

Before looking at syllabus:

" BEGIN RIGHT UP FRONT "

Intellectual
(boot camp)

Main Goals of the Seminar — I regard this a serious business —
the most "basic training" of all.

— To ask some of the most basic questions about what we do as
researchers/analysts and why we do it? (Is it worth it?)
Why?

— In part, to unsettle both you + me from any bland orthodoxies
into which we have fallen or might like to fall.

— And to encourage you to keep unsettling yourself constantly for
the rest of your careers!! (fundamental process: keep
questioning, interrogating the basic set of values + assumptions
that determine how you do your work)

Being comfortable with a single
method can be intellectual death.

So easy to fall into
a system — master a

single unquestioned method
+ to market it for the
rest of your life, even
when times change.

— Attitude → perpetual "discontent" (even suspicion) of
"easy," "established," time-honored, or highly orthodox
SYSTEMS — esp. in their 2nd- or 3rd-generation
of hand-me-down orthodoxy (by which time it's
usually hardened, stale, filled with odd claims that
are no longer questioned) — Better: become independent
thinkers

— Larger aim → To move us all a little bit further away from
insular, isolated methodological naiveté (which, alas, continues
to beset our discipline as a default). Many still do frame research
problems as though it were still 1970.

— But the academic world of the humanities, ^{and its values} has undergone a
seismic shift in 1980s, early 1990s → We cannot responsibly
pretend that it didn't happen and try to roll back the
musicological or music-analytical discourse to 1970 or 1975.

— What is expected now (in the best work) is for us to be
(eagerly to be) pan-disciplinary intellectuals — to be aware of
and join into the discourse that is now common
(obligatory in other disciplines) — to be an ac com erent
with the discourse of the major intellectuals of our time.

This is not a project for one semester — but for a
whole career. And it separates first-rate work in music
from the merely derivative.

(Kuhn "normal science" within a tired "paradigm")

Kuhn —
assigned in this
week's T&A

+ Several of you have already heard me say
course — about:

Our main, everyday task, research, analysis, classroom:

"We confront a piece of music"

SEEMS SIMPLE — but every part of
this sentence is difficult

PROBLEMATIZE!

— TO SYLLABUS —

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Music 845: Methodological Issues in Music History and Analysis

Foundational concerns in confronting a piece of music and the context in which it is embedded. These include: the status of the artwork as an object of interpretation; the existence of multiple layers of implication within a single work; the role of the observer in producing aesthetic or cultural meanings; contending constructions of history and society into which the work might be interwoven. Carl Dahlhaus's *Foundations of Music History* serves as one of the texts from which we shall radiate outward to several interdisciplinary issues: phenomenological hermeneutics, claims of aesthetic autonomy and relative autonomy, objectivity and evidence, gender-related issues, postmodern challenges, sociological readings of the artwork, and so on.

Required Purchases:


- Classic poststructuralist + postmodernist — "textuality"
— Play of textual surfaces Barthes, Roland. *Image—Music—Text* [Selection of essays orig. in French, 1961-1973; instead of feeling an, "truth" contains "The Death of the Author" ("La mort de l'auteur," 1968), "From Work to Text" ("De l'oeuvre au texte," 1971), and "The Grain of the Voice" ("Le grain de la voix," 1972), trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Noonday, 1977.
on deep content —
also — logic of the body
- Sociologist — All art + Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature* [Selection of essays orig. in French, 1968-1987]. Differing translators. Ed. Randal Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
discourse about art are
power-play, position-taking
in a contested field —
Look for power + material advantage
- THE most influential German musicological thinker of 2nd 1/2 of 20th C. — Methodological moderate — opposes reducing art to sociology — philosophical
Dahlhaus, Carl. *Foundations of Music History* [orig. *Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte*, 1977]. Trans. J. B. Robinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- metaphysical approach to art — Being — Disclosure
Heidegger, Martin. *Poetry, Language, Thought* [containing "The Origin of the Work of Art," orig. lecture, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," 1935-36]. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper, 1971.
- Phenomenology of Reading — reader participation in the creation of the text
Iser, Wolfgang. *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* [orig. *Der Akt des Lesens. Theorie ästhetischer Wirkung*, 1976]. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978.
- Jenkins, Keith. *Re-Thinking History*. New York: Routledge, 1991 [rpt. Routledge Classic 2003).
- postmodern manifesto?
Mus Theory?
Korsyn, Kevin. *Decentering Music: A Critique of Contemporary Musical Research*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Session 1: Initial Remarks

2002 (1)

Very basic (+ perhaps obvious) — All of us (whole lines) — producing research + writing, presumably within an academic context

"Fictival" or Naive Model for Research + Writing (Old View?) (public's views?)




2 Obvious Problems That Complicate Everything:

- ① Process of collecting + observing + ^{sifting +} analyzing is NOT straightforward —
- always from an angle; through a particular LENS (of assumptions) ^{FILTER or}
 - Hermeneutic Genres ^{JH} that will determine what you see + don't see — what you choose to consider, + what you do not. ^{enable + constrain as important} (We'll return.)
- ∴ Obvious issue → the choice of a lens/hermeneutic genre.

For now:

- ∴ Something important ^{+ highly selective} is interposed between researcher and "facts" or analysis — a filter, angle, or lens that complicates the process. — and ANOTHER FILTER betw. Researcher + Written DOC.



who chooses this lens? You or someone else?


- ② A piece of writing, whatever it may claim, is NOT only "about" its evidence, its "facts," or its analysis (its supposed "content")
- All writing has an additional sphere of primary content + that's the author's SELF-PRESENTATION (i.e., the article is also "about" how the author seeks to construct himself/herself, through vocabulary, word/concept choice, demonstration of expertise + bkgd. reading, etc.)
 - Concept: "double content" (or multiple content)
 - I.e. - as much a PERFORMATIVE WORK about the author and how she or he wishes to be perceived by a selected peer group - (targeted toward a carefully circumscribed reception community)
 - Not "transparent" but also refers back to itself and its own performance (a "performance in prose")

DOUBLE CONTENT

further complication

Reader

hermeneutic
games of reading



The strength of the arrows can vary! Some writing is almost all performance with very little if any real outside content, even though indiv. pieces of music might be referred to regularly [as part of self-performance] (Only "seems" to refer to outside things! or uses outside things -- pieces, styles, etc -- for primarily performative purposes)

The mix differs from article to article
author to author

Obviously, the q. for all things that you read (or write?)

