The Dahlhaus Project and Its Extra-musicological Sources

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It is probably no overstatement to say that Carl Dahlhaus's *Nineteenth-Century Music* could alter the horizon of English-language musicology. Whether we wish to take issue with it or to build upon it, the book provides a needed focus for discussion, and it seems likely to remain for some time the single broad argument about the century that professionals will be expected to have confronted. Yet the book is not self-explanatory, particularly for American readers. Much of its *raison d'être* lies beneath the surface of its compact, often oblique prose, and it presumes a readership involved in methodological disputes taken for granted in West Germany in the 1960s and 70s. Not surprisingly, the American response to date has been to sidestep the contextual engagement of its arguments in favor of noting the disturbing contrast between the brilliance of Dahlhaus's intellectualist approach to the history of music and the vexing reality of his apparent unwillingness to consider non-Germanic music on its own terms, his rigorously judgemental pronouncements, and his occasional errors of factual detail. Thus Philip Gossett, Dahlhaus's sharpest American critic to date, recently concluded that "the errors [of *Nineteenth-Century Music*] reveal a systemic failure. Dahlhaus's central vision is so pervasive that it tends to misrepresent or demean the music it treats."2

These are serious charges, and they will take some time to assess. To be sure, "central vision" is the dominating factor of the Dahlhaus
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Project, and it merits our closest attention. Here, too, Gossett has provided an initial step with his recent critique, "Carl Dahlhaus and the 'Ideal Type',' which traces an important strand of Dahlhausian methodology to its source in Max Weber. But his "central vision" comprises many other such strands, none of which has been adequately developed in the secondary literature on Dahlhaus. In English-language discussions, they are often alluded to—with a shiver—as features that are forbiddingly Germanic. It is common to encounter, for instance, unelaborated references to an approach "rooted in an intellectual tradition of idealist philosophy quite foreign to the mainstream of Anglo-American analytic empiricism," along with a remark to the effect that many aspects of this approach are fated to "receive little resonance in this country." Other commentaries refer briefly, but ominous, to "the dialectical ruminations of one nourished at the intellectual bosom of Th. W. Adorno", to the Russian-Formalist literary critics; to the Annales School; to Schoenbergianism; and so on. Gossett has provided an exemplary beginning, but other sources underpinning Dahlhaus's work remain insufficiently identified, explored, and contextually coordinated.

This essay attempts a rudimentary mapping of the geography of Dahlhaus's "extra-musical" concerns. By identifying certain modes of thought as extra-musical, I mean only that either they arose outside the academic profession of Musikwissenschaft or that in the 1960s, when Dahlhaus was beginning to consolidate his system, they were considered outside the normal concerns of the professional discussion. This would include Adorno as extra-musical, for instance, since his music-critical methods were often considered unphilologisch, more related to philosophy and sociology than to musicology. Schoenberg, as a prominent composer, however, would always have been considered central to the profession's interest. An examination of Dahlhaus's musicological or music-theoretical sources, most of which were written before 1960, would lead us further afield than is practical here. My references focus, so far as possible, on two of the most central works: Foundations of Music History [FMH] of 1977, which elaborates his fully unfurled methodology, and Nineteenth-Century Music [NCM] of 1980, intended to be, among other things, a practical demonstration of that methodology. [A review of the most fundamental features of Dahlhaus's thought, particularly as presented in these two works, is provided in the Appendix to this essay.]

As the briefest of introductions, we may say that at the heart of the Dahlhaus Project was an effort to keep the Austro-Germanic canon from Beethoven to Schoenberg free from aggressively sociopolitical interpretations. His principal strategy was, first, to insist that as concrete artworks they were conceived primarily under the category of aesthetic autonomy (Appendix, no. 6), and, second, to argue that historians should generally stress primary, not secondary categories. This permitted "great music" to continue to be considered principally within the realm of aesthetics, as a type of socially functionless, nonauthoritarian discourse. These views were profoundly traditional, and in the West Germany of the 1960s and 70s, their acceptability was coming increasingly under attack. Dahlhaus's concerns, therefore, may be understood as essentially defensive. They were undertaken in a world growing skeptical both of the appeal to tradition and of the utility and claims of positivistic research.

In his search for alternatives to an unreflective positivism, alternatives that would still preserve traditional musical values, Dahlhaus was in dialogue with two extra-musical constellations of thought. The first, or "materialist-sociological [Marxist]," constellation, a network of ways of thinking of which he was profoundly suspicious, is the subject of section III below. The second, and for Dahlhaus the more positive, the "empirical-hermeneutic-phenomenological" constellation, will be treated in the concluding section IV. (It should be added at once that in actual practice these constellations intersected in complex, unpredictable ways. The well-known Marxism/phenomenology mix of Sartre, for example, may serve as an illustration of this outside of Germany. While by no means wishing to minimize the intricacy of the issues at stake, the more practical point here is that Dahlhaus, whose thought was shaped during a period of
extraordinary political and methodological tension, seems to have experienced these constellations as generally contrasting.) Before entering this discussion, however, it is necessary to ground Dahlhaus's concerns within the epistemological crisis that engulfed West German universities in the 1960s and 70s. It is only within this context, which included some potent sociopolitical ramifications, that the full impact of his system may be grasped. And it is on this broader, contextual ground that our consideration of Dahlhaus in the upcoming years is likely to unfold.

II

On the most fundamental level, Dahlhaus's writings may be read as a response to the complex of controversies that arose within West German universities from 1960 to about 1980.9 In brief, these disputes were touched off by a collapse of faith in positivistic inquiry, a collapse attributable to the continued (but by now widely acknowledged) decline of the notion of objectively attainable truth. Although the problems involved had been raised earlier in the century, this crisis became particularly evident in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the philosophy of science advanced by such figures as Karl Popper (whose work of the 1930s was now becoming more widely known), Peter Winch, Michael Polanyi, Imre Lakatos, and Thomas Kuhn.10

At issue was the increasing suspicion that the pursuit of truth was little more than the ever-clearer articulation of covert premises (for example, Kuhn’s “paradigms”) which themselves were rarely subjected to scrutiny. As such, “normal science”—for instance, concentrating on something external to ourselves and trying to produce an empirically true statement about its properties—began to look more and more like a network of legitimation-processes for unstated world-views. Hence the most vulnerable aspect of both the scientific enterprise and any historical work influenced by the methods of science was the claim that the individual researcher's personal interests could be factored out of his or her research. The attack on objectivity continued in West Germany during the 1960s with the spectacular rise of Gadamerian hermeneutics. (The first edition of Hans-Georg Gadamers Truth and Method [Wahrheit und Methode] appeared in 1960: see section IV below, where it will be discussed as one of Dahlhaus's central sources.11) And the crumbling of faith in objectivity and in the possibility of what Weber had called “value-freedom” was spurred onward in the much-vaunted “positivist dispute” (Positivismusstreit) from 1961 to about 1971, pitting Popper and Hans Albert as “critical rationalists” on the more traditional (or “conservative”) side against Adorno and Jürgen Habermas as proponents of a dialectical vision of critical theory and “societal totality” on the other.12

By the mid-1960s, a new factor had electrifyingly politicized all of this: the rise of the student movement and the New Left, which peaked in the upheavals of 1968 but continued with considerable strength until about 1974.13 (As is widely known, the New Left insisted that the axioms tacitly undergirding traditional, “value-free” research were little more than conservative—sometimes repressive—political positions.) By the later 1970s, however, the New Left had become politically ineffectual, as a result of the ascendancy of pragmatism, neo-conservatism, and occasionally outright governmental legislation. This Tendenzwende, or change in the climate of opinion, had become particularly noticeable by 1977, a date referred to by German leftists as the “German Autumn.”14

Still, the late 1960s and 70s saw the rise in the West German universities of sociological and Marxist proponents of varying degrees of orthodoxy, confrontation, and activism. One faction stemmed from the critical-theory tradition of the Frankfurt School and centered around the work of the increasingly controversial Adorno15 and the influential writings on the theory of knowledge and society by Habermas. But other, more politically committed figures also played prominent roles in the ongoing tensions, as, for example, in the much-noted Kursbuch 15 proclamation in 1968 of the death of “bourgeois literary criticism” (including Adorno's aesthetic system) by Walter Böhlisch, Karl Markus Michel, Yaak Karsunke, and Hans Magnus Enzensberger.16 The rejection of Adorno by the committed left in the late 1960s on the grounds of artistic elitism, as well
as because of his defense of aesthetic autonomy and work-immanence (probably the key terms of the aesthetic debate of the time) is a central factor here, one that will be revisited in section III. Because it concerned a musician and prolific writer on musical topics, the heated Adorno dispute around 1970 could scarcely be ignored by the institution of musicology—neither by radicalized students within the discipline nor by any Musikwissenschaftler, such as Dahlhaus, with a pronounced aesthetic and methodological bent.17

The human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) felt these challenges with particular intensity. For example, Peter Uwe Hohendahl, writing in 1985 from the standpoint of the left, described the literary-critical crisis as follows:

The criticism of [literary] criticism desolated and thus laid bare the institutional foundations that everyone had blindly considered self-evident. If “bourgeois criticism” was abruptly declared dead, this did not mean—as the New Left had prophesied—the end of German literary criticism but was rather an incentive to interrogate the institution critically. The interrogation concentrated on the relationship between the function of criticism and the social structure of the Federal Republic of Germany. . . . The new perspective required by our object induces us to push traditional questions of the history of ideas into the background in order to foreground questions that were not traditionally posed.18

Several features of this account deserve comment before we move on to a more direct consideration of Dahlhaus. First, Hohendahl’s verb, “interrogate,” with its edgy, political connotations, conveys the ideological tension and accusatory atmosphere within the German human sciences in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Second, Hohendahl implies that the substance of the interrogation concerned something beyond mere “social structure” as abstractly formulated. What was really at stake was concrete praxis: West Germany’s confrontation with and assimilation of its National Socialist past (and of the history that had led up to that past), all considered within the current tensions sparked by the competing political agendas of the West German left, center, and right. Finally, Hohendahl touches on one of the most prominent features of the literary-critical revolution in the past two decades: what was said by the “traditionalist” literary critics was becoming ignored in favor of how it was said and, above all, why it was said. The actual results and claims made by established literary criticism (or, pari passu, by history, science—or musicology) receded in importance, indeed, seemed almost irrelevant, before the new, sociological interrogation. Debates were no longer to center on overt content; rather, the topic was the concealed motivation of the researcher, or better, of the literary-critical or historical institution as a whole.

The most extreme, publicized manifestations of these developments occurred outside German musicology, most of whose leading figures were remaining generally faithful to its traditional mix of positivistic empiricism and Geistesgeschichte. But that mix was now endangered through the rise of epistemological and hermeneutic models outside the discipline that mainstream musicologists seemed, thus far, to be resisting. Ominously, the idealistic self-containment of “great music” had been breached through Adorno’s sharp ideology critique of substantial portions of the musical canon. Adorno’s passionate assaults on Wagner, Strauss, Stravinsky, and others (which, as Albrecht Riethmüller has recently written, “brought political argumentation into apolitical musical circles” that would clearly have preferred to have their “quest for beautiful inwardness” remain undisturbed)19 encouraged others to make even more emphatically politicized invasions into the canon, as well as into the disciplines that were claiming to explicate it. (Riethmüller recalls, for example, “the feverish Adornitis, which so many students around and after 1968 seem to have caught, down to the linguistic mannerisms,” even though, in fact, this passing epidemic produced few lasting results within German musicology.20] Moreover, by the early 1970s West German musicology was encountering vigorous challenges not only from the Adornians and from ever more assertive “materialist” critics, but also from the methods advocated by more orthodox Marxist musicologists in East Germany and the other East-bloc countries.21 Considering the levels of crisis invading the other disciplines,22 Musikwissenschaft as a
suspect institution had begun to run the risk of appearing unsophisticated, parochial in its interests, and generally unconcerned with establishing a defensible conceptual basis for its investigations. This is precisely the charge that Dahlhaus leveled at it in his 1977 Foundations (FMH, pp. 122, 126, 132), and it is without question the reason that the book was written.

