

Carl Dahlhaus, *Foundations*, Chapter 9:
 “Thoughts on Structural History”

- 129-31 Initial approach to structural history: fashionability of the term (why?); and restatement of his suspicion of “extreme” structuralist claims (130) on various grounds. CD thus approaches the whole topic with guarded caution and wishes to appear sufficiently wary of the traps that lie ahead.
- 131-35 Main task here: Administering the blast severe to most prior (traditional) music histories. The basic claim throughout: although these histories have been influenced by certain historiographical principles, by and large they are mere hodge-podges and superficial combinations of unexamined premises, many of which are not sufficiently coordinated. The argument will be: structural history, with its claims to precision and science, is at least better than these.
- 1) Various models for music history could be: history of events (appropriate to political histories) and history of structures (appropriate to cultural histories). [Other possibilities: history of the “artwork” and “autonomy” (which CD accepts, but only for the late 18th/ 19th /early 20th centuries); pure, non-historicized theory-systems; and the motley hodge-podge approach of most preceding music histories.]
 - 2) Some early music histories were attracted to quasi-structural history and context (Ambros) but the discipline soon fell under the half-hearted influence of the “history of events.” But in practice this was never carried out well...mixing with biographies, nationalism, etc. History of events: unpromising, even though musical events obviously do exist. At best, it needs to be combined with principles of structural history.
- 135-40 CD is modestly attracted to some sort of structural history. It has some advantages (esp. when compared with standard music histories) but it also has some significant problems. E.g.:
- 1) If underlying structures are exclusive determiners, how can they ever change?
 - 2) Do they exist in reality at all? Or do only events and works—and “circumstances” (context)—exist? (135: Anticipation of the “**Ideal Type**” argument favored by CD, one that does not claim a “reality” for structural constructs.)
 - 3) Many facts, details, etc., will never “fit” into the presumed structure: reality and “circumstances” are always more complex than “structures” suggest. (CD’s persistent strategy: cast doubt on all monolithic/totalizing concepts or systems and break them up into functionally differentiated, non-determinate sub-systems.)
- Still (137), since some structural histories will admit the possibility of “ideas” and “mentalities” as “real” things (example: Annales School), they are to be preferred to crassly reductionist “social histories” (read esp: “marxist histories”). Renewal of Chapter 8 objections to “social history.”
- 140-44 Even accepting the value of some sort of structural history, that approach will have enormous difficulties facing the various implications suggested by the problem of the “noncontemporaneity of the contemporaneous”—the sense that the phenomena under consideration change at different rates, are insufficiently coordinated, etc. Ultimately, this non-containability of overlapping layers of “reality” will disprove any inflexible claim on behalf of an all-governing “structure.” Discrepancies, contradictions will always exist. Therefore CD’s preferred solution: to view structures not as inflexible a priori models (true “reality”) but as “**Ideal Types**” (Max Weber)—as heuristic, provisional hypotheses that help one to sort through data, though without claims either of “reality” or of total explanation. Something like “structures” with much-scaled-down truth-claims. Helps us to take the middle-path between extremes (144): the practical solution.
- 144-50 THE SOLUTION. THIS IS THE END-POINT OF THE *FOUNDATIONS* PROPER: THE DERIVATION (AND REVEALING) OF DAHLHAUS’S ENTIRE CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM (TO BE APPLIED PRACTICALLY IN *NINETEENTH-CENTURY MUSIC*)—all grounded in the initial acceptance (for that century) of the principle of **aesthetic autonomy**. Once assumed, that principle throws off consequences and implications (with different emphases): the mercantile nature of music (to be contested in strong repertoires), new institutions, new compositional techniques (“musical logic,” etc.), formation of audiences/expectations, the doctrine of genius, repertory-building (canons), etc. Last paragraph = the whole system (a “structure of structures” delivered in one breath!).

Topic ① → structuralism + its Appeal, 1970s, Germany, etc. } pp. 129-30
(Modeterminus) → already outdated by 1975!

- 1) Scientific
- 2) feelings of anonymity

But CD downplays the real issue at stake (curious!! favors a more benign or neutralized explanation), esp. in Europe, ca. 1960-75:

the "grand drama" of the intellectual West, late 19th + all of 20th c.
— collapse of faith in Enlightenment values, liberal (democratic) society, and traditional humanist philosophical systems —
— esp. through the many "shocks" + impacts of 20th c. global history (2 world wars, nationalism, colonialism, the rise of Americanism, etc.)

(You have read Peter Novick's Account of This from the perspective of a practicing American scholar of history — the shocks + aftershocks on his immediate discipline)

(The American "spin" via Kuhn, Popper, Rorty, Fish, Said, Greentz, etc.)
Reality as "Socially Constructed" etc.

Let me, back up + give a slightly differing read of the situation.

Enlightenment (e.g.) (very broadly)
("liberalism" in 19th-c sense)

- reason/objectivity
- emancipation of ind. qua person "subject"
- integrity of indiv. self ("Cogito")
(man has an essence)
- indiv. agency
- indiv. rights for all
- humanism, broadly construed.

modern instit. of education, law, gov't

modern aesthetics

- Europ. art traditions
- incl. "autonomy" poetics, etc.
- value of "beauty"

modern democracy

urbanization

technology/bureaucracy

rel. free-market capitalism

and its consequences

commercialism, etc.