— Where is the self-interest in this article and how is it staged as a performance?

What is being performed (by vocabulary, ideological posture, tone, style, etc.)? ^{demonstration of knowledge}

CENTRAL CONTENT OF EVERY ARTICLE, BOOK — SUCH THINGS AS:

- 1) "What do I want my readers to think of me" ? (which readers?)
- 2) How do I set about establishing my authority in this field? What gives me a right to have a view at all?
- 3) With whom or with which groups am I allying myself? (Differing degrees of ^{risk and} prominence within differing groups)
- 4) How am I demonstrating to my readers which authors have most influenced me? What does this say about my bkgd. reading?
- 5) Whom am I opposing? (Sometimes: whom do I want to goad?)
- 6) Which hermeneutic genre(s) do I support? On what grounds?
- 7) Which hermeneutic genre(s) do I oppose?
- 8) Which arguments, authors, scholars do I ignore altogether? etc.

Initial Remarks :

1. Not "Historiograph
history: Haydn
evidence with
Then: much re
field w
That's not the
historic


2005 — — for this seminar
SKIP TO
P. 5 →

This time: "How does one approach a piece of music... or a small repertory of music?"
This is what we normally do. Analyze? Interpret? Decode? Describe? Evaluate?
And what system does one use? "Music and Meaning."

Bedrock issues in analysis and interpretation. ^{Stepping back} ~~BACKING UP~~ TO THINK → HOW DO
WE DO WHAT WE DO, AND WHY DO WE DO IT THIS WAY, AS
OPPOSED TO THAT WAY? Not to reflect on these things opens one up to the
charge of being naïve, shallow.

Problem: the field itself is conflicted about these matters. Many different approaches—
several of them politicized as old or new, fashionable or un-, last-year's news or
next-year's hopes

(a way of doing things)
Most generally, what we do: APPLY A METHODOLOGY ^(a way of doing things) OR A SET OF PRINCIPLES
(OR A COMPOSITE OF METHODOLOGIES) TO A MUSICAL OBJECT OR
A CONSTELLATION OF OBJECTS. BUT: WHICH METHODOLOGY
DO YOU EMBRACE? AND WHY? Or: when you read a text by someone
else, what methodology is implied, even if not announced? What assumptions,
what axioms, make such writing about music possible? Do you agree with them?



HOW TO APPROACH? FROM WHICH ANGLE? WHAT QUESTIONS DO WE
WANT TO ASK OF THE PIECE? (A piece is likely to give you an answer to any
question you want to put to it...but which?) QUESTIONS HAVE MULTIPLE
DIMENSIONS: INTELLECTUAL; METHODOLOGICAL; POLITICAL

This seminar deals with THINKING about which methodologies you and others have chosen—what the implications of the choice are—what the implications are of the choices that you have not made—and so on. IF YOU DON'T THINK ABOUT THESE MATTERS, THEN SOMEONE ELSE WILL HAVE MADE YOUR CHOICE FOR YOU. "MEANING" IS NOT A SELF-EVIDENT THING IN MUSIC—OR IN ANYTHING ELSE.

THINKING DEEPLY ABOUT MUSIC—STOPPING MUSIC (AND INQUIRIES) TO ASK SOME OF THE BIG QUESTIONS, THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS....AND COORDINATION OF DIFFERING METHODOLOGIES. (LARGE PROBLEM...AT DEEP LEVELS, MUCH CURRENT WRITING IS METHODOLOGICALLY INCOHERENT.)

multiple hermeneutic genres

2. Main problem facing us: Multiple methodologies available, multiple flavors of research and writing (Or: Imagine 52 cards) ... Which one do you choose? Do you rely on others to tell you which to choose? Most choices come pre-packaged by others: here's exactly what you're supposed to do, step-by-step. (Theoretical Systems; Quasi-Scientific Archival Documentary Research; Critical Systems and/or Oppositional Discourses; Modernism vs. Postmodernism, etc.). But they disagree with each other! Which to choose? How to mix or blend? Each: "Choose me, because: fashionable; tried and true; safe; bold—this is the way that everyone does it—or the best people do it—or... And each tells you to avoid the other choices: "Don't choose that one, because: outdated; unfashionable; reductive; risky; timid; ideological; etc."

Grad students often come to grad school to "learn a method" (single method...) but - why choose it? Condemned to second-hand work

Like picking stocks in a volatile market. How will your methodology-choice look five or ten years down the road? Or fifteen?

How does one choose? Or do we let others make the choice for us? But why? And how do we deal with writers who have made other choices?

Jenkins, p. 18 REAS (choices! perfect!!) GOAL choose consciously + continually challenge it - page 1 central of your own discourse

And -> can your constellation of chosen methodologies really work well together? Can they be coordinated into a workable set of procedures?

But a common situation in musicology or music theory today - Much work, - at deep levels - is methodologically

INCOHERENT

(or meth. naive)

of music, (See how ictable ations and can do 17th- ot the BECOME HOUGH NITY)- HAT DO S R

3. Many graduate music seminars of this sort accomplish this by reading current ^{provocative} musicologists or theorists (new musicology, new theory, etc.) Problem: The newness of these disciplines is almost entirely derivative—secondary—borrowed from other fields (philosophy, English, feminist studies, Comp Lit, etc.). These are, at best, sympathetic tremors of earthquakes felt more directly in other fields.

Foucault
Derrida
Saïd
Lacan
Barthes
J. Butler
etc.

All too common strategy for an article (pet peeve): CITE AN AUTHORITY (OUTSIDE OF MUSIC), ACCEPT IT UNCRITICALLY, THEN APPLY IT TO MUSIC IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD FASHION...FRICTIONLESS.


"Let me tell you about the theory of philosopher/lit critic XXXXX and then I'll apply it to music or music history." THE standard trope for much article-writing today. Or "As _____ has argued,"

Because of the casual + unjustified appeal to authority —

Or: "XXXXX says this, which I'll apply to music. Then YYYY said that and ZZZZ said that...and apply those things as well." Problem: XXX, YYY, and ZZZ are often non-compatible or quite different in ways apparently not examined by the writer.

Thus at least for this seminar: by and large —> bypass derivative music-writing to go more directly to the real sources and the real problems. Touch more fundamental issues. And from time to time surface to see how music-writers are doing in their adaptations.