In sum, by the late 1960s, if not earlier, Dahlhaus, who had been reading widely outside of musicology for some time, must have perceived that traditional German musicology, whose tacitly positivistic or Geistesgeschichte base now seemed gutted by the new philosophy of science, was vulnerable to collapse and capture by political ideology. By confronting and, when relevant, importing the disputes from outside the field and then merging them with key concepts within existing German musicology, Dahlhaus’s plan seems to have been to shore up the discipline from within. His project, many of whose main lines appeared in a series of short articles in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik from 1972 to 1978 and were gathered and expanded in Foundations, reconstructed the traditional discipline on new empirical-philosophical-hermeneutic terms, while pointedly keeping sociological concerns and Marxism—especially the orthodox or politically committed Marxism, which seem Dahlhaus’s chief concern—at a respectable distance [Appendix, no. 8].

As such the Dahlhaus Project could be understood as a constituent of what the German intellectual left would persistently, if sweepingly, characterize as a group of “culturally conservative” counterstrategies most prominently represented by the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the early stages of the reception theory of Gadamer’s most illustrious pupil, Hans Robert Jauss. Both Gadamer and the earlier Jauss seemed to reinforce the value of tradition per se, the “strong concept of art,” and the undisputed worth of the established literary and artistic canons. These two figures, along with the theoretical resources on which they draw, loom large in Dahlhaus’s thought.

But one must be cautious to avoid overstatements. Because of the reductive use to which political labels may be put, they are dangerous things, particularly because they are usually attached only by explicit partisans in the heat of battle. One may suppose that Dahlhaus would have insisted that his project was above politics, equally open to the best ideas of the left, center, or right. It is also likely that he would have objected to any collapse of his nuanced positions into anything smacking of political sloganeering, concealed agendas, or explicit partisanship. Still, there is no denying that the Dahlhaus Project was centrally concerned with nineteenth-century German music—more explicitly, with a connotation-saturated repertory that had been pivotal in establishing a German national identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, it was carried out in an atmosphere charged with domestic politics during a period deeply involved with how West Germany was confronting its not-so-distant past and the misuse of its own traditions.

Dahlhaus’s intention to shelter the German Romantic canon from ideology critique could hardly be clearer. For instance, in what is probably the most provocative utterance in Foundations—a litmus-test capable of separating Dahlhaus’s defenders from at least one group of his critics—he insisted that “no-one had a burden to bear because Beethoven wielded authority in music. This line of argument directed at ‘great men’ collapses when transferred from political to music history” (FMH, p. 9). In other words, the power and claims of the “great works” of German music were preponderantly aesthetic. How these works might have been used socially and what the effective function of this aesthetic autonomy might have been are questions that he considered alternately futile or out-of-bounds.

Whatever Dahlhaus’s motivation might have been, his insistence on the nearly pure autonomy of nineteenth-century German music had the effect of helping to normalize [and thereby defuse] contemporary West Germany’s relation to a problematic past. His wish to elevate the musicological discussion but simultaneously to transpose the debate beyond politics, or, at least for “great works,” to shunt political and cultural questions to the margins, was made clear as early as 1971 in Richard Wagner’s Music Dramas (as political a nineteenth-century musical topic as could be imagined, particularly in its 1971 academic context).
Here, Dahlhaus began his discussion with an appeal to the now-threatened values of objectivity and aesthetics:

Even today, a hundred years after the founding of the theatre in Bayreuth, people who write about Wagner veer to one pole or the other: to polemics or apologetics [as with Adorno or Westernhagen].... Yet at last, after the collapse of the false and fateful apotheosis of Wagner under fascism, the belief seems to be spreading that, while the artistic significance and standing of Wagner’s work are undiminished in the second half of the twentieth century, its intellectual and political significance is now part of history and can be regarded with the historian’s detachment. We can look at Wagner objectively without reducing our admiration for the music. While the controversy over Wagner is far too tangled ever to be resolved—it can only be dismantled and forgotten—it began to recede into the background when hostility against Richard was diverted and redirected towards Wieland Wagner and his productions of his grandfather’s works.²⁷

It is not my purpose here either to endorse or to criticize Dahlhaus’s words, only to point out that they are highly charged and cannot be understood apart from the resistance against which they were written. True, music has been typically (if wrongly) regarded as insulated from the mainstream of intellectual discourse within the humanities, perhaps as a quasi-sacralized, healing zone where special interests may be put aside. This may be one reason why Dahlhaus’s project has been less noted [and less controversial] than it might have been. Still, when similar appeals to “the historian’s detachment” were applied to literature and philosophy in West Germany, the left/nonleft debate heated up quickly. And when they were applied to the writing of recent German history, particularly in the more conservative 1980s, the result was the strident, highly publicized “historian’s debate” (the Historikerstreit, revolving around the role of the Holocaust in Germany’s history), which set “neoconservatives” at odds with the redoubtable, battle-experienced Habermas and allied thinkers on the left.²⁸ While the center and the right argued on behalf of the researcher’s neutrality, balanced views, and sympathetic objectivity in dealing with artworks and historical events of the German past, the more committed left construed this as a thinly disguised attempt to re-legitimize a national tradition by refusing to thematize its negative side: one should make explicit one’s horror for that which the tradition had not prevented, or for which it might have been used to further. Thus, from the left, Andreas Huyssen argued in 1986 that the current moral imperative was to fight and refute the “neo-conservatives, who advocate the immanence of art and its separateness from the Lebenswelt.”²⁹ And as Habermas put it in 1988, referring to the difficulty of coming to grips with the Heidegger problem [and hence uttered molto più fortissimo than would be needed in any measured response to Dahlhaus], “In Germany every tradition that served to make us blind to the Nazi regime needs a critical, indeed a distrustful, appropriation.”³⁰

Amid the flurry of such remarks—and they have been there at least from the mid-1960s to the present—even Dahlhaus’s carefully nuanced plea for a largely aesthetic consideration of the German musical tradition is difficult to view apart from its sociopolitical resonances. The embrace of value-freedom and relative objectivity on the part of the researcher and of aesthetic autonomy for nineteenth-century German music can be understood to mean different things in different cultural contexts, and to different social groups within those contexts. However benign or magnanimous its motivation, Dahlhaus’s insistence on “a distinction between a sociology of knowledge that pursues extrinsic relationships,” which is not his primary concern, and “a theory of history that examines intrinsic connections,” which is [FMH, p. 1], invites the social activist to interpret it as playing into the interests of the West German center-right traditionalists of the 1970s and 80s, that is, as helping to support certain aesthetic resonances of the Tendenzwende, whose trajectory very nearly parallels that of Dahlhaus’s career. Dahlhaus was aware of this aspect of his work, and he addressed it at the beginning of Foundations:

To a Marxist—in whose eyes the only alternative to overt bias is covert bias—this [focussing on intrinsic connections] would look suspiciously like a conservative stance entrenched behind formal argument.
This suspicion cannot be allayed; it must simply be borne \([FMH, \text{p. } 1]\).\(^1\)

Since American academies of the 1990s have become more politicized through the competing agendas of the New Historicism, poststructuralism, postmodernism, gender critiques, the revival of interest in Critical Theory and its immediate successors, and so on—all in the midst, of course, of the persistence of traditional methodologies as well—one suspects that much of the Dahlhaus debate-to-come will broach these matters aggressively. Because of the highly charged issues involved, one may only hope that the positions taken will be realistic ones, not caricatures. In some important ways, however, such a divisive issue as “aesthetic autonomy vs. art-as-politics” is beyond objective resolution. Asserting that, say, the Austro-Germanic canon is either the one or the other is characteristically no more than reciting an \emph{article de foi} within an accepted faith system. The argument is rarely advanced by supporting only one of the two sides. This repertory is both aesthetic and political—both in full measure, depending on one’s perspective and on the nature of the inquiry one wishes to pursue. The current temptations in written criticism, in which each faction calls on its own set of exclusive sources (its own “team players”) to bolster its arguments and to disparage those of its opponents, should be avoided. In a situation that might seem to be urging us to cling to either one half of the argument or the other, it would be better to ease our rhetoric and to turn to wholes.

In any event, as will probably become increasingly apparent with the reunified Germany of the 1990s and twenty-first century, Dahlhaus’s writings are very much a product of late-postwar, divided Germany. His physical location in an ideologically split Berlin from 1967 until his death in 1989 is something of a life-metaphor for the tensions that one finds gathered, but not resolved, in his work.

III

The “materialist-sociological” constellation comprises for the most part the many shades of Marxism. This includes Marxist-Leninist thought in the “official,” or Soviet/East German/Central-European sense; actively revolutionary or committed Marxisms (Leninism, Maoism, and various liberationist movements) as encountered among some radical groups in West Germany in the 1960s and 70s; and, more problematically, the far subtler traditions of Western Marxism (including such representatives as Georg Lukács and Walter Benjamin) and, more specifically, Critical Theory, represented especially by Adorno and continued (with a move further in the direction of Weber) in the 1970s and 80s by Habermas and others.

Dahlhaus’s opposition to reductive or dogmatic Marxism (\emph{Vulgärmarxismus}) is a key feature of \emph{Foundations}, which at times reads like an anti-Marxist polemic. This is particularly the case in chapter 8, “The ‘Relative Autonomy’ of Music History,” which catalogues Dahlhaus’s objections to the more unsophisticated strains of Marxism, and also in much of chapter 7, “The Value-Judgment: Object or Premise of History?”, Dahlhaus’s non-Marxist stance appears to have emerged, at least in print, in the early 1970s and was unambiguously clarified by 1974, particularly in the essay, “The Musical Work of Art as a Subject of Sociology,”\(^32\) an anticipatory companion piece to chapter 8 of \emph{Foundations}.

During the mid-1970s, Dahlhaus frequently stressed the inadequacy of the cruder constructions of the base-superstructure model, which would assign the arts a secondary (merely superstructural or derived) role to that of economics.\(^33\) In the classic “extreme” formulation, one which Dahlhaus would keep hurling back at orthodox Marxists \([FMH, \text{p. } 114; SNM, \text{p. } 237]\),\(^34\) the early Marx had written in \emph{The German Ideology} that such things as morality, religion, and metaphysics (and by implication such other forms of “ideology” as the arts) were merely “phantoms formed in the human brain. . . . They have no history, no development.”\(^35\)

Amid such charges, which Dahlhaus certainly heard revived in the 1960s and 70s, the whole matter of whether music has a history at all becomes imperiled. Dahlhaus’s position, however, was quite different: “Ideas are historical facts too,” he wrote in 1974,\(^36\) and his central strategy in countering the indictment that a belief in autonomous music was mere ideology or a state of “false consciousness” that brushed
aside unpleasant social questions was to appeal to the more accommodating letters of the late Engels, which seemed to allow at least a "relative autonomy" to art.37 Once his opponents could be convinced to concede even this small wedge of "relative autonomy" (although Dahlhaus's own belief in artistic autonomy was more expansive), he would use it to drive home—even to skeptics, he hoped—the validity of his own project, which focused more directly on self-contained musical processes.

The brunt of his objections to Marxist approaches to music is that they regarded artworks not as aesthetic objects but as messages to be decoded in the search for the real, non-musical content, a concealed meaning generally implicated in unsavory social power-relations. Thus, according to Dahlhaus, dogmatic Marxism was flawed by a too-eager willingness to arrive at preformed conclusions insufficiently grounded in either the complexity or the aesthetic core of the material under consideration. To be sure, there are important nuances in Dahlhaus's critiques of Marxism—nuances easy to overlook in the tussle of argument. In the essay "Issues in Composition" (also from the crucial year 1974) he laid out his central position in a nutshell:

That there are social implications in the works themselves, in the very conception of the Ring and in the idea of absolute music embodied in the string quartet, cannot seriously be denied, although the prospect of deciphering them is one to daunt any scholar whose ambitions go beyond facile categorizations [such as "bourgeois culture"] on the one hand and the construction, on the other, of merely verbal analogies, analogies which rest exclusively on the words and not on the matters that they are supposed to represent. . . . [Those more interested in the compositional surface of music will admit that] the aesthetic and technical terms of reference are inadequate in their exclusiveness but they are equally essential, as a first stage that must on no account be skipped over.38

Dahlhaus's main writings of the 1974–82 period are bathed in this politically charged light [whereas his more practically oriented work of the 1980s, much of it still untranslated, seems more an enjoyment of the pleasures of an expanded "normal science" once the methodological battle had been won]. His concern for establishing autonomy, the work, and the separateness from everyday life of the category of "neo-romanticism," especially in Between Romanticism and Modernism (1974) and The Idea of Absolute Music (1978), upheld categories that orthodox Marxists [and some neo-Marxists] have viewed with suspicion. Yet, Dahlhaus's Realism in Nineteenth-Century Music (1982), probably intended as a counter-punch to the one delivered in Absolute Music, cast a cold eye on one of the central categories of classical Marxist aesthetics. Its attempt to keep most mid- and late-nineteenth-century music away from the category of realism placed that music still one further remove away from standard Marxist approaches. [Dahlhaus had in mind here such things as official, state Marxism and the literary criticism, for example, of Lukács.]