Counter-currents of
illiberalism or strong
objection to some or all
of Enl/lib. project

Left
primarily
various strains
of Marxism
(orthodox + other)

neo- or humanist

Marxists
(various mixtures)

Georg Lukács
Th. W. Adorno / Frankfurt

W. Benjamin

E. Bloch

J. P. Sartre

("Exist. is a
Humanism" 1946)

Dominated Europ. midcentury
[work as "document"]

still today:

Jameson, Eagleton,

Ch. Norris, etc.
Raymond Williams, etc.

Right

antihumanist
tradition
(attack more
deeply on
Enl/lib. project
itself!)

Nietzsche

Heidegger
E. Letter on Humanism
1947

ATTACK

1960s

anti-Sartrean (anti-humanist) French
illiberalism

"Structuralists / Poststructuralist

mediated by Ferdinand de Saussure + others.

Marxist but
less political

Claude Lévi-Strauss 1962

(Savage Mind) 1962
antihumanist

Jacques Lacan

primary of unconscious
Écrits I, 1966

Louis Althusser
(For Marx)

- "structural Marxism"
- "theoretical antihumanism"
- "ideology" theories

Jacques Derrida
Of Grammatology 1967

Michel Foucault

Les mots et les choses, 1966 (exposure of "man")

epistemes
discourse +
all oppositional
inescapable
power

i.e., antihumanist illiberal wave
at its height, cresting in
France 1965-75

an CD is writing Grundlagen
within a German 1970s context.

(cf. Dahlhaus, p. 130, 7 down)

"At the hands of extreme structuralists..."

in favor of more local,
German conversations

- ∴ By downplaying (not mentioning) this larger grand drama, CD steers clear of the more central challenges of the 1970s in Europe, ("behind the curve"? → so the question becomes → What is recoverable from CD today?)
pre-postmodern

At stake is the (partial?) recovery of an entire humanistic tradition on the verge of collapse (institutional + real collapse), "stained" through + through by the horrors of 20th-century history.
— Apocalyptic edge...

CD → seems to say → this tradition (esp in Germany!) cannot be recovered and preserved as a continuing value in any easy or effortless way, in any non-problematized way!
(Hence his ATTACK ON/DISMISSAL OF prior modes of Music historiography)

- Our approach to it
∴ Must be painstakingly reconstructed by any responsible historian —
— Problems must be acknowledged and written into our historical writings + analyses
— Any "easy" or "frictionless" hist / research work now seems naive, uninformative, underdeveloped, (A challenge to us all...)

∴ In Ch. 9 (+ on the heels of Ch. 8), CD, far from rejecting the notion of "structuralism" out of hand, tries to recover a modest, cautious strain of structuralism —

In light of the "grand drama" → He may be trying to explore the limits of a liberal-humanist structuralism.

Earlier notes

All involved in a large critique of Enlightenment thought (rational individual, philosophical "history")

which may itself be historicized (Lacan, Lacaplan, Malek)

Humanism — Antihumanism debate

(H. Marx)

(ind. action + substantial self / Cartesian "Cogito" (determination b, biol. structure) (ed.)

religion — substantial "self"

"self" as illu. —

tremendous esp. of the WWI, then WWII suspicion of the legacy of the Enlightenment and humanism (comes to violence + power)

"man, subjectivity, reason, 'etc.', Enlightenment, etc., human rights, etc., liberalism

Came to a boil in 2nd 1/2 of 20th c.

Int. intellectual — opposite to liberalism + lib. society illiberalism

(left)

Anti-subject being

human being

"Existentialism — Humanism" (1946)

defense of subjectivity + self-definition in the face of modernism, unconscious, intentionality, etc. towards essence.

Heidegger (right) 1947 — "Letter on Humanism" opposed subject-centered philosophy — Man not at the center — contra Cartesian "Cogito" I think

Rejects Exist. trad. — a decentred "man" must instead find a new way toward personal Being — no prior essence

20A but "standing in the light of Being" → "ek-sistence" (i.e., coming to Being) 213 what is essential is not man but Being

1950s, 60s — leftist anti-humanism — anti-liberal society (+ social conditions of liberal modernity USA) mediated by Ferdinand de Saussure — language then langue/parole, etc

decentering of the subject — via language

Lacan — ego + self an illusion — decentred — unconscious is the real, + the conscious is a fragment of alienation + repression

Levi-Strauss — no agency + subject — ml, "structure" — Center of meaning in structures, not in human agency. Scientific claims — language over parole — biogd. code

Althusser — Structuralist Marxism

Archaeology —

Foucault — famous "erosion of man" conclusion — he has not yet been chosen.

Deleuze — decenters all deconstruction — all sense of a stable foundation or self or meaning. anti-intellectualism

Deleuze + Guattari: Anti-Oedipus

at Derrida's extreme p. 130

Topic 2

CD has a central point to make about his preferred type of "structuralism" but -- as if to show the complexity of the issue -- only provides his conclusion or main point gradually

what he gives us "on the way":

∴ Stations of the gradual jelling or crystallization of CD's qualified and modest embrace of one type of structuralism (constantly distinguishing the "good" type from the "bad" or inflexible and totalizing type)

Each station arrival is preceded and followed by substantial qualifications, hedges, and caveats ("However," "still," "nevertheless," "The difficult part of this problem is" - etc....)

- As if to demonstrate how careful / cautious he is, esp. in comparison with the extreme structuralists and his critics (performative strategy)

[to telos of Ch. 9 and of book → pp. 144-50, with the packed last ¶, 150-151.]