Most published work (frenzy of surface energy)




our study

GROUNDING ASSUMPTIONS AXIOMS

} often tacit or non-problematised

TO SYLLABUS



[like a System Folder in a Computer]

laying the foundation
(more tedious, but essential)

— Let's read through this —
We'll keep coming back to these "essentials"

Classifications of Methodologies and Interests: Five Examples

"Credo" or
Basic postulates
from which this
seminar
springs

Postulates: Historical and analytical inquiry cannot occur without an adoption of grounding principles that are used to justify methods believed to be adequate to the task. In the twenty-first century no grounding principles, however natural or obvious they might initially seem, can be taken as self-evident. It is therefore desirable to give some thought to why one proceeds as one does. To question one's own preferred methodology is, in part, to foreground an awareness of alternative positions and methodologies that contest one's grounding principles. Put another way, one of the first tasks in examining our own work—or, equally important, in coming to terms with the work of others—is to determine where on the spectrum of interpretive possibilities we (or they) have chosen to self-locate. The difficulty of this task lies in this: there is not merely one such spectrum but many intersecting ones, each devised from competing perspectives and angles. Given what amounts to a constellation of such spectrums, we can imagine ourselves (and others) positioned *multiply*, caught and fixed in a web of varied systems of classification and interest. What follows below is an acknowledgment of five such systems.

1st issue → what is a fact? what is knowledge? Who claims to know something?
Can music history or music analysis claim to be a science?

May seem abstract;
(often sidelined,
but it keeps
popping up as
discussions become
more fundamental)

1. Catherine Z. Elgin, "Epistemology's End," *Considered Judgment* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 3-20. (Rpt. also in *Epistemology: The Big Questions*, ed. Linda Martin Alcoff [Oxford: Blackwell, 1998], pp. 26-40.)

Underlying all issues of reflection, history, scientific inquiry, analytical interpretation, etc., are convictions regarding epistemology (questions of knowledge and certainty: "What can I know, and how certain can that knowledge be?" "What is a sufficient reason for thinking that thus and so is true?"). Such questions, of course, have been brought up by innumerable philosophers. Elgin's summary of preceding positions approaches the matter efficiently from the standpoint of twentieth-century pragmatic, analytic, and post-analytic philosophy (that is, she steers clear of phenomenological and other continental approaches to the topic). Elgin divides the various philosophical positions into *three broad categories of epistemological theories* (with many internal variants in each). These are laid out, in order, as one extreme, a middle ground, and another extreme. Both extremes are unacceptable to Elgin (as she argues later in the book). Her book, by and large, is an argument on behalf of her version of the middle ground. Caution: Her labels ("perfect procedural epistemology," etc.), though serviceable, are peculiar to her and are not widely used in the field.

Elgin's three categories are:

— *Perfect Procedural Epistemology* (more usually called *foundationalism*, according to which all knowledge is founded in some separate, larger external truth, serving as a solid base that justifies belief).¹ Its traditional direct opposite (antifoundationalism) is coherentism—the third possibility below. Foundationalism is the mode of knowledge (or knowledge-claim) that demands conclusive reasons guaranteeing the permanent acceptability of judgments. Some terms and ideas associated with it include: “the realist intuition” [10, a literal reality “out there” does exist]; the correspondence theory of truth [that statement is true is that which corresponds with the reality of the facts “out there”]; the conviction that facts exist and “are independent of anything we know or believe about them. . . . The aim of perfect procedural epistemology is to learn those facts” (9). Thus within this viewpoint we can be permanently right or wrong about real facts: once we are in possession of the foundation and in concordance with it, we are “immune to falsity”; our claims are “unimpeachable.” Knowledge is a form of discovering (or recognizing and basing our thought on) that truth that exists “out there.” The image of knowledge (in Ernest Sosa’s image) is that of a “pyramid” built on a single foundational premise. The claim of foundationalists is nothing less than the establishing of a *permanent credibility*, a “cognitive security” (9) in contact with real things and a banishing of illusion not grounded in that certain foundation.

truth + reality are “out there” (apart from us) to be discovered or affirmed
 When a Schlegelian analyzes a piece, is she or he “discovering” something that is objectively in the piece to be found? (It’s there apart from our perception?)
 ∴ a right answer or a wrong one!?

All “knowledge” is grounded in assumptions that we do not question and assume are universally true, as foundations for that knowledge (existence of an external world) “I know I’m right and you’re wrong, because . . .”

= All unchallenged citations of authority (in matters interpretative) . . . evidence sought in large part to support the foundation

The critic Derrida would decry this position—especially appeal to an external, foundational agent of verification—as “logocentrism.”

— *Imperfect Procedural Epistemology*. This is the centrist position favored by Elgin; it is close, perhaps, to the epistemology of Karl Popper; and close to the de facto position of current scientific inquiry. Here one renounces any claim of infallibility, accepts “the perennial possibility of error,” “abandon[s] hope of certainty,” and accepts the necessity of “hypotheses” and “hunches” (11-12). The burden of conviction and proof is less strict and compelling than PPE above; instead, one demands only convincing reasons to argue on behalf of the acceptability of judgments. There are more modest claims here: “given the limitations of our awareness, our best sense of what is likely to be true is And here are the evidential reasons why. . . .” This makes it a humbler variant of PPE above. “Induction is perhaps the most familiar imperfect epistemic procedure” (11). It is less strident and certain by way of absolute truth claims; and “the results [and methods] are revisable,” that is, one is willing to change one’s mind once the error of the original position is demonstrated: hence the embrace of “corrigibility” (12) and the pride in (however modest) “credible results” (13). The claim is reduced from that of PPE (or foundationalism) above: here we have merely *provisional credibility* (12).

in principle, welcomes the opportunity to be corrected for flaws and errors, (less ideological?)

Cf. Popper: we should give the highest “scientific” regard—or knowledge claim—only to statements that are set forth in ways that invite *falsification* by the adducing or discovering of counter-evidence. All “scientific claims” are to be set forth as clear, falsifiable statements—statements that invite and are subject to rigorous testing within a community of researchers. (Thus as a matter of principle one should not ground one’s arguments in sweeping, non-falsifiable claims that are self-immunized against criticism [usually by attacking and casting suspicion on the grounds or beliefs of the critic]. These are claims that no amount of research could

Marxism
 Freudianism
 psychology, etc.