However explicit and unshakable Dahlhaus's aversion to orthodox or actively committed Marxists might have been, his relation to the work of Adorno, a highly unorthodox "Western Marxist," was more complex—and more interesting. Dahlhaus always considered Adorno a special case within his Marxist discussions, and he always treated him with the seriousness due a figure not so easily dismissed. It is probably no exaggeration to say that Dahlhaus's work is haunted by the specter of Adorno, the dominant musico-philosophical figure of the 1950–70 period, but an outsider to the institution of German musicology and its traditional concerns of empirical research. In his own writings Dahlhaus gives us the impression of a marked ambivalence toward Adorno, of a struggling simultaneously to appropriate and to wrestle free from certain of the latter's key ideas. (At times this approaches a near-perfect illustration of Bloom's "anxiety of influence.") Dahlhaus knew Adorno personally before the latter's death in 1969, and from all indications Adorno had admired Dahlhaus's early work, just as Dahlhaus had absorbed Adorno's musical writings, particularly the Philosophie der neuen Musik (1949), which had made a strong impression in West Germany in the 1950s, and such other works as the Versuch über Wagner (1952), Mahler: Eine musikalische
Physiognomik (1960), and various essay collections. While Dahlhaus's writings from 1967 to 1973 by no means embrace Adorno's ideas directly—indeed, as the first page of Richard Wagner's Music Dramas (1971) suggests, they aim instead for a highly cautious distancing—one also finds in this period Dahlhaus's most magnanimous tributes to Adorno. Thus, from 1970:

Great philosophers seldom understood anything about music beyond the level of general bourgeois education. On the other hand, musicians were rarely philosophers. And that was just what made such a deep impression on our generation. And therefore in my view Adorno's importance . . . lies in large part in that he established a [new, higher] standard level on which one can write about music. . . .

If in recent years musicology may claim some prestige within the circles of the literary intellectuals, we may in no small part thank Adorno for this, who from outside the field of musicology is counted as one of the musicologists, although both they and he agreed that he was not.39

Similarly, in the early 1970s, when the leftist question was prominent in the West German academies, Dahlhaus defended Adorno against charges from the more radical left of elitism, idealism, and petty-bourgeois thought. This was a period when Dahlhaus was distinguishing between different types of leftist or materialist thought, that is, between what he judged to be a responsible left whose thinking was carried out at a properly elevated level, with which Adorno could be identified, and a dogmatic left whose argumentation (often grounded, according to Dahlhaus, in a second-hand Adornian or Frankfurt School language that had become mere, unreflective jargon) he found maliciously skeptical, overly simple, and, “injured through fanaticism,” ever seeking hidden agendas in that which it investigated.40

But, from about 1973 or 1974 onward, most of Dahlhaus’s references to Adorno took more pointed issue with him. One way of understanding the subsequent Dahlhaus Project would be to perceive it as the building of a counterproject to that of Adorno that would attempt to dispense with certain sociological or “totalistic” aspects central to the latter’s thought. The issue here goes beyond the schematic base-superstructure model, for Adorno, too [along with most mid-century Western Marxists], rejected it as a naive concept, a “strait-jacket” inapplicable to sophisticated social analysis.41 Consequently, many of Dahlhaus’s most pointed anti-Marxist arguments in the Foundations, however applicable they might be to others, cannot be read as aimed seriously at Adorno. Far more tellingly, however, Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s celebrated concept of the dialectic of enlightenment42 is conspicuous by its absence in Dahlhaus, whereas it served as something of a first postulate for the post-Adornian Critical Theorists of the 1970s and 80s. However much it occasionally seems to lurk around the edges in Dahlhaus’s work, the dialectic of enlightenment, for all practical purposes, is a banished concept whose very mention [even for purposes of rejection] is prohibited.43 The taboo here seems very nearly complete.

The aim would appear to be to send into ideological exile the central Critical-Theory axiom that claims to connect post-Enlightenment artworks with the social conditions that produced them and asks us to consider the simultaneously negative side of the presumed advances of art. [In the often-quoted words of Benjamin, whose thought would be developed by Horkheimer and Adorno, “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”44] Dahlhaus’s banishing of such ideas could not be more significant or more central to his strategy of concentrating on the inner workings and problems of “strong” works of art. Similarly missing from or muted in Dahlhaus’s discussion of the “great works” [although similar considerations do appear in Dahlhaus’s discussions of disputable works and Trivialmusik] are Adorno’s attractions to the growth of an insidious instrumental rationality [Weber’s Zweckrationalität; but cf. FMH, pp. 129–30, NCM, pp. 331, 368] with its links to the culture industry [cf. FMH, p. 144, “the mercantile nature of music,” and NCM, p. 314, “a process of commercialization or industrialization”] and to such standard Marxist-based categories as ideology critique, reification, social totality, the commodity-function of bourgeois art [NCM, p. 314], and so on.
Yet, Dahlhaus clearly appropriated other aspects of Adorno’s thought, especially those that engaged practical musical problems. But he consistently adapted these ideas under more purely work-immanent or nonsociological categories; he employed them more formalistically, without accepting their sociological vocabulary, and without modulating into their Western-Marxist key. It seems likely, for example, that Dahlhaus’s insistence on the autonomy of “the strong concept of art” is rooted in Adorno’s controversial embrace of autonomy as the positive sign of individuation: art both as resistance (a withdrawal or hibernation in bad times) and as a precipher of a future (if only imagined) redemptive social condition. Although by the early 1970s this aspect of Adorno had come to seem outdated and insufficiently activist to the New Left, Dahlhaus would nonetheless recast the hotly disputed concept in even more specifically technical terms and bolster the idea of autonomy by collecting specific eighteenth- and nineteenth-century considerations of “absolute music”; by arguing that the mapping of any broad sociological context onto the music itself was merely speculative or too wide of its central aesthetic point (FMH, pp. 29–31, 113–14); and by appealing to Roman Ingarden’s phenomenological theories of the “intentional” artwork.

Three other phrases of Adorno ring throughout Dahlhaus’s writing: the concept of the “tendency of the material” (originally expounded in Philosophie der neuen Musik,) which sometimes also surfaces as Schoenberg’s closely related “thesis, that to avoid inconsistency music must be developed equally in all dimensions”; the notion that even autonomous music is “historical through and through” (FMH, pp. 7–8, 61–62, 70, 98; NCM, p. 323); and the claim that musical forms—even in absolute music—are to be regarded as “sedimented content.” In each case, however, Dahlhaus seizes upon the originally sociological concept and restricts it essentially to a work-immanent sphere concerned with the working-out of technical problems within the material and the genres themselves. According to Adorno, for example, it was an artwork’s “truth content” that was “historical through and through”—the manner in which it refused to cooperate with the social forces in place at the time it was created. But for Dahlhaus, the notion of the historicity of an artwork involves most centrally a work’s dialogue with the aesthetic and concrete technical problems of its epoch. This permits the conclusion that “historicity is not simply a fundamental basis for all musical creations but actually forms their inmost essence” (FMH, p. 61), but restricts the inquiry to the more manageable problems of genre. Dahlhaus’s strategy of Adornian adaptation may be summarized thus: when assessing “art in the strong sense,” the urge to shift into a sociological critique is kept at bay by collapsing the concept of historicity into the category of genre, conceived largely in the sense of the current technical possibilities and problems of the musical material itself (Appendix, no. 7).

Other aspects of Adorno’s thought, too, crop up in Dahlhaus from time to time: the acknowledging of certain types of musical “alienation” in Beethovenian and post-Beethovenian music, an aversion to Trivialmusik, Kitch, and the shallowness of the present-day world; and, as is often remarked, an abiding Germanocentricism (alternately amusing and infuriating, depending on whose interests are being trodden upon), convinced that the true path of musical art lay in the Bach-Beethoven-Schoenberg line, with Beethoven as the central figure—the one perfect moment—after which the synthesis unravels. Dahlhaus may have shared some of these preoccupations with Adorno, but, as always, his goal was to reconstruct them under different, non-Marxist categories. Thus, the often-unstated agenda of Dahlhaus’s writings is this engagement with and defusing of certain musico-philosophical positions of Adorno. But by no means is Dahlhaus to be casually grouped with him. On the contrary, he seems to have wished to be regarded as something of a more practical, less abrasively sociological alternative.

IV

In the intellectual effort required to neutralize the arguments of the Marxists, while still building on certain aspects of Adorno (and without lapsing into a naive positivism), Dahlhaus would build a pluralistic coalition of ideas garnered from a wide variety of non-Marxist
sources and arranged into a hierarchy of relative importance for his own work. Perceiving these sources through Dahlhaus's dense prose and assessing their roles within the hierarchy is both the most essential and the most difficult aspect of confronting his thought. With few exceptions, these sources appear only as a background presence in his writing. They are often unacknowledged or mentioned merely in passing, and it is difficult for those valuing full disclosure in their own work not to conclude on occasion that Dahlhaus wished to cast a veil over some of the ideas most central to his.

Two of the fundamental sources for this "empirical - hermeneutic - phenomenological" constellation were Gadamer and Jauss. (The latter, of course, has been a central figure of the relatively recent "reception aesthetics" of West German literary hermeneutics.) Hardly less important were several others (whose work also figures prominently in that of Gadamer and Jauss): R. G. Collingwood; René Wellek and Austin Warren; the Russian Formalists [Viktor Shklovsky and Boris Eichenbaum]; and Roman Ingarden and the phenomenological theory of the artwork. But, as if to complicate the matter, there also seem to be several other relevant figures — secondary lights in the constellation — relied upon to serve special functions. These include:

1. The Prague structuralists, Felix Vodička and Jan Mukarovsky;
2. Karl Popper (typically uncited) for arguments relating to empirical rigor and scholarly "intersubjectivity";
3. The historian Reinhart Koselleck (also uncited) for examples of "concept history" [Begriffsgeschichte] at its highest levels, along with issues concerning historical time;53
4. Max Weber, not only for the heuristic concept of the ideal type, but also for some distinctions between Verstehen and Erklären (as in chapter 6 of FMH, also indebted to Johann Gustav Droysen and Wilhelm Dilthey) and the difference between "valuation" and "value-relation" [FMH, pp. 90–92], grounded in Weber's postulate of "freedom from value-judgment" (Werturteilsfreiheit);54 and
5. The Annales historians, Fernand Braudel and others, in order to embrace the possibility of tilting when convenient toward a structural history that need not be conceived within a Marxist framework.55

One of the central constituents of the constellation was Gadamer's Truth and Method [TM] of 1960. Notwithstanding some rather puzzling "difficulties" that Dahlhaus claims to have found in it in Foundations,56 it is a pervasive, guiding force, a "starting point" throughout his mature work (especially that of the mid-1970s), one that he absorbed "so as not to fall behind" [FMH, p. 58] in some of the methodological disputes that he had confronted in the pre-Foundations period.

Gadamer's magnum opus, which has thus far seen five German editions and two English ones, provided the impetus for a pronounced revival of literary and historical hermeneutics.57 As Jauss put it, the central problem of hermeneutics is to confront the difficulty of "comprehending the historical distance between the alien horizon of the text and the horizon of the interpreter."58 Most notably, Gadamer called into question all modes of inquiry that either overlooked the subjectivity of the observer (as with the positivist approaches that believed in the objective exactitude of their results) or claimed to be able to bracket out subjective or present interests in confronting the past (as with the naive "historicism" and the varying forms of Geistesgeschichte indebted to Dilthey). On the contrary, Gadamer is convinced that "real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity" [TM, p. 299]. He consequently embraces the fully conscious "presentness" (and prejudices) of the observer and insists that all historical understanding, whether one realizes it or not, is best described as a "fusion of horizons" [a mediation between the horizon of our present and that of the text's past, as described, for instance, in TM, pp. 306–07] through a complex process of question-and-answer. For this reason any pretense of historical objectivism is a misguided fiction — not even of heuristic value — that "resembles statistics, which are such excellent means of propaganda because they let the 'facts' speak and hence simulate an objectivity that in reality depends on the legitimacy of the questions asked...[More properly, we must realize that] historically effected consciousness...is already effectual in finding the right questions to ask" [TM, p. 301].
The mature Dahlhaus similarly, and repeatedly, distanced himself from the claim to positivist neutrality along Gadamerian lines: “Objectivity will be forever beyond the reach of those who believe that historical facts speak for themselves without first being made articulate by questions involving some measure of subjectivity on the part of the historian” [FMH, p. 87]; or (rejecting the dictum of the nineteenth-century historian Ranke, who strove to reconstruct historical reality “wie es eigentlich gewesen war”): “Music historiography is incapable of reconstructing the way things really were” [NCM, p. 3; cf. FMH, p. 34]. It is precisely on these grounds that the Dahlhaus of the mid-1970s intended to update traditional musicology.