Samples of Stations

(selection → obv. other flashes here + there)

(131) 8 down "Now the principle..." following the battle of Ch. 8, he now suggests that some modest form of structuralism might be all right -- but what is at stake, and what kind of structuralism does CD have in mind? a "frame of reference" is important

First → to the caveats + cautions (bottom of 131 + 132-33)

Arraigns prior music-history methodologies as inadequate (incoherent and unable to stand up to the rigorous critiques of more sophisticated, current theory)

- A survey of bankrupt procedures, esp. those he lumps under the category of Ereignisgeschichte (hist. of events) → chronological lists, Heroengeschichte, nationalism - simple technical innovations (cf. traditional US/UK musicology vs. "new")

Dahlhaus → seeks a different, third way — via media ? or ?

(Out to construct a "good" structuralism —
- intellectually sound
- humanistic)

133, last ¶ — short hint that "good" structuralism (accent theory in a constellation of options) could be methodologically beneficial (here, in terms of a "history of events," more satisfactory than the traditional, bungled methods.

134 6-7 down → toward a Credo → "it is the historian's job, . . ."

↓
12 down → [Credo] → "Or, to put it more precisely, . . ."
beginning to jell


Then to caveats

- Zufall Willkur
- chance + whim (Koselleck)
- functions (135) not origins (anti-marxist)
- AND, NB Funktionsgeschichte, not Entstehungsgeschichte
- + problems (go through . . .)
- "ideal types" introduced, 135

136 4-7 down, etc. — a glimmer of his final claim

- substructures Teilstrukturen and empirically intelligible (can be researched + tested)
- a "system of systems" ("ein System der Systeme")
- flexible

136-37 And again "good" structural hist called on to mediate between extremes as via media



What is engaging is the following constellation of attributes:

CD's modest or middleground structuralism (open to humanism)

- avoids "totalizing" extremes (via media) (cf. ch. 8!)
- treats the subject as "a problem ^{p. 134, middle} not a premise" (∴ problematize in one's own writings) (don't begin w/ your conclusion) [cf. p. 138, 3 down] ← cf. gender feminism
- we should investigate only:
 - sub-structures; should be in close proximity with the music at hand (not psychological theories, grand historical claims, or cultural materialism... [no Foucauldian epistemes or broad Kuhnian paradigms? or Althusserian ideological state apparatuses] (cf. "social constructionists"?) ∴ NOT STRUCTURES but SYST. OF SUBSTRUCTURES)
- substructures should be open to empirical inquiry and testing (not beyond them)
 - and of "a medium order of magnitude" (p. 52) in einer 'mittleren' Grössenordnung


Niklas Luhmann
Differentiation
of Society

- substructures (bkgd, motivations, subsystems, etc.) are not to be posited as "really" existing (not reified) but are only to be used heuristically, as "ideal types." (Weber) (cf. e.g. p. 135, 11 up! clear - less "danger")

- Concepts should be kept loose, flexible (not rigid) and even admit elements of chance, ^{Zufall} which (Willkür) not subjected to structural explanation (not everything is traceable to a coherent system of coordinated causes).

- Substructures (smaller), not a single structure, - and they come "bundled" together, overlapping in unpredictable ways. (Goal of historian → to find the implicit substructures)

Luhmann
Differentiation



∴ Fragmentation + shattering of all monolithic structuralist explanations

(in next few weeks we'll also discover → Verstehen, not ideology-critique Erklären)

For the grand wind-up, he once again pulls out what he regards as a strong trump card:

(141) — "Non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous" as entrée

Ungleichzeitigkeit der Gleichzeitigkeiten

Anything but obscure in German philosophy —

— Marx (Grundrisse, bottom of p. 141) READ

— Nietzsche

— Wilhelm Pinder ^{cited p. 142 and in bibl.} (may have coined the phrase, 1926)
(The Generation-Problem in the Art History of Europe)

— Ernst Bloch

— Hans Robert Jauss (also used as an anti-Marxist trump by Jauss)

— Cf. Raymond Williams's solution (bottom, p. 142)

— CD less judgmental, looser? ⇒ (p. 142 = 12, 13 down "overlapping structures") Time of Times

(144) ^{top 1/2} → Smaller-scale empiricism in pursuit of networks of looser, smaller structures that are non-hierarchical

NOW THE GRAND CLIMAX OF THE BOOK —

(144) bottom 1/2

BEGINS TO OUTLINE HIS NETWORK OF SUBSYSTEMS, SUBSTRUCTURES OF 19th-C Europ. music

(149) — bottom — The grand climax and telos

Topic (3) → Once again, this crucial concept for Dahlhaus (which must be preserved)

DISCUSS — What is this object we are looking at ("piece of music")?
Need to decide?
Under which category do we understand it?

CD, bottom of 132 → 133 separates Work + Event (How?)

(Note: "later" / "course")

"Work" (p. 133) → one of his definitions in the book: Here: 3 attributes

- ideal type (heuristic) [Weber] (not reified)
- concretized intention of ^{individual} mind (not body) [Husserl → Ingarden]
- "meaning" in dessen ästhetischem Dasein, not in its Wirkungen
(more often in CD: eine ästhetische Präsenz) [Heidegger] ^{humanity} projected field [Gadamer]

Sein und Zeit, 1927
the peculiarly human
mode of Being in
Heidegger —
a field of Being in
the world,
thrown into
Being, etc.