¹ The foundational basis for a belief may be itself be completely underived—simply postulated as infallibly true (“immediate justification”), as immunized against error, or as self-evident from experience, or it may be directly or indirectly derived through argument (a trickier project, as one might expect). Examples of foundationalism include Descartes’s “clear and distinct perceptions” or any system that regards a written revelation or document—or even an undisputed point of view—to be infallibly and objectively true regardless of any viewer who might or might not acknowledge it.

Postulates of Faith

* ∴ Ask about anything you read or write → What is the unstated assumption?
 What do you (or does the author) have to believe in order to make his/her statements possible?
 Read BELOW the surface, at levels of assumptions. (X-Ray)

refute: religious claims, metaphysical claims, grand sociological or psychological theories, explanatory master plans, and so on. Note also the similarity to C. S. Peirce's concept of truth as "the [provisionally agreed-upon] end of inquiry."

Truth is what the group agrees that it is.

—Pure Procedural Epistemology (more usually called coherentism). The basic conviction of this broadly skeptical mode of thought—at least in its strong versions—is this: there is no outside, single "truth" ("no independent standard" to use in order to compare and judge outcomes of thought [4]); rather, it is the system, group, or social episteme that produces what is counted as knowledge within that group; and thus there is no external check to verify "from outside" what are regarded as facts or knowledge within the system. As Elgin puts it, this conception construes reasons for believing something as constitutive of that knowledge (5). Arguments on its behalf are typically accompanied by a strong indictment of foundationalism and the correspondence theory of truth. "Truth" and "knowledge" are culturally produced, not found, and they vary contextually from group to group.

"This is what we believe but we don't want to foist it on you!" (No truth-claim outside the group)

Citations of authority (warrants of legitimacy) [and who you don't cite] mark you as a member of the group. (JH: "Rhetoric of Solidarity")

Some of the most influential current thought is grounded in this position or in similar, related positions: the later Wittgenstein; Kuhn; Rorty; Foucault; Derrida; the poststructuralists; and so on. This antifoundationalist view is also generally regarded as a central conviction of postmodernism and "oppositional discourse" or "identity-politics" relativism.

"fiction" (Hayden White)

"social construction"

This leads to the consensus and coherence theories of truth; and also, in some guises, the pragmatic theory of truth (e.g., in Rorty's thought). "Coherentism" and inner consistency are the touchstones (the "raft" model, not the "pyramid" model, in Ernest Sosa's terms). Thus coherentism answers no questions outside of its own boundaries (unlike "perfect procedures and imperfect procedures[, which] are supposed to answer to something beyond themselves" (16). Those opposed to this category usually level charges of absolute relativism (18) and nihilism. Skepticism within the system "is avoided" (19); what matters is consensus.

Derrida? Kisteva? Butler? R. Williams? L. Kramer? Schuber? Schuber?

Perspectivism — Insider/Standpoint epistemology

Again, this viewpoint often stresses an opposition to "objective knowledge," to any claim of disinterestedness on the part of the inquirer, and (more recently, as in Barthes, Derrida, etc.) to the coercive "violence" and/or suppression on the part of those who assume that they are in possession of one of the two forms of truth suggested above. Advocates insisting on taking into account the subjective position and framing contexts of the knowing subject—the specific social and cultural site and interests of the "who" that is doing the knowing—will adhere to this position. This is associated with the epistemologies of identity politics; different ways of "knowing"; feminist epistemologies; difference theorists of knowledge; etc.

Test case (famous!) — Hitler + the Holocaust — no difference in truth claims of Hitler + others ("moral equivalency" in the absence of a foundationalist yardstick?) — Or Stalin's history textbooks vs., say, England's? (cf. Middle East question — — + q. of "moral equivalence"?)
No way to make any evaluation against any external checks?
Are all systems equally o.k. from within?

Elgin + analytic philosophy usually referring to scientific "truth" or "knowledge"
But in continental traditions there are other types.

E.g.

2. Jürgen Habermas, "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective" [inaugural lecture, Frankfurt University, 1965; expanded into the book], *Knowledge and Human Interests* [*Erkenntnis und Interesse*, 1968], transl. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 301-17 [the inaugural lecture is included as an appendix to the book].

(Difficult!)

no "objective" or "disinterested" knowledge.
No "neutral" knowledge -

Initially cites Schelling as an example of that which he disputes.

In this essay Habermas emerges as a young participant on the *contra* side of the *Positivismstreit* of the 1960s in Germany. Here he opposes the entrenched concept that value-free positivism and disinterested empirical inquiry are possible. All knowledge, he maintains, is linked to human interests, and we should admit this freely. He is particularly concerned to indict "scientism" (controlled experiments, data-collecting, seeming objectivity) in the human sciences (sociology, history, literature, and the like—if and when they display mere facts described in "sterilized language"—p. 316). The first part of his argument refers to the rise of the concept of interest-free knowledge (which Habermas disputes) and cites some influential attempts to embrace it (ancient Greece; Schelling; Husserl—touched upon and found inadequate in Sections 1-4). The later parts outline his own system of research-types (beginning around p. 308, top, and all of the pivotal Section 5), seeking to disabuse each of them from the illusion of disinterestedness and objectivity. The argumentational method is situated squarely and exclusively within Germanic academic discourse of the 1960s. It assumes knowledge of German philosophical constructs (e.g., phenomenology) and the particular historical and political circumstances of West Germany at that time.

cf. Kennan, etc. "positivism"

Most important: Habermas distinguished among three types of research (thus suggesting three differing approaches of inquiry to problems of knowledge and interpretation). He associated each of the *Forschungsprozessen* with the cognitive interests that guide them. To some extent he was arguing against the research principles of Karl Popper, which minimize—according to Habermas—the predispositions and constitutive features of the knowing subject. The three processes are:

Most epistemological work in analytic philosophy concerns this (the status + legitimacy of scientific knowledge) (cf. Kuhn, etc.)

—The *Empirical-Analytic Sciences*, especially the natural and social sciences, at least those latter in pursuit of "nomological" knowledge. Here the general research aim is that of understanding, managing, and coping with our surroundings, including the things that threaten us. This process seeks to predict and control the external world and thus has an "orientation toward technical control" (311). This is the *technical* cognitive interest (308).

"factual" side of things (use, dating, collection of archival letters, etc.)

But: Habermas + others (esp. continental) are much concerned with other types of "knowledge" + inquiry.