Still, even this assertion demands nuancing: Dahlhaus is no mere Gadamerian disciple [Appendix, no. 4]. Despite the undeniable impact of Gadamer on the mature Dahlhaus’s methodological thought, there remains in the latter a confidence in practical, empirical investigation, in the techniques of traditional Musikwissenschaft, in which he had been thoroughly grounded in the 1950s and early 1960s [Appendix, no. 2]. Perhaps the most accurate statement would be that Dahlhaus blends Gadamer’s hermeneutics with principles and interests that might be most readily associated (should one be seeking an elaborated epistemology) with Popper’s critical rationalism. For example, while postulating individual subjectivity along with Gadamer, Dahlhaus wrestles free from the accusation of the relativism of all knowledge by appealing, in an extraordinarily blended passage of Foundations, to Popper’s (and Weber’s) notion of intersubjectivity [FMH, p. 89]. According to this concept, a self-critiquing body of scholars can minimize the effects of personal bias through the process of a rigorous, continual testing that seeks to falsify each others’ hypotheses. An important corollary of the idea is that, to be considered scientific, a hypothesis must not be “immunized” against refutation; rather, it must be proposed in terms that permit and encourage one’s colleagues in the “friendly-hostile” scientific community to submit it to the test of falsifiability. Or, as Dahlhaus put it, “value-relations must pass the muster of empiricism” [FMH, p. 89].

Dahlhaus’s blend of Gadamer and empirical thinking is a separable mixture, not a compound, and it is variably mixed to suit the problem at hand. This blending remains one of the most elusive features of Dahlhaus’s thought, and occasionally it leads to seemingly contradictory assertions with regard to the problem of “objectivity.” This is particularly noticeable when comparing the earlier (and presumably less Gadamerian) with the later Dahlhaus and might help to explain the earlier Dahlhaus’s maestoso fanfares in the directions of objectivity and “the historian’s detachment,” as in the opening of the 1971 Richard Wagner’s Music Dramas [quoted in section II above], which for polemical and practical reasons lays claim to an objectivity that Gadamer would dispute. Notwithstanding a few impatient lapses into this default position in the more mature work, the Dahlhaus of the later 1970s usually took pains to distance himself from such claims.

Related to the notion of the historian’s subjectivity is Gadamer’s idea [drawing on Hegel and, above all, on Droysen] that past artifacts or texts continue to exist as part of our present. So crucial was this idea to Dahlhaus that he employed it as the initial gambit of both Foundations and Nineteenth-Century Music. A passage like the following, therefore, may be recognized as a Gadamer paraphrase: [FMH, p. 5; cf. FMH, p. 63].

In like manner, Dahlhaus’s autumnal [Brahmsian?] conclusion in the fifth chapter of Foundations [pp. 70–71; see n. 31], a glowing peroration that urges a resigned, aesthetic contemplation of a meaningful past forever beyond our grasp and receding ever more rapidly—history as aesthetic—seems inconceivable without the precedent of Truth and Method. [FMH, p. 5; cf. FMH, p. 63].
Similarly, Gadamerian is Dahlhaus's insistence on the importance of working within an established tradition: this includes the acknowledgement of the positive presence of both a Wirkungsgeschichte (or history of effects of individual works) leading directly into our hands, and a canon of facts and works given to us, which we are not at liberty to ignore. \(\text{FMH, pp. 53–71 and, especially, pp. 89–97 provide a spirited defense of a traditional canon along with a critique of those who believe that it can be easily altered or dispensed with.}\) “Historians do not compile [tradition] so much as encounter it” (p. 97), writes Dahlhaus: “To put it bluntly, judgments are made with reference less to actual things than to earlier judgments” (p. 92), and so on. Such remarks recall Gadamer's Droysen-guided insistence that we are all “situated within traditions” \(\text{TM, p. 276; cf. pp. 215–18,}\) along with his defense of tradition’s authority:

That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that the authority of what has been handed down to us—and not just what is clearly grounded—always has power over our attitudes and behavior. All education depends on this \(\text{TM, p. 280.}\)

This is precisely the aspect of Gadamer that much of the German committed left has found so controversial. One suspects it will be equally controversial in Dahlhaus, particularly among those wishing to open up or overturn the “elitist” canon in favor of a looser, more inclusive collection of works grounded in less gendered or Eurocentric norms.

Both Gadamer and Dahlhaus stress that tradition is primarily transmitted through the process of Bildung (character-formation through education). Quoting Hegel, the former writes that "philosophy [and, we may add, the human sciences, Geisteswissenschaften] "has, in Bildung, the condition of its existence." [TM, p. 12]. More simply, without the conscious cultivation of ourselves toward the true or the beautiful, those ideals will cease to exist. Identifying Bildung as one of the "guiding concepts of humanism," Gadamer had introduced it early on in his own book \(\text{TM, pp. 9–19.}\) In Dahlhaus, the term surfaces as the condition required to perceive "strong" artworks conceived under the principle of autonomy \(\text{FMH, pp. 146–50, and NCM passim; note especially the concept of Bildungsbürgertum.}\). Thus, the central category of nineteenth-century choral music was Bildung \(\text{NCM, pp. 160–68,}\) and one often finds in Dahlhaus’s writing such remarks as “In the history of reception, the correlate to the nineteenth-century idea of chamber music is musical education, or Bildung” \(\text{NCM, p. 259.}\)

Equally important was Gadamer’s extensive review of the past hermeneutic and philosophical traditions, especially the issues raised by such nineteenth-century historians as Droysen with his hermeneutic critique of Ranke’s presumed objectivism. Thus, when Dahlhaus informs us that his own \text{Foundations} \(\text{has Droysen’s Historik [1857] as its closest model (FMH, p. 1)}\) the English-language reader unfamiliar with Gadamer or Jauss is likely to miss the point: there was something of a Droysen-revival among the hermeneuticists in the 1960s, and invoking him served, among other things, as a declaration of sympathy with modern hermeneutics (and as a rejection, therefore, of the advocates of politicized ideology critique, for whom Droysen was an irrelevant figure). Indeed, Dahlhaus’s frequent returns to certain nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German historians and sociologists to help explicate a point, along with his “deep-sinking” into and close explications of individual texts recovered from the past, recalls both the procedures and often the specific discussions of both Gadamer and Jauss.

This is particularly evident in the importance that Dahlhaus gives to Collingwood’s \text{An Autobiography} of 1939, the book whose question-and-answer model was pivotal for Gadamer as well. This model was grounded in sympathetic openness to the past, not in suspicious interrogation or cross-examination (see for example, \text{FMH, pp. 72–74, clearly based on Gadamer; cf. Appendix, no. 5}). Although it cannot be demonstrated that Dahlhaus discovered Collingwood through Gadamer, both cite or paraphrase Collingwood’s central dictum with approval (one of Collingwood’s versions: “you cannot tell what a proposition means un-

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less you know what question it is meant to answer" [cf. FMH, p. 153; TM, pp. 370–72]. And when, for example, Dahlhaus concludes his discussion of Beethoven’s late style [NCM, p. 88] by telling us that Beethoven’s mastery—"the great synthesis—"turn out to be solutions to problems . . . [each of which] differs from the next" and thus concludes that Beethoven’s contribution to musical structure is the realization of this “problematical” concept of form [NCM, p. 34], we should understand that Collingwood [and hence, probably, Gadamer] lies behind the thought. For Dahlhaus, therefore,

[It is part of the nature of] major works of art . . . to make problems manifest rather than concealing them in artifices, a sure sign of mediocrity. . . . The life of compositional history is to be found less in its actual results than in its problems and utopias (NCM, pp. 292–93).

Collingwood’s summary of his notion of history could stand as an epigraph for both Gadamer’s hermeneutic and Dahlhaus’s historical enterprise:

History conceived as a search for the proper questions] was no longer a ‘closed’ subject. It was no longer a body of facts which a very, very learned man might know, or a very, very big book enumerate, in their completeness. It was an ‘open’ subject, an inexhaustible fountain of problems, old problems re-opened and new problems formulated that had not been formulated until now. Above all, it was a constant warfare against the dogmas, often positively erroneous, and always vicious in so far as they were dogmatic, of that putrefying corpse of historical thought, the ‘information’ to be found in text-books. For in the history of philosophy, as in every other kind, nothing capable of being learnt by heart, nothing capable of being memorized, is history. . . . [History] is not a thing to look at, it is a thing to live in.67

The Dahlhaus-Jauss relationship may be even more significant, although in a more complicated way. Both began in the 1960s and early 1970s to build hermeneutic, Gadamerian-grounded systems that addressed more practical, specific questions within their respective disciplines (music history and literary history). Both relied on the same theoretical resources but weighted them differently. Because Jauss’s writings are broader, chronologically prior, and conceptually more complex than Dahlhaus’s and because the terminological connections and modes of argument between the two are too close to dismiss as coincidence, one cannot escape the impression that much of Dahlhaus’s thought was derived from Jauss. In short, a close reading of the earlier Jauss [1965–75] covers much of the same theoretical-methodological ground that we also find [albeit simplified] in Dahlhaus.68

Jauss’s famous inaugural lecture at the University of Constance [1967], for instance, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory” [hereafter “LH”],69 seems to have left a deep impression on Dahlhaus’s work in the middle and late 1970s. Dahlhaus probably encountered it in one of its originally published versions, perhaps in the third, revised version as printed in Jauss’s 1970 collection of essays, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation.70 Even a casual reading of Jauss reveals the link to Dahlhaus’s Foundations. As Dahlhaus would also do, Jauss begins with the pronouncement of a methodological crisis:

In our time literary history has increasingly fallen into disrepute, and not at all without reason. The history of this worthy discipline in the last one hundred and fifty years unmistakably describes the path of a steady decline (“LH,” p. 3).

The analogue in Dahlhaus’s initial chapter, “Is History on the Decline?” (“Verlust der Geschichte?”), is the opening sentence, “For several decades now historians have felt threatened by a loss of interest in history, even believing at times that their existence as an institution is in jeopardy” [FMH, p. 3].71

Jauss then proceeds to submit traditionally historical, then Marxist, then Russian-Formalist solutions to the problem to a trenchant critique before outlining a set of theses for a Rezeptionsästhetik. Early on, in note 2 (“LH,” p. 191), Jauss provides a quotation from Wellek’s and Warren’s Theory of Literature [3rd edn., hereafter TL],72 outlining the problem that would come to serve as the explicit linchpin of Dahlhaus’s entire historical project: “Most
leading histories of literature are either histories of civilization or collections of critical essays. One type is not a history of art; the other, not a history of art’’ (TL, p. 253). In this passage, which Jauss found in the ‘‘Literary History’’ chapter, the aim of Wellek and Warren was to encourage the writing of such a history based on the internal properties of literary works themselves rather than on biographical information, appeals to the history of ideas, and so on. Down to the italics, Dahlhaus adopted the idea and shaped it into the conclusion of chapter 8 of Foundations, where it follows his nuanced but decisive paean to the Russian formalists:73 ‘‘However, the real problem lies not in disclosing the weaknesses of formalism but in removing them without sacrificing its pivotal methodological idea: how to write an art history that is a history of art’’ (FMH, p. 129; cf. Dahlhaus’s Wellek-and-Warren inspired criticism of prior music histories, FMH, pp. 17, 44–45, etc.). On this idea—which had also appeared earlier, most prominently in the 1974 ‘‘Sociology’’ essay translated in Schoenberg and the New Music, p. 247—he would then construct the entire Nineteenth-Century Music. Here, the remark [again including the italics] re-appears in one of its early credos (NCM, p. 7).