- (cf. p. 35 → work, nonetheless, an unstable concept if we are looking for material substance)
- an aesthetic presence [eine ästhetische Präsenz] recaptured [?] in performance
- not a blunt object ["fact"] but an intentional construct, "conceptualized events"
- (cf. p. 4 → cornerstone ^{die zentrale Kategorie} → "aesthetic presence")

- i.e. — for CD the concept ^{WORK} is bathed in German philosophy, esp. the phenomenological tradition + intentionality (+ flecks of Heidegger here + there — + Gadamer) [as if the concept will collapse w/o this underpinning —]
- Not the typical Engl-language, blunter concept of a given, self-standing (realist) masterpiece or artwork, ^{"common sense"} CD's words draw in Germanic resonances. (also → those opposed to materialist explanations)

Out of this (as we've seen or will see), various features interrelate or are made possible.

- Autonomy postulate (or relative autonomy)
- Aesthetic of contemplation/reverence/high regard
- Mind, not "body" (even in performance)
- Poetic, not material substance
- Correlates in
 - 19th-c Germanic Idealist Philosophy
 - "Self-expression" of individual mind
 - Education for the task (Bildung)
 - Institutions to further + cultivate this.



— And ultimately recovers the "humanist" aesthetic presence of the artwork and the 19th-c tradition.

CD's main concern is to contrast this with,
on the one hand, Marxist base-superstructure + ideology critique models,
and on the other hand, concept of music history construed as:

esp. in Ch. 8

Sometimes with Document
or symptom

"Event" p. 132 bottom (like an individual act or performance)

- not significant in themselves [no lasting "presence"] but in their consequences
(They do not persist... their consequences do)
(non-repeatable)
(a single action in social space)

Q → Isn't a piece of music like this?

P. 134, last ¶ → Events → ^{high} structures but less so "works" [a bit unclear?] → JH on Genre vs Exemplar

Cf. Schoenberg + New Music, p. 236

Back figure 236

JH on Genre vs Exemplar

i.e. - g. of what belongs to structure and what belongs to individual craft or expression. - self-present text (in old sense)

Not considered - other possible meanings/construals of work (besides "intentional aesthetic presence" a set of patterns & opportunities)

Is a "work" primarily a set of instructions (or oral traditions) for subsequent realizations by others? (for more personal or competitive reasons)

- display of personal skill/grace, etc. in a competitive environment? (cf. figure-skating competitions)
- for career building?
- for personal/social enjoyment? (parttime)
- for honorific purposes?

What is the view of performers about this?

- Or scholars - a "work" as an opportunity to analyze, discuss, + show our own expertise?

OR
Niklas Luhmann Essays on Self Reference (1990) -- Differentiation of Society (transl.) -- Essays on "autopoiesis" (self-sustaining, quasi-autonomous) - and "The Work of Art and the Self-reproduction of Art"

Work as a site of discussion within society - facilitates certain kinds of social interaction and communication that serves society's larger ends

- Art as a "testing" site for limits of communication (cf. p. 213, Luhmann)

Or - anthropological studies of a work (a text) in a quasi-ethnographic way -

E.g., especially - Clifford Geertz + "thick description"

- text as cultural artefact with interplay of symbol systems to be decoded and read ("symbolic anthropology")

- dissolves boundaries between text and the culture that produces + sustains it -> "plugs it in" to thickened description of social beliefs + institutions, local conventions, etc.

- dissolves text into social systems that sustain it.

- text as elaborate network of social codes + symbols - our interest -> in that culture and its "local" construction of knowledge

- Social construction of Musical Symbol-Systems (esp. common in Medieval/Ren (early-modern) musicology) -

seeks to re-envision the symbolic life of past cultures

C. Wright M. Finkel P. Jeffrey Rob Liguori talk by + Friday -
Music + place

also imp. - such figures as anthrop. Victor Turner -> Emph. on the Ritual aspect of art/drama/film, etc.

"Ritual Studies"

Martha Feldman on opera seria, JAMS 1991

Yale interest, etc.

(But -> Beethoven?)

Recreate the real, physical life of a community -> their liturgies + rituals, processions, devotions, local customs, etc.

[Music and place

or → poststructuralist / postmodernist sense
Not considered

"Social Text" or "[Social] Discourse"

— a linchpin of poststructuralist + postmodern thought

TEXTUALITY → Princeton Encycl. of Poetry + Poetics.
INTERTEXTUALITY [better, clearer?] (PHOTOCOPY, — READ, etc.)

esp. for anyone seeking to find what is recoverable in CD.
So — the question remains, → If CD is concerned with upholding "work" concept (and relying mostly on the Ingarden /phenom. tradition), how can we approach CD today if that concept has been so exploded?

TEXTUALITY

they come after an intense period of creativity is over, for they then shatter the coherence of the work) to McGann's view that lit. is a social product (requiring attention to the result of the collaborative efforts of the author, the author's advisers, the publisher, and others) and to McKenzie's concept of the "sociology of the text" (in which, for instance, the physical features of textual presentation, such as typography and layout, are part of the social context that influences readers' responses). Arguments for each of these approaches have frequently been offered as if their acceptance entails the rejection of other approaches; but there is no exclusively valid approach to the past. An interest in authors' intentions (whether original, intermediate, or final) and an interest in the texts that were made available to readers do not invalidate one another: each focuses on a different aspect of textual history, and each therefore tells one part of a larger story. T. crit., like other forms of history, can never tell the whole story, nor can it reconstruct any part of it with certainty; but we must make the attempt to uncover the story whenever we wish to read works as communications from the past.

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G.T.T.

TEXTUALITY, a key concept in poststructuralism, signals a new way of understanding writing, reading, and the relations between them. It stands in opposition to the idea of the "work," its unity, and its humanistic underpinnings, and thus underwrites an attack on the metaphysical presuppositions of the traditional conception of lit. in the West.