—The *Historical-Hermeneutic Sciences*, including especially the humanities [cultural sciences, *Geisteswissenschaften*], history, and certain types of sociology (those types involved with matters of interpretation and "mutual understanding in the conduct of life" (311). Their primary mode of communication is through language [we might add, music], and their goal is "the preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-oriented mutual understanding" (310). The larger aim is thus social and positive: "the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of a self-understanding derived from tradition" (310). Habermas calls this the *practical* cognitive interest (310).

What do these things mean? What patterns do they produce or follow? How can we "understand" them?

—The *Critically Oriented Sciences*, including psychology (Freud) and ideology critique (Hegel, Marx, Weber). Typically, these research processes are concerned with exposing "ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed" (310). This involves "self-reflection" and is determined by the *emancipatory* cognitive interest—the liberation from constraints and illusions that we once took as natural. [Cf. Ricoeur: *Hermeneutics of Suspicion*]

Where is Schelling? Neo-Riemannians? Sketch-Study? Archival research? Black Studies? Feminist Studies? Gay/Lesbian or Queer Studies?

Now — with (3) + (1) below = the main divides
(extremely important)

3. Paul Ricoeur, "The Conflict of Interpretations," in *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 20-37 (with special attention to pp. 26-36).

Here Ricoeur famously laid out the "polarized opposition" [27] lying at the core of modern hermeneutics—the seemingly irreconcilable opposition between modes of interpretation (based on the attitudes and intentions of the one doing the interpreting). After identifying this opposition (in these selected pages), Ricoeur would later argue on behalf of the mutual necessity of both—on behalf of their fusion and interdependence.

Similar to
Habermas's Category (2)?

— *Hermeneutics of Faith* [aka: Hermeneutics of Charity; JH preferred term: *Hermeneutics of Recovery*]. This is sympathetic "interpretation as recollection of meaning" [28] or "the manifestation and restoration of [an intended] meaning addressed to me in the manner of a message" [27]. Cf. the nineteenth- and early-mid-twentieth-century tradition of Germanic hermeneutics, from Schleiermacher to Dilthey's concept of *Verstehen* ("understanding" or "sympathetic intuition," seeking to participate sympathetically in a consciousness other than one's own). Cf. Gadamer's central argument in *Truth and Method*. Cf. R. G. Collingwood's "question and answer" principle of seeking to "re-enact" the past by entering sympathetically into the consciousness of those who made its decisions ("history as re-enactment"). Cf. Donald Davidson's Principle of Charity. Cf. E. D. Hirsch's concept of "meaning" (original authorial intention, as opposed to "significance," created by later interpretations).

Similar to
Habermas's Category (3)?

— *Hermeneutics of Suspicion*: a "demystification . . . a reduction of illusion" [27]; "a reduction of the motivations illusions and lies of consciousness" [32]; an "exercise of suspicion" [32]; an unmasking of interests; a refusal to be deceived by surface appearances. In another much-cited passage Ricoeur also identified the three great "masters" of "the school of suspicion" [32]: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. (In addition, we might include all stripes of oppositional politics and oppositional discourses—minority, colonial, feminist, race-class-gender—at least in their treatments of hegemonically established discourses, art, literature, etc.)

[For some suggested nuances and complications, see the chart on the next page:]

Test case

Fräulein und -leben

Cf. Solie/Cusick vs Muxfeldt → diff. herm. styles (even genres)

In everything you read or write → Be certain where the writer falls on this divide!
And why? Was the choice made consciously? For which purposes? Why?
Or was it de facto? Etc.

The Two "Pure" Hermeneutic Modes Usually Shade into Recognizable Variants/Accommodations

Combinational Modalities

Recovery/Restoration

(continuum)

Suspicion

(continuum)

in some writings

Pragmatic/Eclectic (Rorty): Both modalities are valuable in investigating all repertoires. Therefore one should be a pluralist, shuttling from one mode to the other as seems appropriate and salutary. Consistently to ignore or denigrate one mode or the other is to miss out on something important.

Strongly opposed to all exercises of suspicion regarding a privileged symbol-system.

"Believe in order to understand; understand in order to believe."

(St. Augustine)

"Ethical" interpretation: less militant but insists that charity, sympathy, and "good will" are enjoined upon us as a higher moral and intellectual ground.

(Schleiermacher)

Collingwood - History as re-enactment

Gadamer

Dialectical (Ricoeur): A more complex, dialectical interrelationship between the two modes. This dialectically charged fusion of the modes is, like the eclectic combination above, consistently applicable to all symbol-systems. Ricoeur argues that one essential condition of modernity is the imperative to fuse or sublimate dialectically the two hermeneutic poles in all responsible exercises of interpretation. The two poles consistently interpenetrate and illuminate each other, even to the point, eventually, of coinciding in their aims.

"Double-Standard"; Political ("Spin"); or Advocacy: In order to promote a specific repertoire, course of action, or cultural agenda, one mode is applied consistently to one repertoire, the other to another.

"Critical" interpretation: less militant but favors this mode's skeptical edge.

*Adorno
Horkheimer
Marxism*
(Frankfurt School?
Neo-/post-marxists?, etc.)

*Fr. Jameson
T. Eagleton*

*L. Krav
S. McClary
P. Beeth
G. Tompkins*

Strongly opposed to all exercises of the "sympathetic" stance of the recovery mode.

Derrida: unmask charity as "good will to power"

(extreme skepticism)
..... "Purer"
Postmodernism?
(Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard, etc.).

dismissed as naive or co-opted or a willing hope to unjust power

In part, this diagram adapts classifications suggested in an unpublished paper of Joel Weinsheimer (University of Minnesota), "Charity Militant: Toward a Post-critical Hermeneutics of Tradition"

Cannot be stressed too much !!

4. Karl Marx. Extracts from six statements.

(Extremely famous lines → Historically world-changing - life-changing)


6 enormously powerful challenges

What follows would turn out to be absolute fault-lines within historical scholarship and analytical interpretation. The purpose and direction of one's work depends fundamentally on the degree of one's agreement or disagreement with these six claims. They are: the activist thesis (or the transformationalist thesis, proclaiming the necessity of linking knowledge or interpretation with a self-aware, committed engagement to radical social change; in Marx's version this was leftist change, but there is nothing in the thesis proper to prohibit its adoption by any activist group on either end of the political spectrum); four versions of the materialist social-determination thesis (in Marx, this is base-superstructure model, in which only the base—the economic foundation (and the sets of relations that spring from it)—is considered "real"); and the strong version of the anti-agency or personification thesis, a final statement about the manner in which individual agents are to be considered within historical analysis.

