Main riposte to White, Jenkins (H. White)

p.36




∴ CD's answer to "what is a fact of music history"?

A concretization (p.35, bottom) of "conceptualised events" → including a process of selection of source-data [raw] on the basis of certain conceptual categories, which may differ from scholar to scholar. (i.e., on Tugend-based answer)

- Facts + histories are "readings" - concretizations - of the plenitude of source data ... filling in gaps + blanks etc. (Bakhtin...) [Plenitudes + selectivity]

- Obv. CD thus gives priority to close examination of the categories (hypotheses) through which musical "facts" and "history" are made. (p. 37 = solution)



p.34


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Fusion of Collingwood - Gadamer - Wellek - Ingarden - Weber, etc.
cf. p.83 ↑

Work - Answer to a Question Collingwood on p.153, Dahlham

Returned to and pursued more explicitly in Chapter 6.
("Hermeneutics in History")

34:
"not the source, but the process it refers to"



i.e. → a work is in part of a concentration from a background of historical/aesthetic concern.

IF the "work" is central to 19th-c music (not to 17th!), then we should view it as an answer to a question.

Historian must reconstruct the question —

Is that of a "fact"? It, too, is a concentration + guiding principle (heuristic), not a "reality" in the normal sense.

Weber = Ideal Type

Kant = Regulative Idea

Danto (p.11) = "explanation sketch"

cf. Wellek, p.257 = relating hist. process to a value or norm

Wellek p.265 - regulative idea

Remember Ch.9 = Structure of Substructures, construed as Ideal Types

Langue - parole (Wellek-Warren 152-57 !!)


Wellek's special take on it, merging Ingarden's phenomenology with Saussure's (Ferdinand de Saussure)

Note = Wellek on Ingarden, starts 151.
concept of concretization (esp. 155)
et. "realized in actual experience", p. 150.


NB - 150 - work = "a structure of norms" -
a "potential cause of experiences" (150)
a "stratified system of norms" (153)
"an object of experience" (154)
identity of structure through time (157)

Interestingly, Wellek proceeded to throw Ferdinand de Saussure into the mix (152)

Now one might have expected




BUT (key point!) Wellek interprets further, to consider the ARTWORK ("structure of norms", 150)



NB = History itself
p. 265 !!
a system of norms, standards, conventions

individual concretization (or Ingardenian "profile" or "reading")
(experience of poem) is
a reading = PAROLE

But note = if written criticism, that becomes a statement or LANGUE, subjected to its reader's concretization.




cf. pp. 154-55! Esp. 155
"series of concretizations"

etc. Infinite Regress, leading away from the work.

In garden

1st one is given the work pre-aesthetically + we concretize it into an intentional (aesth. object) or

JH i.e. → most immediate reality of a work lies in differing (heterogeneous) acts of consciousness — differing concretizations! (Hence → we should attend to the principles that guide ours)



Mostly Ch. 8 (Identity of Work in Historical Time) [Dahlhaus's concern]

Listeners

Acts of consciousness / acts of perception (perceiving sound-base (153) and also perceiving hierarchies of "non-sounding" elements — up to and including forms, emotions, and aesthetic values

Also relevant in this profile or concretization are competence, training, education (153)

Moreover, Multiple listeners, experiencing the music intersubjectively, establish the work as public and social (a "social work") through discussions, reports, debates, analyses ... consensus form about the nature & character of the work. (154-55)

NB guarantor of identity! (same as Dahlhaus's "aesthetic presence?")

NB: "bind together" all subsequent performances and "profiles" of the work (150, 147, etc.)

guarantees its identity in future multiplicities (140 — — 151)

Provides a realization of one of the work's PROFILES (150) or CONCRETE PROFILES

NB! work exists as an "ideal boundary" (119) where the composer's and listener's acts

of creativity and consciousness meet — hopefully in a realm without errors or inadequacies

∴ A PURELY INTENTIONAL OBJECT (117) THAT DOES NOT EXIST APART FROM HUMAN INTENTIONALITY + CONSCIOUSNESS (read p. 120 NB!)

(Score → a kind of ultimate regulating device)

Most basic point (Ingarden)

[Here's one conceptual divide]

What Ingarden presumes as axiomatic are two things
(actually, the same thing applied to two different agents, producer and receiver)

More or less (or preponderantly)

- The integrity of
- An individual consciousness (subject) capable of producing "a purely intentional object" (117): art, lit., music — as an act of a centered mind → a site of potentially centered meaning (that can persist in time)
- The same on the receiving end (another subject) apprehending the intentional act by means of a process of concretization (a reading or an understanding) — Again, a centered subject and an act of mind... via understanding of "sound base" (118) + removal of "gaps" or "areas of indeterminateness" (116, 18) to produce a ready.
- True, communication may be imperfect, its results (different concretizations) variable + historically conditioned

but ideally, this is the sympathetic interaction of centered and focused consciousnesses, in which intention + personal control of intention is paramount.