The concept of the "work" (see POETICS; TEXTUAL CRITICISM) entails meaning, unity, and the authority of a transcendent source. A work is complete, it exists in space, it is wrought by the creative power of the artist, and its meaning is stable across time and culture. A text, on the other hand, inhabits and is inhabited by lang., without a privileged outside—an origin or source—to guarantee or authorize its meaning. The source of each text is always another text, but there is always another text before that. No text lies outside the endless play of lang., and no text is complete: each exhibits traces or "sediments" of some other text in an endless repetition of originary lack. To humanistic ("logocentric") assertions of a transcendent refer-

1
X
anti-aesthetic pleasure

- [1276] - * anti-metaphysical
- anti-humanism
- anti "unity" (+ coherence, stability)

inquire into a text's gaps,
blankes, absences,
suppressed implication

TEXTURE

ent (the transcendental signified) that organizes human experience and renders lang. meaningful. t. opposes the notion that at the origin there is "always already" lang., writing, a trace of some other text. The terms "trace," "supplement," and "writing" indicate an absence in the text, its impossibility of self-presence. Each text is haunted by this absence, which opens it up to an entangled web of relations with every other text and which permits the articulation of a "subtext." The subtext is not what is "meant" or "expressed," but rather that which tends to "dissimulate or forbid" and which it nonetheless makes evident at certain points of stress or conflict. The subtext functions as a text's unconscious—what it does not know it knows—and indicates a reading against the grain.

The subtext was not always conceived as a strategic dismantling of the text. In the work of the Rus. Formalists (see RUSSIAN FORMALISM), and in the early stages of structuralism (q.v.), the subtext was one of the visible components of the text, one of the parts that fitted into the whole. The stable linguistics that gave rise to structuralism perceived the subtext as a partially hidden segment of the text, elucidation of which would provide a synchronic view of the whole. Later views of t., which perceived the text diachronically rather than synchronically, in terms of what is missing or absent rather than merely hidden from view, think of the subtext as a destabilizing element in the play of significations. The subtext is not assimilable to the text; it works against and undermines a text's potential meaning.

* T. is thus fraught with dissonance. Each text is a locus of conflict which cannot be decided without repression. More recently, t. has become associated with questions of power: not only the power play between text and subtext, but of the competing claims and ideologies which make themselves evident in a text. The major effect of t. is to problematize the question of knowledge—the relation between what we know and how we know. T. assumes the impossibility of thought without lang., thus effectively subsuming knowledge within lang. itself. Disciplinary knowledge, like the work, also lacks a transcendental signified and is not authorized by any epistemological high ground. Each discipline constitutes itself as a discipline by repressing its linguistic, rhetorical nature, but t. disrupts this movement of repression, highlights it, and focuses on what a field of knowledge tends to "dissimulate" or "forbid." T. assumes the "t." of all disciplines and thus the tropological (rhetorical) nature of all knowledge. Texts read and write one another and translate one another without regard for primacy, secondariness, or disciplinary borderlines. T. transforms the relations between reading and writing and even the very nature of academic institutions: in the world of the work, knowledge is transmitted; in the world of t., knowledge is produced, and that production is always open to question. Barthes' claim that

"there is no father-author" and Derrida's statement that "writing is an orphan" (themselves descriptive of the condition of t.) open texts and disciplines to an indeterminacy (q.v.) that infects disciplines with a rhetorical self-consciousness and disrupts the borderlines that made possible their self-definition. In affirming that there is no outside to t. ("il n'y a pas de hors-texte"), t. generates a problematizing of knowledge and the conditions of power which knowledge authorizes. See also ALLUSION; DECONSTRUCTION; ORGANICISM; INTERTEXTUALITY.

J. Derrida, *De la grammatologie* (1967, tr. 1976)—with essential preface by G. Spivak, and "Signature, Event, Context," *Marges de la philosophie* (1972); M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Lang.* (tr. 1972), *Power/Knowledge* (tr. 1980); R. Barthes, *Le plaisir du texte* (1973), "De l'oeuvre au texte," *Revue d'esthétique* (1974); E. Said, "Abecedarium Culturae," *Beginnings* (1975), "The Problem of T.: Two Exemplary Positions," *Critl* 4 (1978); *Textual Strategies*, ed. J. Harari (1979)—excellent intro., bibl.; M. Riffaterre, *La production du texte* (1979, tr. 1983); S. Stewart, "Some Riddles and Proverbs of T.," *Criticism* 21 (1979); *Untying the Text*, ed. R. Young (1981); J. Culler, *On Deconstruction* (1982); *The Question of T.*, ed. W. Spanos and P. Bové (1982); J. MacCannell, "The Temporality of T.: Bakhtin and Derrida," *MLN* 100 (1985); H. Baran, "Subtext," in Terras; *Textual Analysis*, ed. M. A. Caws (1986); *Unnam'd Forms: Blake and T.*, ed. N. Hilton and T. A. Vogler (1986); S. Weber, *Demarcating the Disciplines*, (1986), ed., *Institution and Interp.* (1987); G. Harpham, *The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Crit.* (1987); G. Norris, *Derrida* (1987); G. Jay, "Paul de Man: Being in Question," *America the Scrivener* (1990). H.R.E.