Activist/Transformationalist.

What is your primary goal in choosing and investigating a topic? How do you choose your values?

— Theses on Feuerbach [1845], Eleventh Thesis: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." (future-oriented; not past-oriented)



Five Versions of the Materialist-Social-Determination Thesis (varying strengths)

— The German Ideology [1845-46, the strong version of the social-determination thesis] "The production of ideas; of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. . . . If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

surface appearances (what seems "natural") are an illusion

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process. . . . The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain their semblance of independence. They have no history, no development. . . . Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."

Ideas, art, music, lit HAVE NO HISTORY OF THEIR OWN (Collapse into social history)

Dahhaus objects

This is the precise opposite of the claims made by partisans of the principle of aesthetic autonomy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Cf. Marx's and Engel's later (controversial) remarks about the relative independence or autonomy of art from this principle.

Cf. ch. 8

As opposed to the 19th-c (Austro-Germanic) autonomy claim → Music is primarily a self-contained system obeying + developing according to its own laws.

— Music exists primarily as an art, to be contemplated apart from expectations of social utility

Dahhaus largely (with nuances) supports this claim contra the Marxists.

2nd Version

— *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* [1851-52, the weak version]: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.”

Seems more compromised

This suggests an opening toward a complex interaction between economic base and personal/ideological superstructure; and suggests, as Anthony Giddens points out [in his theory of structuration, e.g., in *The Constitution of Society*, 1984], the ability of individuals to interact with and change the underlying structure of society—the very structure that, in turn, “determines” (enables and constrains) their own self-awareness and options.

Hence appeals to more “moderate” post-Marxist sociologists

3rd Version

— *The Grundrisse* (1857-58): “Society ^{anti-humanistic} does not consist of individuals, but the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand.”

At bottom = relations (not nouns but verbs?)
Processes as “facts”

A key passage, e.g., for Pierre Bourdieu—emphasizing “relations” (Bourdieu: “fields”). One opposing sociological point of view would be classical rational-action theory, in which freely acting individuals are the only “real” things: the abstract concept of “society” as such, in this view, would be a fiction.

4th Version

Among the most influential lines ever penned. Summary of his whole system.

— Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* [1859, the strong version]: “. . . The sum total of these relations of [material] production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. . . . With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. . . .”

die Basis
der Überbau

∴ the claim = all non-Marxist analyses of anything are incomplete, stop short

Thus the implication is that no mode of philosophical-literary-aesthetic analysis is complete until the discussion is brought back to its ultimate and final horizon, the material conditions and interests of its making. To remain only within the realm of aesthetics—whether it be regarded as mere “superstructure” or not (however that term might be problematized, as in the work of Raymond Williams)—is to rest content to exist in the world of ideology or false consciousness. Complicating questions in the second half of the twentieth century include: is the base exclusively material and economic? Are there other components of the determining base? Power? (“Power-Knowledge,” as in Foucault) Prestige? Class? Gender and sexuality (“libidinal economies” of desire) Consciousness of Race/Ethnicity? Language and communication? Collective archetypes? Psychological or cognitive patterning? Etc.

cf. “phantoms” quotation on preceding page

To this last question Fredric Jameson, for example—especially ca. 1980—consistently answered in the negative, arguing instead on behalf of the “semantic priority of Marxist interpretation over the other interpretive codes that are its rivals in the theoretical marketplace today. . . . This is not to say that no intelligent contemporary Marxism will wish to exclude or repudiate any of the themes listed above, which in all their various ways designate objective zones in the fragmentation of contemporary life. Marxism’s ‘transcendence’ of these other methods does not spell the abolition or dissolution of their privileged objects of study, but rather the demystification of the various frameworks or strategies of

containment by means of which each could lay claim to being a total or self-sufficient interpretive system. [We should affirm, though, that] . . . Marxist analysis . . . [is an] ultimate and untranscendable horizon—namely the horizon of the social. . .” (Jameson, “Marxism and Historicism” [1979], in *The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986* [Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1988], II, 149.) This point is also at the core of Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981): “Marxism is here conceived as that ‘untranscendable horizon’ that subsumes such apparently antagonistic or incommensurable critical operations, assigning them an undoubted sectoral validity within itself, and thus at once cancelling and preserving them” (10). “There is nothing that is not social and historical—indeed . . . everything is ‘in the last analysis’ political. The assertion of a political unconscious proposes that we understand just such a final analysis and explore the multiple paths that lead to the unmasking of cultural artifacts as socially symbolic acts.” (20)

Cf. the varied positions of Raymond Williams; Louis Althusser; Pierre Bourdieu; Peter and Christa Bürger; Peter Uwe Hohendahl; Terry Eagleton; the analytical practice of cultural materialism; etc.

Q → Could one accept a social determination thesis without accepting the activist thesis?
Or vice-versa?
(3rd Reich? Feminist? Gender?)

5th Version

—Preface to the first German edition of *Capital*, Volume 1 (1867): “To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense *couleur de rose*. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.”

anti-humanist

— no real individual choice + agency
∴ no responsibility.

Individuals (and works) are to be dealt with only as symptoms or exchangeable representatives of a larger, more fundamental process.

The Principal Methodological Divide: Examples of The Dichotomy

Approach: Liberal-Humanism;
Phenomenology (“subjective”);
Individualism; etc.

Approach: Sociology
 (“objective”); Anthropology;
Structuralism; Critical Theory; etc.

Valued: Recovering the statements of individual
creators; savoring the individual craft of the
statement

Valued: Uncovering ideology in action; social
statements on behalf of or opposed to group
interests; political action in the present

Internal analysis (from the inside out)

External analysis (from the outside in)

Voluntarism (assumption of free will and
action—and perhaps good faith—on the part of
the producer and the receiver)

Determinism (free will is an illusion; our
conduct is predetermined [predestined] by an
outside force or set of forces—society, power,
desire, epistème, paradigm, etc.)

Thus: the balance tips toward “humanism” in
varying degrees of strength

Thus: the balance tips toward “anti-humanism”
in varying degrees of strength

Assumption: the composer “freely” creates the
individual artwork.

Assumption: other, larger forces speak through
the composer; the work is a symptom of those
larger forces

Related concept: charismatic concept of the
artist; “genius”; etc.