The arguments in Foundations bear a remarkable resemblance to those in Wellek’s and Warren’s once widely read classic. Both books share an anti-Marxist, proformalist stance. And anyone familiar with the main lines of Dahlhaus’s work will experience a repeated ‘‘shock of recognition’’ in reading chapters 12, 17, 18, and 19 of the Theory of Literature, ‘‘The Mode of Existence of a Literary Work of Art’’ [which shows considerable interest in Ingarden, also crucial to Dahlhaus’s defense of musical autonomy], ‘‘Literary Genres,’’ ‘‘Evaluation,’’ and, especially, ‘‘Literary History.’’ This last chapter embraces not only the notion of an inner history of great literature, but also embraces a nuanced methodological pluralism, often identified earlier in the book with the moderate stance dubbed ‘‘perpectivism’’ [TL, pp. 43–44].74

To return to the generative Jauss essay: after citing Wellek and Warren, Jauss proceeds to reject Marxist versions of literary history (‘‘LH,’’ pp. 9–16) on the grounds that society is more complex at any given point than a simple base-superstructure model of it would suggest. A Marxist (or any structural) theory of literature, he argues, could be of value ‘‘only when it no longer insists on the homogeneity of the contemporary in the temporal misrepresentation of a harmonizing arrangement of social conditions and the literary phenomena reflecting them, side by side’’ (‘‘LH,’’ p. 12). Jauss later shores up the point by arguing that ‘‘pure synchrony is illusory’’ [p. 17] and by alluding to ‘‘the actual noncontemporaneity of the contemporaneous’’ [p. 36], a concept that is also a central feature of the work of Reinhart Koselleck, still another important Dahlhaus source.75

In Foundations, Dahlhaus, too, would seize upon this idea: ‘‘The most difficult and intractable problem for structural history, and an almost paralysing one, is the so-called ‘non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous’’ [FMH, p. 141; cf. p. 125 and NCM, p. 351]. From this, and surely also from Koselleck’s key contribution (‘‘History, Histories, and Formal Structures of Time’’) to the Poetik und Hermeneutik Group’s Colloquium in 1970 on Geschichten und Geschichte,76 Dahlhaus would develop the principle of steering clear of ‘‘History’’ on the large scale in order to turn instead toward separate, individual ‘‘histories’’ [FMH, pp. 48, 53, 125]. In other words, Dahlhaus advised that, at least for the present, historians should be wary of grand, totalizing schemes that presuppose a given concept of Geschichte in the singular. Rather, they should be content more modestly to undertake ‘‘empirical studies within a history of a ‘medium’ order of magnitude’’ [FMH, p. 52]. It is for this reason that the manifest plan of Nineteenth-Century Music is the study of differing, but contemporaneous, genres and categories, which we are apparently to understand as clusters of parallel but often conceptually separable Geschichten [Appendix, no. 7].77 But here, however, as is suggested also by a comparison of these ideas with those in note 3, one immediately stumbles on Dahlhausian inconsistencies. Although the study of varying ‘‘histories’’ may be the book’s intended plan, Dahlhaus’s practice not infrequently strays from his theory, that is, he seems most centrally concerned with constructing the ‘‘History’’ of the Germanic institution of auton-
omous music. The other "histories" scattered about Nineteenth-Century Music—French, Italian, "Nationalist," Trivialmusik, and so on—often strike one as claiming little more status than that of obligatory diversions whose primary interest for the author resides not in the specific social and musical preconditions from which they might actually have arisen, but rather in the degree to which they may be understood as opposing, aspiring to, or tilting toward Germanic artistic categories.

When Jauss takes up the issue of the Russian formalists, however ("LH," pp. 16–18), upon whose concepts of defamiliarization and immanent literary history Dahlhaus would ground much of his own historical practice, it is to be initially attracted to their project but ultimately to reject it as too work-immanent. Reshaping the central principle of Wellek and Warren, Jauss insisted that

_to see the work in its history, that is, comprehended within literary history defined as 'the succession of systems,' is however not yet the same as to see the work of art in history, that is, in the historical horizon of its origination, social function, and historical influence. The historicity of literature does not end with the succession of aesthetic-formal systems ("LH," p. 18)._

Hence, his preference for reception history. In another essay from three years later—also central to Dahlhaus—"History of Art and Pragmatic History"78 ("HAPH"), Jauss expanded upon his objections to both the Russian formalists and the more purely phenomenological literary critics. He favored instead the Prague structuralists, Vodička and Mukařovsky ("HAPH," pp. 71–74), who were able to integrate public expectation more clearly into their system: "Prague structuralism has taken up and historicized an approach of Roman Ingarden's phenomenological aesthetics" (p. 73).

Dahlhaus, too, would be impressed with Ingarden's defense of the essential identity of a work of art, but he would employ it only in passing, as part of an elliptical footnote-strategy of things taken-for-granted (as in FMH, p. 6, which does not specifically mention Ingarden, or p. 152, which does).79 But at least for "strong" works of art he would continue to favor the methods of the Russian formalists and their reliance on work-immanence over those of the Prague structuralists (FMH, pp. 154–55). This preference permitted him to stress the more traditional concept of musical autonomy, and apparently for this reason Dahlhaus willingly admitted Jauss's ideas of reception history, social interaction, and the like only to those musical works whose status as art was disputed (Appendix, no. 8).

Here again the essence—and for some the sticking-point—of the Dahlhaus Project comes to seem its unnecessarily rigid affirmation of aesthetic autonomy and the concreteness of the artwork. For Jauss as reception historian, the need to mount an explicit defense of autonomy was less of an issue. It is on this fundamental point that Jauss and Dahlhaus differ most, although many of the other incidentals are the same. And consequently, from the perspective of the 1990s, one must probably conclude that Dahlhaus acknowledged but did not adequately confront two of the central art-critical problems of his time: the concept of artistic production and reception as participating in an "institutional" framework whose social or political goals may be both broader and less overt than the "institution" itself claims; and the collapse of the traditional concept of the stable Kunstwerk into a complex, variable "text."80 For example, despite the widespread perception of Jauss as a covert traditionalist,81 "sociological" critics nonetheless admitted that he opened up central questions about the location of a text. Henry J. Schmidt writes:

_In Gadamer's wake, [Jauss] helped overturn the classical principle of artistic autonomy by demonstrating that readers are affected not by a text alone but also by its reception history.... [By 1977 Gunter Grimm, in his Rezeptionsgeschichte, would be] in a position to assert: "No serious discourse any longer maintains that there is such a thing as a 'text in and of itself.'"82_

On occasion Dahlhaus admitted that the concept of a Kunstwerk was problematic. One such passage may be found in Foundations, p. 35. (Characteristically, it is this multilayering of nuances that makes any summary of Dahlhaus's thought so difficult.) Here, he confessed
that on close inspection it dissolves into a murky mix of sources, authentic texts, compositional intentions, and reception histories. Still, only a page later he readmitted the concept of the work primarily in the phenomenological sense, as "a functional complex of musical meanings," and assigned it a prominent rank within a hierarchy of musical "facts" (FMH, p. 36; cf. Appendix, no. 3). And it can hardly be denied that, for all his awareness of the problem in principle, in practice Dahlhaus usually carried out his historical work, at least in *Nineteenth-Century Music*, as though the concepts of autonomy and the work had not been seriously challenged. As with his consideration of the value judgement (FMH, pp. 85–107), he could consistently fall back upon the position either that autonomy was the object, not necessarily the premise, of his project, or that, in any case, autonomy was no more than what he chose to write about, although others might prefer a more sociological view (FMH, p. 27).

Jauss’s “History of Art and Pragmatic History” (1970) also left clear marks on Dahlhaus’s concept of the problems of narration in music history. The latter’s quotation from Droysen at the opening of *Foundations* (pp. 3–4), for example, had also appeared, along with its almost immediate repetition (as in Dahlhaus), in Jauss’s essay (p. 59). Similarly, *Foundations*, pp. 10–13, concerns itself with the concept of historical continuity in precisely the same terms as those found in Jauss (pp. 55–59, 60–62): the consideration, in order, of Ranke, Droysen, and Arthur C. Danto could not be coincidental. Also included in the same passage of Jauss, and echoed in *Foundations*, pp. 44–47, is a view of nineteenth-century history-writing as based on the narrative techniques also found in the novels of the time. Dahlhaus’s extraordinary suggestion, however, that current histories might consequently be modeled on the techniques of Proust and Joyce may be his own idea, and it is one that helps to explain the often puzzling structures of his own books:

A modern historian who is aware of the literary dimension to his métier does not presume to be an ‘omniscient observer’ recounting ‘the way it really was’; instead he prefers to present an occurrence from several different perspectives that may at times contradict rather than complement one another. Moreover, he is wary of fixed beginnings and ends (FMH, pp. 47–48).

In sum, the more one reads Gadamer, Jauss, and their theoretical sources, the more one understands the conceptual underpinnings of the Dahlhaus Project. Any serious evaluation of Dahlhaus’s work will have to deal with these underpinnings on at least two levels. First, one must inquire to what degree, and how consistently, the mature Dahlhaus was actually guided by them in his practical, historical work. For example, readers of both *Foundations* (which, I think, must be regarded as Dahlhaus’s most significant work) and *Nineteenth-Century Music* can scarcely fail to notice that the practical achievements of the latter sometimes fall short of the aspirations of the former. As I have suggested above, in *Nineteenth-Century Music* this problem is most evident in the omnipresence of Germanic categories, which clearly yearn to produce a “History” (in the singular) in spite of both the overwhelming refractoriness of the material and Dahlhaus’s stated intentions to the contrary. Moreover, the labored “difficulty” of the historical argumentation, along with the unusually high-pitched judgements compulsively concerned to divide “art” from “non-art,” seem to reveal the imperiled nature of the entire project. Working explicitly within the traditional institution of Musik, Dahlhaus’s eleventh-hour attempt to stave off the collapse of the work-immanent integrity of Germanic “great works” seems fully, if grudgingly, aware of its own unfolding in a pluralistic, postmodern, and aesthetically entropic world. The sheer strain surrounding this aspect of his writing speaks eloquently, and in ways that Dahlhaus might not have intended, of the concept of a single-dimensional “History” in tatters.

Second, and on a far broader plane, one would need to assess the adequacy of the theoretical aspects of the Dahlhaus Project to the task at hand. And here, while by no means accepting these aspects in toto, our reactions may be, on balance, more positive: we shall be contending with Dahlhaus the methodologist for decades to come, and we shall doubtless benefit greatly by doing so. The hermeneutic coalition-
building of both Jauss and Dahlhaus does impress in its maneuverability, openness, and adaptability to new data, and, needless to say, it is this collecting and reassembling of disparate sources that accounts for the impression of enormous erudition conveyed by both writers. The procedure inevitably leads to the embracing of eclecticism as a positive principle. For Dahlhaus this became the axiom of “methodological pluralism” [FMH, pp. 116, 122; Appendix, no. 4], a differentiated system whose stability lies in its refraction into interrelated yet conceptually separate subunits. As with any sufficiently differentiated system, the chief advantage is that an error or flaw in one subunit can normally be contained within that portion without spreading to damage the whole. Even multiple surface problems [the occasional factual errors in Dahlhaus’s practical work, some of its “ideal-type” overstatements, and so on] are aspects that are, for us, repairable through the process of intersubjective criticism. These will remain flaws—sometimes serious ones—but they need not lead to what Gossett called “systemic failure.” The general features and tone of Dahlhaus’s methodological system [if system it is] do not stand or fall with the fortunes of any single postulate or conclusion.

But to its more methodologically consistent [monist or “purist”) critics, particularly, but not exclusively, on the committed left, this differentiated pluralism will seem little more than das Prinzip der Prinzipiellenlosigkeit, a tactic to avoid the social implications and half-hidden power transactions of “art in the strong sense”; a flinching from the imperative to drive thoughts to more socially compelling conclusions; a fear of unifying the whole scheme with an overarching sociological idea or “emancipatory” master-narrative. One’s willingness to entertain such criticisms depends upon three factors: a suspicion of the “purely aesthetic” claims of art; a discomfort with a functional differentiation that should lead, at least in principle, to a set of pluralistic “histories” without clear, practical [future-oriented] social goals; and, most important, a prior postulation of an unambiguous view of a sharply differing “History” [in the singular] to which one would like Dahlhaus to conform.

With regard to the third factor, the concept of a coherent “History,” it is far from clear how much longer and in what form any grand, teleological “metanarrative” [to use Jean-François Lyotard’s term] can retain its viability in the postmodern, increasingly fragmented fin de siècle that we have entered, especially in the wake of the social, intellectual, and political upheavals currently taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. Still, it is clear that at some point Dahlhaus defenders will have to confront at least some of the objections that, say, Jaus’s work has already encountered—such criticisms, for instance, as those of Peter Bürger, who, reviewing Jauss’s project, wrote skeptically of a “theory [that] incorporates elements from a variety of disparate scholarly contexts without even questioning whether such components can be conjoined. Here, too, are some reasonable grounds—even apart from ideology—on which the Dahlhaus controversy-to-come might be waged.