IMPLICIT EVERYWHERE → Hermeneutic of Recovery (Verstehen) (Sympathy)
— And a postulating of the value + existence of the individual conscious mind.
— Plus, here, a high valuation of the project + potential content of Western high art (no suspicious approach / no "unmasking")

∴ (And despite some idiosyncratic nuances) largely on the liberal-humanistic side of the procedural divide,
(+ main question → WHEN WE, AS INDIV. SUBJECTS, PERCEIVE THE PHENOMENA OF MUSIC — WHEN IT IS GIVEN TO OUR PERSONAL CONSCIOUSNESS — WHAT AND HOW IS IT THAT WE PERCEIVE?)

despite
Hermut's famous
bracketing of
of not asking
of questions

⑤ Sounding Elements of a Musical Work (= Chain of Sound-Constructs, or constructions of sounds)

- Motives, notes, phrases ⁸⁷ (succession of sounding units) (with a sense of ordered continuation)
- = hence, sonic "movement" (88)
- technical features ("element")

Def → BASE ⁸⁸ of a musical work (= SOUND BASE) (Dahlhaus = acoustic substratum) ^{also 118}
 "The musical work of art is not confined to its sound base" 88
 but on that base the non-sounding elements are built up. 88

Non-Sounding Elements of a Musical Work (88) - amount varies from one type of music to another: J# → NOT VERY SATISFACTORY

hard → J# → intentional plan of succession in time? - concept of formal arrangement

motion in time is an intentional perception of an impression of motion.

also difficult → forms are determinant of sound-constructs.

a special, seemingly temporal span (p. 70) - implies temporality + its concretized into strict temporality in a performance (70)

- the work's temporal or quasi-temporal structure (89) - not only the purely sound aspect but also everything that manifests itself in the work (90)
 "structured duration" (90) - time structured in one way or another, but not limited only to durational matters - also includes textures, rhythms, tempo, etc. (89)
 Something like prescriptions for a performance - its intended conception of succession.

Appearance of MOVEMENT or MOTION (90) - closely linked with sound + sound-clusters - (a modular idea or gesture) (an idea moves, in a sense, from here to there)
 - "Musical space" contains a "multiplicity of inner motions" (91)
 (The space phenomenally called up by motion.)

Motion → continuity of processes ⁹² (fugue → overlapping of several simultaneous motions) ⁹²
 (Problem of interconnecting diff. modules - bottom of p. 92)

- Forms of small + large elements, arranged in a hierarchy (93) - the same or "form", e.g.s could be articulated in several differing sound constructs (e.g., by transposing a melody - playing it slower, etc.) 94.
 - built on the sound base of a work (i.e. hierarchies) 95
 - form = an "agent of relational ordering" 95 (verse = sonnet, a rhyme scheme)

WEAK - Emotional Qualities (97) [also built on sound constructs ^{base}] - not sounding in nature but obv. connected to sound-constructs (98)

- Transferred of feelings 104 } also take as "outside the work" 105
- Representation (images) 105
- "Aesthetically valuable qualities and the qualities of aesthetic values. 108

Remember → Main Q of Seminar

Us → the work

What is it that we are confronting when we attend to a piece of music?

Secularity → the q. of autonomy of the work and its legitimacy (structuralists, marxists, etc, will collapse the presumed autonomy into acts of society, not so much of individuals) — The Hermeneutic Divide from Marx — What is a work of art?

Ingardien Chapter 1 HANDED OUT

- ① Work of music NOT identical to any performance or to all performances of it.
 - Performance — a specific musical process unfolding in time, fixed in space, differ one from another.
 - Work of music — persists in time (15) (but not "temporal" like a performance)
 - Not an ideal object (like triangle) = has a historical moment when it arises
 - Not a real object — no clear spatial location (18)

- ② In chapter (2) Work of art NOT a cluster of conscious experiences (a mental/psychological thing) — true → originates in subjective experience

In chapter 3 (not on photocopy)

- ③ Work of art NOT identical with the score (blocks of ink, paper — 35) and material properties (ink) cannot be said to possess immaterial properties (36)
 - Score → a system of signs (37) ... Some set of signs can give rise to different performances (37) And = not all works are notated

Chapter

- ④ Some features of a Musical work
 - Concurs difficulties + traps of definition.
 - Music — only a single stratum (50) — not like literature (four) or art (two)

Now: from Chapter 5 ("Sounding + Nonsounding Elements") 2002

Ingarden — Nonsounding Elements (JH commentary)

What Ingarden (locked into a variant of Husserlian phenomenology) downplays are the contingent rules or codes for interpreting both a work and its subjects, (subsumes them under "education" or "competence" p.153)

(I.e., Ingarden takes a "world" of European art music and its conventions for granted, as relatively unchallenged, ... Interprets his sense of phenomenological perception within that world only!)

JH → Most important nonsounding element → THE IMPLICIT RULES OR PROTOCOLS UNDER WHICH THE NOTATIONAL "SCHEMA" OR ACOUSTIC SURFACE ("sound-base") MAY BE UNDERSTOOD AS A COMMUNICATION/UTTERANCE.

①

- A shared code or set of understandings, presumably shared by a composer + his/her intended audience —
"rules of the game" → what conventions to look for, expect etc
— And in music, these bgd. conventions are often verbal, wholly or partially. (descriptions of patterns, intentions, etc.) (conceptual background)

— Theory of genres (More on this momentarily)

② Also → even within score or acoustic substrate, a non-sounding element (an absence) can be part of the content.


— Sonnet (e.g. omits 13th line)
(or shortens final line to a half line)

— Sonata form (omitting a secondary theme altogether as if in an ellipsis — Fidelio, Symph. Faust.)

What "exists" here "in" the work is an absence only by dialoguing with the background set of expectations or protocols — the "rules of the game."

This means — In order to perceive/interpret what is given to us as a work, there is some responsibility ("rules of the game") to pass through (or acknowledge) its genre (or set of conventions).

Genre → a constellation of enabling and constraining guidelines for interpretation within a given historical community (socially grounded and constructed)




E.g.

"Work" inset into a Genre (-System)

Work saturated with its participation in a genre

(individual exemplar)



"fugue"
"sonata form"
"opera buffa"
"symphony"

∴ Cleanes