TEXTURE. T. signifies the palpable, tangible details inscribed in the poetic text. It refers to the distinguishing elements in a poem which are separate and independent of its structure (q.v.), the elements that persist when the argument (q.v.) of a poem has been rendered into a prose paraphrase (q.v.). The term has close affinities with the concept of surface detail in painting and sculpture. Such a conception is designed to solve the difficulties posed by schematic and over-generalized theories of poetics. A poem has t. to the degree to which the phonetic and linguistic characteristics of its surface promote stylistic density. At one level t. involves the familiar poetic techniques of assonance and alliteration (qq.v.); at another level it assumes the form of sensory intensities and tactile associations (e.g. harshness or softness—cf. EUPHONY). It is to these surface qualities that t. corresponds and is made more complex by metrical patterns.

John Crowe Ransom's theory of poetry, in particular, with its stress on the dense t. of meanings in poetry, privileges the notion of t. For Ransom

* Text as an open field or an arena of discourse - [1277] - NOT CONTROLLED BY INTENTIONALITY OF AUTHOR
- instead of vertical depth + anchoring, horizontal shiftings to surface connections.

Helen Requeiro Elann (SONY Albany)

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F. McKenzie, *Bibl.*
P. L. Shillingsburg,
Age (1986); D. H.
texts (1987).

G.T.T.

in poststructural-
standing writing,
on them. It stands
work," its unity, and
thus underwrites
presuppositions of
the West.

POETICS; TEX-
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her hand, inhab-
out a privileged
to guarantee or
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always another
side the endless
te: each exhibits
ther text in an
x. To humanistic
uscent refer-

INTERTEXTUALITY

midrash may generally be distinguished from Christian typological interp. by the former's exegetical dependence on the actual (Heb.) lang. of its scriptural base.

Origen had a threefold system—somatic, psychic, and pneumatic—based on Hebraic and Gr. psychology. Augustine in his *De doctrina christiana* provided the canonical justification to the high Middle Ages for the use of allegorical methods, even though his own system usually refers to the way Jesus Himself taught rather than to current biblical exegesis. He did distinguish, however, the spiritual from the literal sense, and he provided an aesthetic of allegory in which the beauty of figurative and obscure biblical lang. is praised. Gregory the Great (d. 604), esp. in his *Homilies on Ezechial* and *Moralia* (a moralized commentary on Job), proposed a threefold method which became more influential than Augustine's in med. biblical allegorizing.

Various medieval schools of exegesis flourished and carried on the trad.: the Ir. Monastic School, the Benedictines, the School of Laon, the Victorine School, the school of Scholastic exegesis, and, above all, from the 12th c. on, a "scientific" school, culminating in Nicholas of Lyra of the 14th c., who unified all the exegetical trads. for subsequent Christianity. Among Jews, the 12th c. Franco-German school of Rashi (Rabbi Solomon Itzhaki) distinguished contextual ("peshat") from rabbinic exegetical ("derash") meaning. Sp. Jewish exegetes developed allegory to bring scripture into congruence with rational or philosophical truth; in the 13th c., they adopted mystical doctrines as well. Accordingly, in 1291, Bahya ben Asher employed a fourfold system of interp. which soon became known as "*pardes*" (Heb. for "orchard")—an acronym for "peshat" (contextual, philological level), "remez" (rational or philosophical level), "derash" (rabbinic, midrashic), and "sod" (mystical, kabbalistic).

In modern literary theory, the medieval and Ren. use of the so-called fourfold system of interp. in lit. has been much debated. Is there a "fourfold" meaning to the *Romance of the Rose*, or in Chaucer or Chrétien de Troyes, and so on? Some have thought so. That biblical symbolism and exegesis had influence on medieval and Ren. works is beyond doubt, but the degree and extent of that influence is difficult to establish. Typological and allegorical levels of meaning have been plausibly attributed to such explicitly Christian poets as Milton, Herbert, and Blake. In the 20th c., typological models of crit. have been proposed in particular by Protestant biblicists and by Northrop Frye. See also ALLEGORY; FIGURATION; HEBRAISM; HERMENEUTICS; INTERPRETATION; MEDIEVAL POETICS.

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M.W.B.; E.L.G.

clearer discussion?

INTERTEXTUALITY refers to those conditions of textuality (q.v.) which affect and describe the relations between texts, and in most respects is synonymous with textuality. It originates in the crisis of representation and the absent origin that would guarantee meaning, centrality, and reference. Without an ultimate referent that would make possible the self-presence and meaning of a text, texts are by definition fragments in open and endless relations with all other texts.

In traditional models of influence (q.v.), a text comes to rest on a prior text which functions as a stable source which is retrieved and made present by a study of allusion (q.v.), quotation, and reference. Relations between texts are thus straightforward and determinate. Their determinacy is the result of five premises of traditional crit.: (1) that lang. has the capacity to create stable meaning; (2) that such meaning exists within the confines of form; (3) that the artist is in control of meaning; (4) that a work has closure (q.v.), its tensions, ambiguities, and ironies coming to a point of resolution; and (5) that crit. is an ancillary activity, separate from lit. These premises tend toward totality (either in the mode of "the work itself" [see AUTONOMY; NEW CRITICISM] or Frye's mode of the "total form of lit." [see MYTH CRITICISM]), and the concepts of stable meaning and the artist's control of it are basic to the humanistic trad. of learning, which affirms and emphasizes the notions of human self and human will.