NOTES

3Two days after Dahlhaus’s death (13 March 1989), Joachim Kaiser wrote a tribute in the Süddeutscher Zeitung (“Enorm gescheit, gebildet, gerecht: Zum Tode von Carl Dahlhaus, dem großen Musikwissenschaftler,” 15 March 1989, p. 14), that recalled Dahlhaus’s passionate defense of Martin Gregor-Dellin’s Wagner biography, although critics had attacked it as error-laden. According to Kaiser, Dahlhaus responded, with a laugh, that he much preferred books that [whatever their minor [or major!] problems] pursued and accomplished “grand projects.”

Similarly, Dahlhaus praised Giorgio Pestelli’s The Age of Mozart and Beethoven (1979; Engl. trans. Eric Cross [Cambridge, 1984]) on much the same grounds, adding that “it has been quite some time since musicologists have seen as their primary task the exploration of music history not only in its details, but also in the narrative presentation of its broad [inner] connections. In large measure the writing of music history has fallen into the hands either of authors of [encyclopedic] books of facts [Sachbuchautoren] or of amateurs.” Mozart-Jahrbuch 1986 [Kassel, 1987], p. 228. It is obvious that Dahlhaus conceived his Nineteenth-Century Music not as a Sachbuch [its overlooked factual errors and distortions are its weakest aspect by any stan-
dard) but as a quasi-narrative “grand-project” history in the above sense.


Dahlhaus seems to have intersected actively with little French thought (beyond Lévi-Strauss) of the 1960s and 70s. One senses no impact on Dahlhaus from Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, Baudrillard, and so on. Did he ignore these figures? His citation of a single (and scarcely incisive) line from Barthes’s Le Plaisir du texte in his 1975 essay “Avantage und Popularität” — trans. Derrick Puffet and Alfred Clayton in Schoenberg and the New Music (Cambridge, 1987), p. 24 [hereafter SNM] — seems the odd exception that proves the rule. Moreover, he seems not to have engaged much post-1975 European or American thought. In other words, Dahlhaus’s system seems to have been in place by 1975–77, after which he pursued its implications [and carried out the research necessary both to shore it up and to demonstrate its effectiveness] rather than expanding it further. The key methodological issues that he faced belong to a period whose immediate concerns have to some extent been superseded by postmodernist complications and other voices.

10 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery [Logik der Forschung, 1934–35] (New York, 1959), which challenged the concept of induction as the basis of science, and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [1962] (2nd edn. Chicago, 1970) are probably the best known of these books to non-specialists. Aspects of both books are echoed in Dahlhaus’s work [e.g., Kuhn’s concept of shifting paradigms under which normal science is carried out seems related to Dahlhaus’s historical paradigms, FMH, pp. 20–23, 74–75; see also Appendix, no. 5].

General discussions of the mid-century crisis in science and in the concept of objective knowledge are widely available. Two that I have found particularly helpful are Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia, 1983), and Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (New Haven, 1985). Needless to say, the crisis of the collapse of positivism and scientific certainty goes back further than mid-century (one thinks, e.g., of the work of Werner Heisenberg, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Charles Sanders Peirce), and it has continued, even more radically, into the 1970s and 80s with the writings of Paul Feyerabend and others.


12 The essential documents are collected in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology [1969], ed. Theodor W. Adorno, Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London, 1976). David Frisby’s “Introduction to the English Translation” (pp. ix–xlii) provides a helpful overview.

13 Its fortunes were intertwined with, among other things, the 1974 resignation in scandal of Willy Brandt as well as with the growing shift in public opinion against the increase of terrorism in Germany, widely identified with positions held by the left. For one overview (from the left) of the major socio-political events of the 1967–78 period, see Karl Heinz Bohrer, “The Three Cultures,” in Observations on The Spiritual Situation of the Age [1979], ed. Jürgen Habermas, trans. Andrew Buchwalter (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 125–55. Compare Peter Uwe Hohendahl, The Institution of Criticism, trans. Henry J. Schmidt et al. (Ithaca, 1982), p. 41: “By 1974 it was clear that the cultural revolution of the New Left had failed. . . . With unrestrained glee major feuilleton critics stressed that literature had returned to its normal function, implying that criticism would also resume its traditional role.”


15 Compare Hans Robert Jauss, “The Literary Process of Modernism from Rousseau to Adorno” [1983], trans. Lisa C. Roetzell, Cultural Critique 11 [1988–89], 34. Referring specifically to Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment [see n. 42] and Adorno’s Minima Moralia, Jauss writes: “Both [of these works] had an impact upon modernization [in the 1960s] that can only be compared to that [on the eighteenth century] of both of Rousseau’s Discourses.”


17 The highly politicized early 1970s also saw a few other prominent methodological disputes in which neo- or post-Marxism, or its critical-theory variants, was pitted against various perceived adversaries: these include, most notably, the Habermas-Gadamer debate and the Habermas-Luhmann [systems-theory] debate. For the former, see Martin Jay, “Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn? Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate,” in Fin-de-siècle Socialism and Other Essays [New York, 1988], pp. 17–36, and Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism, passim. For the latter, see the bibliography in Adorno, The Positivist Dispute, p. xxxi, n. 70; and the discussion in Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore, “Translators’ Introduction,” in Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society [1971–77] [New York, 1982] pp. xxix–xxxii.

18 Hohendahl, A History of German Literary Criticism, p. 3.


20 ibid., p. 6.


22 Hohendahl, The Institution of Criticism, pp. 11–12: “During these years of turmoil [1970–77] there was no agreement on the task of criticism and especially not on the method and function of aesthetic evaluation. For a
number of years the crisis was so severe that the system itself appeared beyond repair. During the first half of the 1970s it was almost impossible for the critical observer to follow traditional paths of literary criticism and write just another scholarly book or concentrate critically on the latest novel or play. It would have been a problematical pretense to insist on perpetuating the tradition of the discipline. Academic critics were literally besieged when students protested against conventional literary studies and occupied the seminar rooms and libraries."

For example, present histories of music are accused of being little more than "a mere encyclopaedic patchwork quilt pieced together from bits of biography, intellectual history, and the history of genres and institutions" [FMH, p. 122].

"Rudolf Stephan, "Carl Dahlhaus (1928-1989)." Die Musikforschung 42 (1989), 203-06: "The decisive impulses for [Dahlhaus's] intellectual and professional [wissenschaftliche] development came from books that emerged outside the established work of the profession and that, more importantly, contradicted the ruling opinions of the time, or, at least, kept their distance from them" [p. 204, translation mine]. Writing for musicologists, Stephan goes on to refer to Adorno's Philosophie der neuen Musik—presumably as an extra-musicological source.

Peter Bürger, "Literary Criticism in Germany Today," in Observations, pp. 207-10. Perhaps needless to say, the issues involved are more complex than any isolated charge from one side or the other might suggest. See also, e.g., Jaus's own description of the ideological struggles of the 1965-75 period in Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics [1977], trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis, 1982), pp. xxx–xl, and cf. the introduction by Wlad Godzich, pp. vii–xxiv.

This point was developed in a series of conversations with Sanna Pederson after reading her unpublished paper, "The Task of the Music Historian; or, The Myth of the Symphony after Beethoven," which focused on this issue.


For a summary of the issues involved, see [from the perspective of the left] John Torpey, "Introduction: Habermas and the Historians," New German Critique 44 [1988], 5–24 (the entire issue is devoted to the Historikerstreit) and [from the neoconservative perspective], Jerry Z. Muller, "German Historians at War," Commentary 87 [1989], 33–41. Habermas’s position has clearly received more attention in English translation: see Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historian’s Debate, ed. and trans. Sherry Weber Nicholsen [Cambridge, Mass., 1989]; Richard Wolin’s introduction [pp. vii–xxxi] provides yet another overview of the debate.


In Foundations, pp. 67–71, Dahlhaus takes pains to distinguish among "naive traditionalists," "conservatives," and "historacists." Dahlhaus clearly identifies himself with the last group, which "enjoys past things for being past, in a form of recollection that figures as an essential feature of the present moment.... Aestheticising the historical and historicising the aesthetic are opposite sides of the same coin."

32This throwing-down of the gauntlet may be found in SNM, pp. 234–47. See also the related "Avant Garde and Popularity" [1975], SNM, pp. 23–31; and compare these essays with the earlier, and more ambiguous, essay from 1966, but published in 1970, "Progress and the Avant Garde," SNM, pp. 14–22. See also the introduction to Realism in Nineteenth-Century Music [1982], trans. Mary Whittall [Cambridge, 1985], pp. 1–10; and "A Rejection of Material Thinking" [1984]. SNM, pp. 274–87. Although the subject needs more investigation, it appears that Dahlhaus’s most emphatic anti-Marxist polemics began in earnest around 1973 or 1974. This would be the nearly precise moment when the New Left was perceiving itself as having lost the day (see also n. 40 below).

As current neo- and post-Marxists are likely to point out, Dahlhaus’s anti-Marxist arguments throughout his writings presuppose, and then reject, a rather inflexibly formulated set of pro-Marxist positions. For an introduction to the complexity of the issues at stake in more sophisticated base-superstructure positions, see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature [Oxford, 1977], pp. 75–107.


Dahlhaus, "Nationalism and Music," in Between Romanticism and Modernism, p. 79.

Especially crucial for Dahlhaus was the famous letter of Engels to Hans Starkenburg, 25 January 1894. See, e.g., Dahlhaus, "The Work of Art as a Subject of Sociology," SNM, pp. 241, 297; cf. FMH, p. 108.


The concept was developed in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment [1944], trans. John Cumming (rpt. New York, 1988). "The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world, the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy" (p. 3). Yet, the Enlightenment program contained a regressive moment that, in fact, led to the "self-destruction" (p. xiii) that is Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s main thesis. "Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their power" (p. 9); and "On the one hand the growth of economic productivity furnishes the conditions for a world of greater justice; on the other hand it allows the technical apparatus and the social groups which administer it a disproportionate superiority to the rest of the population. The individual is wholly devalued in relation to the economic powers" (p. xiv).

In short, the process of the liberating of rationality that
would seem to secure our own freedom from myth and prior social systems (Adorno's "individuation") is simultaneously the instrumental rationality (Weber's Zweckrationalität) that leads to trivialization of the self and the rise of bureaucratic control from forces outside our true natures. This thesis seems readily supportable by citing the concerns of early "Romantic" philosophers: Rousseau, Schiller, and so on. Dahlhaus clearly refers to some of this "disenchantment" in his discussion of the loss of naive immediacy in Beethovenian and post-Beethovenian composition [and even in Russian composition: see NCM, pp. 57–64, 81–88], but he refuses to ground this phenomenon socially or, what is more surprising, even to confront what was clearly one of the most influential theses of the 1960s and 70s.


45See, e.g., Zimmermann, "Literary Criticism from 1933 to the Present," in A History of German Literary Criticism, pp. 404–05.

46See also Dahlhaus, "The Musical Work of Art as a Subject of Sociology," pp. 243–44.

47For Dahlhaus's early intersections with Ingarden's work, see the bibliography in Esthetics of Music [1967], trans. William W. Austin [Cambridge, 1982], p. 105, along with the chapter "Toward the Phenomenology of Music," pp. 74–83. In his later writings, such as FMH and NCM, Dahlhaus—problematically—takes Ingarden's conclusions for granted, as when he refers to Ingarden's "starting point," "the identity of the work [of art]" [FMH, p. 152]. Similarly, when Dahlhaus refers in FMH, p. 6, to "the realization of a composer's intention in a concrete work or text," he is appealing essentially to Ingarden. A useful overview of Ingarden's concept of music may be found in Karol Berger, review of Roman Ingarden, The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity [1966], ed. Jean G. Harrell, trans. Adam Czerniawski [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986], Journal of the American Musicological Society 41 (1988), 558–65.


49Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music [1967], p. 92.