Related concept: “genius” is an illusion; the
genius-effect is a by-product of cultural and
social interests

Art possesses the capability of becoming
autonomous, largely removed from most
conceptions of social utility.

The claim of autonomy is not only wrong but
dangerous, permitting one to escape into an
irresponsible fantasy-world—or to impose those
aesthetic norms on others as an act of coercion.

Personal identity is the most important thing, not
the group

Group/social identity the most important thing,
not the individual

Individual actions massed together create the
fiction that we call “society.” Individual choice
matters most.

Society (etc.) is what is “real”; social
construction creates (or at least largely
determines) the individual

Interest: An artwork's particularity, idiosyncrasy; emphasis on internal details. The goal: to bring forth those details into our attention; to savor them; to admire craft, madeness, etc. A primary valuing of aesthetics, beauty, poetics, close reading, well-madeness.

Sympathetic approach to the work;
Verstehen ("understanding"); hermeneutics of faith or recovery

Hence: interest in the details of what the writer, author, speaker, composer actually sought to "say" in the statement at hand. (Cf. the Karl Popper tale on the page below: the perfect paradigm?)

Evaluation of works "on their own terms"; changing of perspectives to adapt to the apparent assumptions of each work. "Ethical" evaluation vis a vis present interests is less important (or criticized as "presentism," etc.)

Etc.

Interest: An artwork's genre, broader social purpose. The goal: to decode the work as an artifact of ideology or social function. What you see/hear on the surface is not what the work is really about. Don't fall prey to the illusion. "Beauty" (like "truth") is a suspect category, masking power.

Critical approach to the work:
Erklären ("explanation"); hermeneutics of suspicion

Hence: less interest in the details of a statement or argument (which, in a sense, are almost irrelevant) than in the composer's manner of saying it—chosen vocabulary, style, etc.—and the hidden reasons behind those style choices. (Cf. the Karl Popper tale on the below.)

Evaluation of past works on the basis of whether they advance or retard current political or social interests. One uses the past politically; mere "appreciation" (of things that are politically detrimental) is naïve.

Etc.

between sociology and anthropology has been reversed. Social anthropology has been promoted from an applied descriptive discipline to a key theoretical science and the anthropologist has been elevated from a modest and somewhat short-sighted descriptive fieldworker to a far-seeing and profound social theorist and social depth-psychologist. The former theoretical sociologist however must be happy to find employment as a fieldworker and a specialist: his function is to observe and to describe the totems and taboos of the natives of the white race in Western Europe and the United States.

But one probably should not take this change in the fate of the social scientist too seriously; particularly as there is no such thing as the essence of a scientific subject. This leads me to my ninth thesis.

Ninth thesis: A so-called scientific subject is merely a conglomerate of problems and attempted solutions, demarcated in an artificial way. What really exists are problems and solutions, and scientific traditions.

Despite this ninth thesis, the complete reversal in the relations between sociology and anthropology is extremely interesting, not on account of the subjects or their titles, but because it points to the victory of a pseudo-scientific method. Thus I come to my next thesis.

Tenth thesis: The victory of anthropology is the victory of an allegedly observational, allegedly descriptive and allegedly more objective method, and thus of what is taken to be the method of the natural sciences. It is a Pyrrhic victory: another such victory and we—that is, both anthropology and sociology—are lost.

My tenth thesis may be formulated, I readily admit, a little too pointedly. I admit of course that much of interest and importance has been discovered by social anthropology, which is one of the most successful social sciences. Moreover, I readily admit that it can be fascinating and significant for us Europeans to see ourselves, for a change, through the spectacles of the social anthropologist. But although these spectacles are perhaps more coloured than others, they hardly are, for this reason, more objective. The anthropologist is not the observer from Mars which he so often believes himself to be and whose social role he often attempts to play (and not without gusto); quite apart from the fact that there is no reason to suppose that an inhabitant of Mars would see us more 'objectively' than we, for instance, see ourselves.

In this context I should like to tell a story which is admittedly extreme but in no way unique. Although it is a true story, this is immaterial in the present context: should the story seem improbable to you then, please, take it as an invention, as a freely invented illustration, designed to make clear an important point by means of crass exaggeration.

Years ago, I was a participant in a four-day conference, organized by a theologian, in which philosophers, biologists, anthropologists and physicists participated—one or two representatives from each discipline; in all eight participants were present. The topic was, I think, 'Science and Humanism'. After several initial difficulties and the elimination of an attempt to impress us by exalted depth [*'erhabene Tiefe'* is a term of Hegel's who failed to see that an exalted depth is just a platitude] the joint efforts of roughly four or five participants succeeded in the course of two days in raising the discussion to an uncommonly high level. Our conference had reached the stage—or so it appeared to me at least—at which we all had the happy feeling that we were learning something from one another. At any rate, we were all immersed in the subject of our debate when out of the blue the social anthropologist made his contribution.

'You will, perhaps, be surprised', he said, 'that I have said nothing; so far in this conference. This is due to the fact that I am an observer. As an anthropologist I came to this conference not so much in order to participate in your verbal behaviour but rather to study your verbal behaviour. This is what I have succeeded in doing. Concentrating on this task, I was not always able to follow the actual content of your discussion. But someone like myself who has studied dozens of discussion groups learns in time that the topic discussed is relatively unimportant. We anthropologists learn—this is almost verbatim (so far as I remember)—to regard such social phenomena from the outside and from a more objective standpoint. What interests us is not the what, the topic, but rather the how: for example, the manner in which one person or another attempts to dominate the group and how his attempts are rejected by the others, either singly or through the formation of a coalition; how after various attempts of this type a hierarchical order and thus a group equilibrium develops and also a group ritual of verbalization; these things are always very similar no matter how varied the question appears to be which serves as the topic of the discussion.'