In the late 1950s and '60s, however, as a result of the influx of Fr. crit. into America, the premises

TEXTUALITY = ANTI:

- [620] → humanism / liberalism / aesthetics / self /
metaphysic / "meaning" / stability

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INTERTEXTUALITY

upon which the study of lit. had been carried out changed dramatically, and the conceptual approach to literary relations underwent an equally radical transformation. With structuralism (q.v.) and poststructuralism (see DECONSTRUCTION), the concept of "influence" was discarded in favor of the concept of "i." Seven major premises now come into play: (1) Lang. is not a transparent medium of thought or a tool in the service of communication; it is arbitrary and dense, and its very excessiveness leads to an infinite number of interps. (2) Texts are fragments, without closure or resolution. No text is self-sufficient; each text is fraught with explicit or invisible quotation marks that dispel the illusion of its autonomy and refer it endlessly to other texts—like the entries in this *Encyclopedia*, referring parenthetically to other references, except that there is no way to contain all possible references in any encyclopedic "whole." (3) Given the above, no writer can ever be in control of the meaning of the text. I. does away with the concept of "author" in its conventional meaning (authority, property, intention), supplanting it with the concepts of "author-function" (Foucault) or "subject" (Lacan). (4) Meaning is supplanted by the notion of "signification" (a sign is composed of signifier and signified, but in post-structuralist thinking the signified is lost, leaving the signifier in search of a referent it can never find). Poststructuralism thus discards the humanistic version of human beings as creators of meaning, and proposes them instead as creatures (effects) of lang. (5) Crit. is no longer an ancillary activity, but is now considered part of the poem, creative of its meaning or signification. In formalism and humanism, the task of crit. is "explication" (q.v.), which distinguishes the reading subject from the literary object and defines lit. as a discipline and a mode of knowledge. I. stands in direct opposition to explication, with its explicit distinction between primary and secondary texts, and instead opens up literary, critical, and indeed many other texts to illimitable relations. (6) Disciplinary boundaries are erased: such fields as philosophy and psychoanalysis are all considered discursive practices and ultimately inseparable from lit. (7) Finally, poststructuralist crit. defies the rules of reason and identity and suggests instead the idea of contradiction. "Contradiction," says Adorno, "indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived." Adorno's "contradiction" is very close to Derrida's "*différance*."

I. is marked by two key features: the absence of an origin and the function of randomness. Traditional ("logocentric") critics consider lit. as a privileged mode of communication, expressive of human nature in its highest form. For these critics a transcendent referent (the "transcendental signified") organizes all lang. and experience, making possible a "self" which expresses itself in terms of "voice" (q.v.). Poststructuralist crit. "steals" that

ultimate referent. In the place of a privileged origin it finds a trace of something prior, which is lang. (writing) itself. Derrida speaks of the absence of a center or origin which would "arrest and ground the play of substitutions" because the sign which replaces the center "supplements" it and thus underscores its lack. *Différance* is the name for this unnamable absence of origin and for the "chain of differing and deferring substitutions" which it unleashes. In this respect textuality is precisely synonymous with i., in that it signals the impossibility of boundaries or borderlines that would adequately frame a "work" and its "meaning," and points instead to writing's "dissemination." Under these conditions, there could be no metalanguage, no privileged point that would make reference and knowledge possible, that would not "always already" be implicated in the tropological relations it would seek to describe. This submission to the legislature of lang. transforms the nature of intertextual relations and thereby the relations between crit. and lit. In the absence of an origin that would guarantee presence, meaning, and voice, there can be no originals—only copies. And without a univocal and transcendent referent, all texts refer to one another—translate one another—in infinite and utterly random ways.

Representation and reference, the mainstays of traditional humanism, underwrite a patriarchal "logocentric" order (Derrida terms it "phallogocentric") in which a work or a referent functions as a stabilizing ("seminal") source and provides the authority of meaning. Explicit in i. is the dismantling ("dissemination") of paternity. Barthes claims that "there is no father-author"; Derrida argues that "writing is an orphan." I. underwrites a critique of logocentrism and of patriarchy, substituting for patriarchal self-presence the feminizing "otherness" of intertextual "lapses."

These lapses which signal lost and irrecoverable meaning have altered the very shape of the "book." Notable as an effect of i. is the number of quotation marks deployed across texts, indicating "other" or alien contexts in which the words in question might be understood. The book, as a concept and as an entity, has undergone a similar transformation. While it still appears to us as words between two covers, the traditional rules by which prefaces functioned as openings, introductions introduced, and afterwords or epilogues closed are often missing. A preface may be termed a "pre-text" or "prefatory material"; a conclusion may well be a "postscript" or an "afterword" (or both, in sequence); "interchapters" or "interstices" point to the fragile relations between parts; and footnotes will sometimes constitute a parallel text, as in Derrida's "Living On . Borderlines," where the essay is entitled "Living On" and the long footnote threading its way through the essay is entitled "Borderlines." The latter does not function in submission to or as a subtitle to the former; so even the punctuation between them for routine

INTONATION

reference becomes problematic. All of these strategies point to the impossibility of a text's wholeness or self-presence, and to the changed relations i. has wrought between reading and writing. See now ALLUSION; DECONSTRUCTION; ORGANICISM; STRUCTURALISM, *Moscow-Tartu School*; TEXTUALITY.

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INTONATION. See PITCH; ACCENT; DURATION.

INTUITION.