50Adorno, Aesthetic Theory [1970], trans. C.Lenhardt [London, 1984], p. 273 ("The truth content of works of art, which ultimately determines their rank, is historical through and through"); cf. pp. 126, 193, 261–63. Although Dahlhaus consistently associates this phrase with Adorno, it probably stems from Nietzsche's collection of posthumously published aphorisms entitled either Unveröffentlichtes aus der Umweltzeitung (1882/83–1888) or Studien aus der Umweltzeitung [sic]: "Was uns ebenso von Kant wie von Plato und Leibniz trennt: wir glauben an das Werden allein auch im Geistigen,—wir sind historisch durch und durch" [Nietzsche's Werke, vol. XIII, Nachgelassene Werke [Leipzig, 1903], p. 10]. For the further sense of the phrase in Nietzsche, see his discussion of history in "The Use and Abuse of History," from Thoughts out of Season [1873–76], and in "Our Virtues," section 224, from Beyond Good and Evil [1886].

51Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp. 7, 202, 209.


54As mentioned in n. 2 above, Gossett's essay treats the concept of the ideal type. For the other useful companion to Dahlhaus's Foundations is Dirk Käsler, "Methodological Writings," Max Weber: An Introduction to His Life and Work [1979], trans. Philippa Hurd [Chicago, 1988], pp. 174–96.

55In "The Music of Carl Dahlhaus: An Exchange" [n. 2 above], the translator of NCM, J. B. Robinson argues, "In the Grundlagen Dahlhaus also declares his allegiance, not to Adorno or the universal historians of the Enlightenment, but to Fernand Braudel and the Annales school of structural historians." This seems overstated and suggests the part for the whole: Dahlhaus is better characterized as declaring his allegiance to no individual system (Appendix, no. 4). In chapter 9 of Foundations, he does look approvingly on some aspects of the Annales school, but, more often than not, these things are qualified and are used as a foil to the Marxist structural historians. Robinson is right to point out the relevance of structural history to Dahlhaus, but, in this case, nuances and proportions are everything. My own view is that for Dahlhaus structural history is an occasionally useful methodological "accent" [FMH, p. 133, cf. "emphasis," p. 83] that might be used cautiously from time to time. Still, however, the [more] fundamental category is not the 'event' but the 'work'" [FMH, p. 132]. The Annales tradition is a secondary (although not negligible) star in a positive constellation dominated by thinkers more central to the Dahlhaus Project.

One may suggest further that, with regard to the issue of the possible existence of structural history, Dahlhaus's thought and methodology might be closer to that of Reinhard Koselleck than to that of the Annales school. Compare, e.g., Dahlhaus's remarks on the impact of historical "chance and whim" as potential spoilers within any rigid system of structural history [FMH, p. 134] with Koselleck's 1968 essay, "Chance as Motivational Trace in Historical Writing," in Futures Past [n. 53 above], pp. 116–29. Moreover, one might note that the work initiated by the historian Werner Conze [one of Koselleck's principal teachers] may provide a clearer, more purely Germanic structural-history path to Dahlhaus: "The Establishment of social-historical research at Heidelberg during the latter 1950s predates the international reception of the Annales historians and of English social history" [Keith Tribe, "Translator's Introduction," in Koselleck, Futures Past, p. ix].
Dahlhaus discusses Gadamer specifically in FMH, pp. 58–60 (one of the most difficult passages of *Foundations*, and a misleading one if read casually) and pp. 63–64. As suggested above, it is characteristic of Dahlhaus to distance himself from an important source, probably to avoid the charge that he is accepting any source uncritically (see Appendix, no. 4). Some of Dahlhaus’s reservations about Gadamer, it should be noted, are intended to make room for common sense, practical work (the appeal to traditional musicology and reasonable standards of objectivity, cf. Appendix, no. 2), and especially for the concepts of musical autonomy, the artwork, and absolute music—postulates that Dahlhaus wishes to hold as central for nineteenth-century music. Upon close inspection, most of the implied criticisms leveled at Gadamer on pp. 59–60 misfire. For a moment the reader wonders whether Dahlhaus understood his source.

The essential project of hermeneutics—the interpretation of texts, particularly within the German tradition begun by Schleiermacher—is presented succinctly in Gadamer, *TM*, Part I, II, 2, D, “Reconstruction and Integration as Hermeneutic Tasks,” pp. 164–69.


I cite Popper here not so much as a direct source for Dahlhaus [although that might have been the case] but as representing the strongest, most optimistic, mid-century articulation of the philosophy of empirical research as it is carried out in practice. This is the tradition of the scientific method, “commensense realism,” and “objective knowledge” risen to philosophical and critical self-awareness. For a useful anthology of these ideas, see *Popper Selections*, ed. David Miller [Princeton, 1985], and for an overview of some of grounds on which they have been recently criticized, see Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* [Cambridge, Mass., 1978], pp. 44–52, 60–61.


Compare Gadamer, *TM*, Part II, II, B, iii, “The Hermeneutic Significance of Temporal Distance,” esp. p. 297: “Temporal distance is not something that must be overcome. . . . In fact the important thing is to recognize temporal distance as a positive and productive condition enabling understanding. It is not a yawning abyss but is filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything handed down presents itself to us.”

For example, *TM*, Part I, II, C, “The Borderline Position of Literature,” p. 163: “All written works have a profound community in that language is what makes the contents meaningful. In this light, when texts are understood by, say, a historian, that is not so very different from their being experienced as art.”


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densed version of Jauss’s essay (equivalent to pp. 168–206 of the version printed in Literaturgeschichte als Provokation) appears in it. Curiously, it is the passages omitted in Warning’s 1975 anthology—the opening four sections of the essay—that seem to have had the deepest effect on Dahlhaus. There can be no question that Dahlhaus confronted the Jauss essay in its earlier, fuller format.

It might be added that Warning’s anthology itself appears to have had an impact on Dahlhaus’s post-1975 work. Some of the authors that it anthologizes (Ingarden, Vodicka, Gadamer, Jauss, and Iser) are among Dahlhaus’s principal conceptual sources. Chapter 10 of Foundations [pp. 150–65] seems largely a response to a few essays in this book [but cf. Dahlhaus’s earlier essay, “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der ‘Rezeptionsgeschichte,’” Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 134 [1973], 636, and two of them, in particular, are singled out: Jauss’s “Racines und Goethes Iphigenie” [FMH, pp. 153, 169; Rezeptionsästhetik, pp. 353–400] and Vodicka’s “Die Konkretisation des literarischen Werks—Zur Problematik der Rezeption von Nerudas Werk” [FMH, pp. 152–54, 171; Rezeptionsästhetik, pp. 84–112].

Compare the opening sentence of the “Vorwort” to Jauss’s collection, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation, p. 7. “Literatur—its history and its study—have recently fallen more and more into discredit.”


Not surprisingly, Wellek and Warren also praised the work of the Russian Formalists—Viktor Shklovsky and others: e.g., TL, pp. 235–36, 242, and cf. p. 261, “Good beginnings [toward this type of history] have already been made, especially in Russia.”

Dahlhaus’s dependence on Wellek and Warren seems incontestable. The only issue, particularly because he did not acknowledge the Wellek-Warren source in either FMH or NCM, is whether he discovered the Theory of Literature, and its pivotal, partially italicized sentence, from Jauss’s essay (which seems most likely) or independently. An earlier edition of the Theorie der Literatur, trans. Edgar and Marlene Lohner, had been published in Germany as early as 1958, but, to my knowledge, Dahlhaus never actually cited the Theory of Literature itself in his own work, although I do not believe there can be any doubt about his acquaintance with it.

Curiously, however, in a pivotal Neue Zeitschrift essay of 1974, “Was ist und wozu studiert man Musikgeschichte?” [pp. 79–84, cf. Jauss’s original title for “Literaturgeschichte als Provokation,” n. 70 above], Dahlhaus laid out the essence of the Jauss/Wellek-Warren argument about historical continuity within literary works, and it is here, so far as I know, that Dahlhaus first used [p. 82] the crucial sentence: “Die eine Art ist keine Geschichte der Kunst, die andere keine Geschichte der Kunst.” Here Dahlhaus did not locate the phrase within the Theory of Literature, but instead referred his readers to a three-page essay by Wellek, “Zur methodischen Aporie einer Rezeptionsgeschichte,” included in Geschichte—Ereignis und Erzählung, ed. Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel [Munich, 1975], pp. 515–17. [see also n. 76.] Interestingly enough, in that essay Wellek had pointedly [and critically!] referred to Jauss’s “Literary History as Challenge.” Thus, the circle (for Dahlhaus) is complete, although for reasons that were doubtless his own, Dahlhaus never seems to have acknowledged in his own work his indebtedness to the Theory of Literature.

See, e.g., Koselleck, “History, Histories, and Formal Structures of Time” [1973], in Futures Past [n. 53 above], pp. 92–104, esp. 94, see also n. 76. The concept may be ultimately traceable to Ernst Bloch’s concept of Ungleichzeiten [nonsynchronisms]. See Bloch, “Non-Synchronism and the Obligation to its Dialectics”; and Anson Rabinbach, “Ernst Bloch’s Heritage of Our Times and Fascism,” New German Critique 11 [1977], 5–38. Compare Huyssen, After the Great Divide, pp. 187, 236. The Jauss-Koselleck sources, of course, are conceptually far closer to Dahlhaus than is that of Bloch.

The proceedings of the Colloquium were published as vol. 3 of the series Poetik und Hermeneutik, Geschichte—Ereignis und Erzählung, ed. Koselleck and Stempel [p. 74 above], see esp. the “Vorwort,” pp. 7–8. Koselleck’s essay, “Geschichte, Geschichten und formale Zeitstrukturen,” may be found on pp. 211–22 [for a translation, see n. 75 above].

One might bear in mind that genre theory is also central to Jauss. As is widely known, Jauss has been one of the foremost genre theorists in the past few decades with his concept [borrowed from Popper] of the “horizon of expectations.” Similarly, some of Dahlhaus’s published work from 1967 to about 1973 revolved around the problem of defining the category of musical genre, a concern that peaked in a lengthy (and important) essay from 1973 that has remained untranslated, “Zur Problematik der musikalischen Gattungen im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Gattungen der Musik in Einzeldarstellungen: Gedenkschrift Leo Schrade, ed. Wulf Arlt, Ernst Lichtheim, and Hans Oesch (Bern, 1973), pp. 840–95. For a wider bibliography of Dahlhaus on genre, see Jeffrey Callberg, “The Rhetoric of Genre: Chopin’s Nocturne in G Minor,” this journal 11 [1988], 238–61.

“Jauss, ‘History of Art and Pragmatic History’ [1970], Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, pp. 46–75. Jauss wrote the essay to be part of the Geschichten und Geschichte Colloquium [see n. 76 above].”

For Dahlhaus and the concept of intentionality, see also the essay “The Musical Work of Art as a Subject of Sociology,” SNM, p. 240, n. 9, which refers (p. 297)—with Dahlhaus’s typical footnote-strategy on this point—to Ingarden. Dahlhaus’s work on Ingarden in the 1960s, e.g., in the 1967 Esthetics of Music, pp. 74–83, also makes the central point, if in less developed and subtle terms [apparent pre-Jauss terms]: “A musical work presents a completed structure. . . . It is intended and ought to be grasped as a whole. . . . Moreover, the expectation of unity in variety belongs to the thing itself, no matter how vague may be this expectation. It belongs to the intentional object, to speak the language of phenomenology” [p. 77].


Critics on the left saw in Jauss’s early work a system that “proposes the category of the reader in order to construct an autonomous history of literature. Like formalism, early
APPENDIX

An Overview of the Dahlhaus Project

Although Dahlhaus’s thought is not easily summarizable, a rough sense of it may be conveyed by the following ten themes. These are not offered as anything new: they merely outline a base of understanding outside of which any reading or discussion of Dahlhaus becomes perilous. I have tried to present them here more or less neutrally, that is, without critique or external comment, and to arrange them in the order of their importance. Each is dependent upon its predecessors: the first few themes are by far the most crucial, and they are the ones most often overlooked in Dahlhaus criticism to date. The bibliographical citations are to Foundations of Music History (FMH) and to Nineteenth-Century Music (NCM).