We listened to our anthropological visitor from Mars and to all he had to say; and then I put two questions to him. First, whether he had any comment to make on the actual content and result of our discussion; and then, whether he could not see that there were such things as impersonal reasons or arguments which could be valid or invalid. He replied that he had had to concentrate too much on the observation of our group behaviour to have been able to follow our argument in detail; moreover, had he done so, he would have endangered (so he said) his objectivity; for he might have become involved in the argument; and had he allowed himself to be carried away by it, he would have become one of us—and that would have been the end of his objectivity. Moreover, he was trained not to judge the literal content of verbal behaviour (he constantly used the terms 'verbal behaviour' and 'verbalization'), or to take it as being important. What concerned him, he said, was the social and psychological function of this verbal behaviour. And he added something like the following: 'While arguments or reasons make an impression on you, as participants in a discussion, what interests us is the fact that through such means you can mutually impress and influence each other; and also of course the symptoms of this influence. We are concerned with concepts such as emphasis, hesitation, intervention, and concession. We are actually not concerned with the factual content of the discussion but only with the role which the various participants are playing: with the dramatic interplay as such. As to the so-called arguments, they are of course only one aspect of verbal behaviour and not more important than the other aspects. The idea that one can distinguish between arguments and other impressive verbalizations, is a purely subjective illusion; and so is the idea of a distinction between objectively valid and objectively invalid arguments. If hard pressed, one could classify arguments according to the societies or groups within which they are, at certain times, accepted as valid or invalid. That the time element plays a role is also revealed by the fact that seemingly valid arguments, which are at one time accepted in a discussion group such as the present one, may nevertheless be attacked or rejected at a later stage by one of the participants.'

I do not wish to prolong the description of this incident. I imagine that it will not be necessary to point out, in the present gathering, that the somewhat extreme position of my anthro-

logical friend shows in its intellectual origin the influence not only of the behaviouristic ideal of objectivity but also of certain ideas which have grown on German soil. I refer to the idea of philosophical relativism: historical relativism, which believes that there is no objective truth but instead merely truths for this or that age; and sociological relativism, which teaches that there are truths or sciences for this or that class or group or profession, such as proletarian science and bourgeois science. I also believe that the sociology of knowledge has its full share of responsibility, for it contributed to the pre-history of the dogmas echoed by my anthropological friend. Admittedly, he adopted a somewhat extreme position at that conference. But this position, especially if one modifies it a little, is neither untypical nor unimportant.

But this position is absurd. Since I have criticized historical and sociological relativism and also the sociology of knowledge in detail elsewhere, I will forego criticism here. I will confine myself to discussing very briefly the naïve and misguided idea of scientific objectivity which underlies this position.

Eleventh thesis: It is a mistake to assume that the objectivity of a science depends upon the objectivity of the scientist. And it is a mistake to believe that the attitude of the natural scientist is more objective than that of the social scientist. The natural scientist is just as partisan as other people, and unless he belongs to the few who are constantly producing new ideas, he is, unfortunately, often very biased, favouring his pet ideas in a one-sided and partisan manner. Several of the most outstanding contemporary physicists have also founded schools which set up a powerful resistance to new ideas.

However, my thesis also has a positive side and this is more important. It forms the content of my twelfth thesis.

Twelfth thesis: What may be described as scientific objectivity is based solely upon a critical tradition which, despite resistance, often makes it possible to criticize a dominant dogma. To put it another way, the objectivity of science is not a matter of the individual scientists but rather the social result of their mutual criticism, of the frictionally-hostile division of labour among scientists, of their co-creation and also of their competition. For this reason, it depends, in part, upon a number of social and political circumstances which make this criticism possible.

Thirteenth thesis: The so-called sociology of knowledge which tries to explain the objectivity of science by the attitude of

5. Wolfgang Iser, "Introduction" (encompassing the subheadings, "The Marketplace of Interpretation" and "Interpretation as Translatability"), in *The Range of Interpretation* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 1-12.

Iser notes over the past several decades a "marketplace of three basic trends" or styles of textual interpretation. After reviewing each of the three briefly, he declares each to be eclipsed, outdated, methodologically inconsistent, or otherwise flawed. He then proceeds to recommend their replacement with a fourth type that, he argues, steers clear of the shortcomings of the preceding three.

- "Types of interpretation that claim universal validity for their assumptions, thus pretending to provide an overall explanation of everything. A case in point is Marxism, which, in its heyday, claimed nothing less than a monopoly of interpretation. This type is now on the wane, in part because of the reification of its presuppositions. Such reifications occur in almost all forms of what has come to be known as ideology critique, Marxist or otherwise. The various brands of ideology critique elevate their presuppositions to the status of reality, just as do the ideologies they combat. Monopolies of interpretation thus present themselves as transcendental grandstand views . . ." [2] (According to Iser, by the late 1990s this style "has already turned into a dead end." [2])

Elgin
Category ①

- [Types of interpretation that embrace a competitive pluralism or dialectical encounter of interpretations within the marketplace—in part, to see what adapts and what survives. This suggests the tense coexistence of potentially valid, multiple types of interpretation.] This is the style that "Ricoeur once termed 'the conflict of interpretations.' It manifests itself as competition, with each type trying to assert itself at the expense of the others in order to demonstrate its respective importance and the depth and breadth of its insights and range. What the conflict [actually] reveals, and what makes it interesting, is the inherent limitation of all presuppositions. The greater the awareness of such limitations, the more the conflicting discourses of interpretation begin to appropriate one another. . . . Such an amalgamation of interpretive discourses reveals that none is able to establish a monopoly of interpretation. . . ." [3-4]

JH:
Si, lo
confesso!

- "'Oppositional discourses,' ranging from minority to postcolonial. Oppositional insofar as they set out to subvert or dispute the standards of what they consider to be the hegemonic discourse, they are developed by social groups for the purpose of asserting their objectives, of gaining recognition for their agenda, and of striving for power. They face a problem, however, in that a great many of them use the very procedures developed by the hegemonic discourse. . . . In trying to gain validity for their objectives, they develop a frame of reference that, in the final analysis, is not far from being logocentric itself, because a certain rationality is required if an agenda is to be accepted. . . . [Thus, often,] these latter discourses [are] indirectly dependent on what they intend to discard." [4],

I.e.
Elgin Category
③
discourse
often slips
into
Category ①

- Iser's solution: to explore the anatomy of interpretation as *translation*, the transposition of one form of discourse into another. What is needed, he argues, is a clearer sense and examination of the crucial distinction or "division between the subject matter to be interpreted and the register brought to bear [that is, the quite different register into which it is to be translated]." This difference is called a "liminal space" and interpretation is an effort to narrow that unclosable gap. The register, obviously, is "coded" with "viewpoints and assumptions that provide the angle from which the subject matter is approached." But the register involved should make no transcendental knowledge claims (as if actually discovering the truth); it is merely "two-way traffic" between source and translation, and all "interpretation takes place within historical situations that we cannot get out of." Thus: "the [selected] register is nothing but the bootstraps by which we pull ourselves up toward comprehension." [5-6]