- I. IN AESTHETICS AND POETICS
- II. IN POETRY

I. IN AESTHETICS AND POETICS. The term "i." owes its importance in 20th-c. poetics to Benedetto Croce's use of it in his *Aesthetic as Science*

of *Expression and General Linguistic* (1902, tr. D. Ainslie, 2d ed., 1922), where he identifies it with expression (q.v.). Rejecting as naive the popular view of i. as a completely subjective phase of the cognitive process, Croce lays down the warning: "it is impossible to distinguish i. from expression in this cognitive process. The one appears with the other at the same instant, because they are not two, but one." Also: "to intuit is to express; and nothing else (nothing more but nothing less) than to express" (Ainslie 8-11). In 1915, Croce acknowledged that his own dissatisfaction with his 1902 account of i. had led to its "conversion" into the "further concept of pure or lyrical i." Under the influence of Giovanni Gentile (*Philosophy of Art*, tr. G. Gullace, 1972) as well as Vico and Hegel, Croce had delivered his Heidelberg lecture in 1908 on "Pure I. and the Lyrical Character of Art," where the term's meaning deepens to include the "successful union of a poetic image with an emotion."

By the time he is done, Croce has given an aesthetic theory of i. which is a theory of expression and of imagination (q.v.) as well. By identifying it with expression and imagination, Croce was able to give his use of i. a measure of variety and novelty it probably could not have sustained on its own. Croce nearly makes us forget that, before Kant took it up with fresh insight, the concept had already had a long history in Med. Lat. as *intuitus*, and an even longer history in its original Gr. form, *nous*.

It was C. S. Peirce who pointed out that the Lat. term *intuitus*—which Kant puts in parentheses after the Ger. equivalent, *Anschauung*—first occurs as a technical term in St. Anselm's *Monologium* (11th c.; tr. S. N. Deane 1903). Anselm, Peirce explains, had tried to draw a clear distinction between seeing things through a glass darkly, (*per speculum*) and knowing them "face to face," calling the former *speculation* and the latter *intuition*. In a famous passage of the *Monologium*, Anselm says: "to the supreme Spirit, expressing [*dicere*] and beholding through conception [*cogitando intueri*], as it were, are the same, just as the expression of our human mind is nothing but the i. of the thinker." Some students of Pound's *Cantos*, commenting on the so-called St. Anselm canto (105), have suggested that the entire *Monologium* may be read as an adumbration of what Eliot called the "objective correlative" (q.v.).

In the *Prologium*, St. Anselm would later attempt to show that, in the concept of God intuited through Christian faith, enough is contained to "prove" discursively that anything so conceived must not only be thinkable but also exist. Pressing his argument (against the fool who has said in his heart "there is no God"), Anselm compares human i. of God with a painter's i. of a painting he has actually painted, as contrasted with his i. of the same before he has painted it. This so-called ontological "proof" of God's existence, later advanced by Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spinoza, prompted many later critics to attack Anselm. And foremost

INTONATION

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I. IN AESTHETICS AND POETICS. The term "i." owes its importance in 20th-c. poetics to Benedetto Croce's use of it in his *Aesthetic as Science*

of *Expression and General Linguistic* (1902, tr. D. Ainslie, 2d ed., 1922), where he identifies it with expression (q.v.). Rejecting as naive the popular view of i. as a completely subjective phase of the cognitive process, Croce lays down the warning: "it is impossible to distinguish i. from expression in this cognitive process. The one appears with the other at the same instant, because they are not two, but one." Also: "to intuit is to express; and nothing else (nothing more but nothing less) than to express" (Ainslie 8-11). In 1915, Croce acknowledged that his own dissatisfaction with his 1902 account of i. had led to its "conversion" into the "further concept of pure or lyrical i." Under the influence of Giovanni Gentile (*Philosophy of Art*, tr. G. Gullace, 1972) as well as Vico and Hegel, Croce had delivered his Heidelberg lecture in 1908 on "Pure I. and the Lyrical Character of Art," where the term's meaning deepens to include the "successful union of a poetic image with an emotion."

By the time he is done, Croce has given an aesthetic theory of i. which is a theory of expression and of imagination (q.v.) as well. By identifying it with expression and imagination, Croce was able to give his use of i. a measure of variety and novelty it probably could not have sustained on its own. Croce nearly makes us forget that, before Kant took it up with fresh insight, the concept had already had a long history in Med. Lat. as *intuitus*, and an even longer history in its original Gr. form, *nous*.

It was C. S. Peirce who pointed out that the Lat. term *intuitus*—which Kant puts in parentheses after the Ger. equivalent, *Anschauung*—first occurs as a technical term in St. Anselm's *Monologium* (11th c.; tr. S. N. Deane 1903). Anselm, Peirce explains, had tried to draw a clear distinction between seeing things through a glass darkly, (*per speculum*) and knowing them "face to face," calling the former *speculation* and the latter *intuition*. In a famous passage of the *Monologium*, Anselm says: "to the supreme Spirit, expressing [*dīcere*] and beholding through conception [*cogitando intueri*], as it were, are the same, just as the expression of our human mind is nothing but the i. of the thinker." Some students of Pound's *Cantos*, commenting on the so-called St. Anselm canto (105), have suggested that the entire *Monologium* may be read as an adumbration of what Eliot called the "objective correlative" (q.v.).

In the *Proslogium*, St. Anselm would later attempt to show that, in the concept of God intuited through Christian faith, enough is contained to "prove" discursively that anything so conceived must not only be thinkable but also exist. Pressing his argument (against the fool who has said in his heart "there is no God"), Anselm compares human i. of God with a painter's i. of a painting he has actually painted, as contrasted with his i. of the same before he has painted it. This so-called ontological "proof" of God's existence, later advanced by Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spinoza, prompted many later critics to attack Anselm. And foremost