1. In recent decades the writing of history has become so problematic, that is, its standard methodological postulates have been so challenged on all fronts, that today any responsible music-historical work must thematize these concerns rather than pretending they do not exist. “The problems, it would seem, are labyrinthine and virtually inextricable. There is little an historian can do to avoid falling victim to them other than take them up as a topic” (FMH, p. 85). Consequently, one should be suspicious of any attempt to address issues of music history that, on the one hand, claims to solve problems without simultaneously acknowledging the intricacies of the actual historical/aesthetic issues at stake, or, on the other, uncritically adopts modes of historical narration that have been arraigned as methodologically inadequate.¹

2. The various factions in the dispute over methodology essentially drive toward two extremes, both of which are simplistic and therefore undesirable: naïve objectivism (noncritical forms of positivism/empiricism; the accumulation of data without a clearly articulated, conceptual purpose for doing so) and deep-seated skepticism and suspicion (especially orthodox or "vulgar Marxist"/sociological analyses). Often the opposing positions of differing methodologies seem irreconcilable and undesirable. The practical historian should seek a middle ground. In order to avoid a paralysis brought on by excessive speculation in the absence of concrete practice, the hardest cases are to be confronted and (at least temporarily) resolved first, by the conviction that in practice any historian is inevitably in dialogue with a given historical tradition (and canon) not of his or her own individual devising—one that cannot be ignored or easily altered, and one, therefore, that it is futile to indict (FMH, pp. 92–99)—and, second, by recourse to pragmatism, and especially by the appeal to demonstrably successful results (FMH, pp. 59, 83, 104, 117, 123, 139, 144).

3. The central task of a historian is to determine the proper categories under which to view his or her material. The struggle over differing methodologies boils down to a disagreement about linguistic categories: the controller of the language of historical discourse will control the way music is perceived and interpreted. Analogous to Kantian “regulative ideas” making perception possible, historical categories harness and organize raw “data” and turn them into usable hypotheses or “conceptualised events” called “facts” (FMH, pp. 34–36). (For example, Dahlhaus’s central categories for considering Meyerbeerian grand opera [NCM, pp. 124–34] are “tableau,” “shock,” and “local color.”) Categories (which may apply either to the production or the reception of music) are central to everyone’s perception of music: merely to perceive music is already to subject it to a categorical processing. “Music does not stop at its underlying acoustical substrate; it is the outgrowth of a process of categorical formation, and the categories that take a formative part in musical perception are just as aesthetically ‘real’ when they owe their impact less to a solid foothold in the musical material than to associations accumulated over the years” (NCM, p. 41). Moreover: “The interest of music history attaches mainly to the poetics that underlie a composer’s work” (FMH, p. 37).

4. An adherence to any single methodological system is subject to the double charge of naivete and reductionism. Historians should thus strive to write in such a critically aware tone that their own work cannot be categorized or readily collapsed into the blind acceptance of the tenets of any given system. Nothing is to be embraced or rejected in toto; all po-

³84 Georg Knepler, “Das Prinzip der Prinzipienlosigkeit” [see n. 21]; Knepler’s title is taken from the Grundlagen, p. 195 (FMH, p. 122, “the principle of doing without principles”).
positions taken are to be nuanced, approached with caution and in an openly acknowledged awareness of the arguments of both its supporters and critics. Ultimately, the best methodological solution is an eclecticism [FMH, p. 24] or methodological pluralism [FMH, pp. 116, 122] that, far from being random or scattershot, stresses, accents, or emphasizes the appropriate concern at the appropriate time, while not denying the existence of the other concerns [FMH, pp. 12, 83, 133]. Any methodological pluralism should operate in full knowledge of the riskiness of the procedure: "Obviously, the eclectic approach is fraught with difficulties and contradictions; for the moment, however, it is all we have" [NCM, p. 3; cf. NCM, p. 382].

5. Since the historian must posit an Archimedean point from which to launch a system of inquiry, let it be this: within certain limits and with great caution, one ought at least to begin one's historical work by locating the axioms of the period under investigation [FMH, pp. 12, 74, 112]. This is done by a knowledgeable selection and hermeneutic explication of key texts of the period. Further, these key texts must be approached with the purpose of understanding them sympathetically, not cross-examining them skeptically [FMH, pp. 72–73]. One useful method is to proceed by "following [R.G.] Collingwood's dictum that to understand a text means to apprise oneself of the question it is meant to answer" [FMH, p. 153]. It follows that the differing periods of music history call for strikingly different modes of inquiry [FMH, p. 38]. No single approach does justice to a succession of periods, each of which viewed its own music under different categories: primarily, but not exclusively, functional [pre-Baroque], representational [seventeenth and eighteenth centuries], personal [late eighteenth and nineteenth], structural [much of the twentieth], and, finally, as documentary evidence of social structures [post-1945] [FMH, pp. 20–23, 74–75].

6. For most of the nineteenth century, and particularly within Germanic cultures, the fundamental postulate (category) of the highest form of music was that of the "autonomous artwork" (or simply, the "work"). This was no mere entertainment or universal language of the emotions, as it had been in the eighteenth century, but rather music that claimed "the strong concept of art" [FMH, p. 28; NCM, p. 9]. In short, with Beethoven music made the "claim to be listened to for its own sake" [FMH, p. 12; cf. p. 109], which suggested that, "like a literary or a philosophical text, [it] harbors a meaning which is made manifest but not entirely subsumed in its acoustic presentation" [NCM, p. 10]. Consequently, musical compositions began to be conceived and received as "texts" whose meaning is to be deciphered with "exegetical" interpretations" [NCM, p. 9]. This striving toward an "absolute music" comes to dominate the century's music to the point of forging its main institutions (music analysis, the bourgeois concert, the formation of a canon, and so on). As such it is the principal category under which nineteenth-century music should be viewed, if one is interested in music as art: "The concept 'work,' and not 'event,' is the cornerstone of [nineteenth-century] music history" [FMH, p. 4].

7. Hence the goal of Nineteenth-Century Music is to write a history that stresses the centrality of the concept of autonomy, the self-contained artwork: only this aim does justice to the artwork’s claim to be an aesthetic object instead of bypassing or rejecting that claim in order to decode the work as a mere illustrative document of its age or sociological milieu. Following concepts generated by the Russian Formalists in the 1910s and 20s, the guiding problem to be solved is "how to write an art history that is a history of art" [FMH, p. 129; NCM, p. 7]. Therefore, as a glance at its subchapter headings reveals, Nineteenth-Century Music is organized around two broad groups of ideas. The first is that of genres, their transformations and progressive dissolution in favor of individual statement: "It is precisely in musical genres that we find history in the strong sense of the term: continuity and evolution, the setting and breaking of norms" [NCM, p. 390, cf. p. 393]. The second is the establishing and defending of the proper conceptual categories [cf. no. 3 above; a compact list of the central nineteenth-century categories may be found in FMH, pp. 149–50]. As a matter of principle, Nineteenth-Century Music steers clear of data-assembly or biographical information.

8. The desirability of appealing to social history is a more complex matter. While by no means irrelevant, such an appeal is not central to the undisputed core of autonomous pieces, for which the category of the "work" (which alone addresses their aesthetic aspect) is more telling. These undisputed pieces include [for Dahlhaus] Germanic symphonies and chamber music, symphonic poems, Wagnerian music dramas, and so on. For these works sociological explanations [especially Marxist ones] are to be avoided, or at least minimized, relegated to the position of minor "accents" within an overriding aesthetic and generic-formalist system [FMH, pp. 7, 12, 83, 133]. In other words, for works of art the historian should be more concerned to investigate the composer’s solving of technical problems within ever-collapsing genres, although it is to be understood that such solutions were undertaken within a system underpinned by an implicit or posited metaphysics of music. Social history is to be stressed only for repertories whose status as autonomous "art" cannot be accepted as a given [choral music, most non-Germanic opera, church music, nationalistic music, virtuoso repertories, and so on]. Here, the appeal to such things as the self-definition of classes and social groups, economic systems, reception history, and Bildung [character formation through education] is to be encouraged. Still, by various processes of mediation, compensation, or adoption of certain aesthetic/technical features of the
more undisputed repertories, some of the pieces in these more emphatically social repertories may in fact still manage to qualify as art in the strong sense.

9. The principal task of Nineteenth-Century Music is to trace the progression of genres and certain individual masterworks from one cluster of closely related categories (in which music’s role is para-aesthetic, judged essentially to be an “event” within a normative praxis of life) to another (in which music is essentially an “artwork,” a text worthy of contemplation, sited in what was believed to be a redemptive space removed from the everyday world). The first cluster [associated with Enlightenment and pre-Enlightenment values] interrelates such categories as: event; praxis; function; in-place institutional support (church or court); individual pieces as exemplars of genres; “objective” portrayal of generalized, normative emotions; affect; appeal to “sensibility,” “sentiment,” and psychology; “taste” and adherence to a norm; and so on. The second cluster (“esoteric Romanticism,” NCM, p. 92) includes: “work”/“art”; poesis; functionlessness; autonomy (“absolute” music); uneasy relationship with given institutions (a fleeing from the “mercantile nature of music,” FMH, p. 144); individual genius/personalized expression (“originality” and the gradual dissolution of genres); and empathetic aesthetic grounding (metaphysical basis/music as religion). To write such a history as Nineteenth-Century Music is to ask how individual pieces come to be perceived as “art”; to determine in which order the given genres dissolve or collapse to give way to “art”; to establish criteria to judge whether a given nineteenth-century piece is an “event” (dominated by the lingering or persistence of the first-cluster categories, and hence of marginal importance to a “history of art”) or a “work” (second cluster).

10. When we approach works of music qua music, the issue that unlocks all the others is the historical progression from the concept of form as schema or arrangement—the architectonic or periodic balances and symmetries (both melodic and tonal) characteristic of the Classical style—to a favoring of “musical logic,” the unfolding of motivic ideas in the deep structure of the music, which renders the surface of the music a mere façade overlaying the real processes underneath it. A concern to uncover traces of this musical logic privileges discussions of both “motives” and the interconnections of contiguous phrases. The progression “event”-to-“art” (no. 9 above) is mirrored in the dissolution of periodic syntax (the balancing of foursquare phrases) and architectural schemes. This ultimately leads to the virtually full embrace of nonsymmetrical evolution of motives (for example, what Schoenberg called the “musical prose” and “developing variation” of Brahms), the extreme reluctance to restate anything without varying it, and, in the most advanced cases, to the decisively nonarchitectural concept of form-as-motivic-web [Wagner from Das Rheingold onward].3 Many other genres and pieces, however, lag behind the main line of development, as such their claim to be regarded as “art” is endangered. In deciding this matter, music historians do nothing less than to decide which pieces “belong to history” [FMH, p. 102].

NOTES [APPENDIX]

1Hence Dahlhaus’s criticisms, for example, of aspects of American and British musicological writing; see “The New Grover,” Music & Letters 62 [1981], 249–60; review of Leon Plantinga, Romantic Music [1984], this journal 11 [1987], 194–96; see also Plantinga’s reply, this journal 12 [1988], 190–92.

2English-speaking musicologists and theorists will have little difficulty spotting the influence of Riemann, Reti, and, especially, Schoenberg in Dahlhaus’s motivic approach to analysis, although American Schenkerians will doubtless view this as the weakest aspect of Dahlhaus’s writing on music. [Schenker is mentioned only twice in NCM: pp. 297 [in a discussion of Mussorgsky!]] and 379.] For Dahlhaus on Schenker, however, see Analysis and Value-Judgment [1971], (esp. pp. 8–9, 14, 40, 86–87) and “Schoenberg and Schenker” [1973–74], Schoenberg and the New Music, pp. 134–40.

Perhaps less obvious is the debt that the general conception of no. 10 above owed to Jacques Handschin’s Musikgeschichte im Überblick (Lucerne, 1948). As Dahlhaus admitted in NCM, p. 255, his own concepts of “architectonic” and “logical” form, the central Dahlhausian analytical concerns, were originally suggested by Handschin, and his respect for this book (as well as for other sources) is also alluded to in Rudolf Stephan, “Carl Dahlhaus [1928–1989],” Die Musikforschung 42 [1989], 204. The relevant passages in Handschin are to be found on: pp. 330–31 [in which the Classical concept of “form” is defined as “the forming of periods or, better, the closing of period-structures” which contrasted with Bach’s tendency to “unified ‘Ausspinnung’”], pp. 354–55 [concerned with Beethoven’s departures from the “architectonic” norms of the Classicists, “an asymmetry, through which, however, we still feel the ‘actual’ symmetrical periods which fundamentally underpin it”], and especially p. 367, which contains a passage that Dahlhaus would elevate to the center of his arguments about Wagner: “If in his well-known books Alfred Lorenz undertakes the task of presenting Wagner’s works as model examples of form and construction [Aufbau] on the basis of mere harmonic and tonal correspondences, then I can only say once again: not everything that is form to you is form to me. To me Wagner’s music, as is the case with Bruckner and Reger, is more flow and urgency than form [mehr Fluß und Drang als Form].” See also Dahlhaus, review of rpt. of Handschin, Musikgeschichte im Überblick [Wilhelmshaven, 1981], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 February 1982.